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Articles
PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL ARRESTEE OR SUSPECT: IN
SEARCH OF A RIGHT, IN NEED OF A RULE
SADIQ REZA*
ABSTRACT
Criminal accusation stigmatizes. Merely having been accused of a
crime lasts in the public eye, damaging one's reputation and threat-
ening current and future employment, relationships, social status,
and more. But vast numbers of criminal cases are dismissed soon
after arrest, and countless accusations are unfounded or unprovable.
Nevertheless, police officers and prosecutors routinely name criminal
accusees to the public upon arrest or suspicion, with no obligation to
publicize a defendant's exoneration, or the dismissal of his case, or a
decision not to file charges against him at all. Other individuals
caught up in the criminal process enjoy protections against the public
disclosure of their identities-sexual assault complainants, juvenile
offenders, grand jury targets, and others. The Supreme Court has
endorsed these protections, and also upheld restrictions on the dissem-
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ination of arrest records. All of these protections are grounded in
privacy doctrine-specifically, informational privacy, of common-
law origin. In this Article, Professor Reza argues that the same pri-
vacy right should attach to arrestees and suspects, and government
actors should accordingly be presumptively required to withhold the
identities of arrestees and suspects until a judge or a grand juiy has
found probable cause of guilt, unless an arrestee or suspect requests
otherwise. The argument moves from common-law privacy doctrine
through a cluster of doctrines that are rarely addressed concurrently:
the Supreme Court's government information cases; the common-law
access doctrine; and the First Amendment doctrine of access to the
courts. Professor Reza also offers a sample statute to protect this pri-
vacy right, and explores ramifications of such protection.
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What's in a name?'
My reputation, Iago, my reputation.2
The right of a man to the protection of his own reputation from un-
justified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no more than our basic
concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being-a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.3
INTRODUCTION
Privacy is all the rage. Hardly a day passes without some public
hand-wringing over a hot issue of privacy;' meanwhile, new legislation
to protect "private" information proliferates,5 academic symposia on
privacy abound,6 and the Practising Law Institute has now held the
1. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF ROMEO AND JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, 1. 43 J.A.
Bryant, Jr. ed., Signet Classics 1964).
2. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF OTHELLO, THE MOOR OF VENICE, act 2, sc. 3,
11.. 262-63 (Alvin Kerman ed., Signet Classics 1963).
3. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4. See, e.g., Bill Broadway, When Calls for Prayer Trample Personal Privacy; Disclosing Details
of Members' Health Could Pose Legal Problem for Churches, WASH. POST., Apr. 24, 2004, at B9
(discussing potential liability of churches for disclosing information about the health of
individual members); Bob Davis, The Outlook: As Jobs Move Overseas, So Does Privacy, WALL
ST. J., May 10, 2004, at A2 (suggesting that privacy concerns could inspire opposition to
outsourcing of jobs that involve handling confidential medical and financial records); Edi-
torial, Privacy in Peril, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2004, at A18 (criticizing subpoenas issued to
hospitals by the Justice Department seeking patient records containing information about
abortions for the Department's defense of lawsuits against the Partial Birth Abortion Act of
2003); Howard Pankratz & Steve Lipsher, Bryant Judge Apologizes to Accuser's Kin; Comments in
Court Follow Posting of Alleged Victim's Name on Web, DENV. PosT, Aug. 1, 2004, at C5 (discuss-
ing the third inadvertent disclosure of information about a sexual assault complainant in a
high-profile case and the consequent alleged invasion of the accuser's privacy); Katharine
Q. Seelye & David E. Rosenbaum, Privacy of Wife's Fortune Casts a Shadow Over Kerry, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at A26 (discussing the effect on a presidential candidate of his wife's
desire not to release her tax returns); Megan Yeats, Letter to the Editor, Give the Olsen
Twins Some Privacy, USA TODAY, June 29, 2004, at 12A (criticizing a newspaper for publish-
ing an article about a young television actress's eating disorder).
5. See, e.g., Consumer Privacy Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1262, 109th Cong. (protect-
ing personal information disclosed in commercial transactions); Federal Agency Protec-
tion of Privacy Act of 2005, H.R. 2840, 109th Cong. (requiring federal agencies to consider
the impact on individual privacy when promulgating rules); Personal Information Privacy
Act of 2003, H.R. 1931, 108th Cong. (protecting individuals against unauthorized disclo-
sure and misuse of Social Security numbers and other personal information); Stop Taking
Our Health Privacy (STOHP) Act of 2003, H.R. 1709, 108th Cong. (restoring privacy pro-
tection standards for individually identifiable health information).
6. See, e.g., Enforcing Privacy Rights Symposium, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 751 (2003); Sympo-
sium, Modern Studies in Privacy Law, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1097 (2002); Privacy and the Law: A
Symposium, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1097 (1999); Symposium, Privacy, 68 Soc. REs. 1 (2001);
Symposium, The Effect of Technology on Fourth Amendment Analysis and Individual Rights, 72
Miss. L.J. 213 (2002).
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sixth of its new annual institutes on privacy law.7 Much of the agita-
tion stems from the extraordinary capabilities and perceived dangers
of the computer age,' but scholars of all persuasions are also reassess-
ing the fundamentals of privacy in a growing corpus of recent publica-
tions.9 And the attacks of September 11, 2001 have only fed the
frenzy, with fresh concerns about government surveillance and the
privacy of personal information of various kinds."0 "Informational"
privacy, a species of privacy developed mainly by the common law and
traceable back to the seminal 1890 law review article by Warren and
Brandeis," is the focus of most of this attention, as opposed to the
constitutional right to privacy-the fundamental right of decisional
7. See PRACTISING LAW INST., SIXTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: DATA PROTEC-
TION-THE CONVERGENCE OF PRIVACY & SECURITY (2005); 1 PRACTISING LAW INST., FIFTH
ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: NEW DEVELOPMENTS & COMPLIANCE ISSUES IN A SECUR-
ITY-CONscIOUS WORLD (Intellectual Prop. Course Handbook Series, No. G-788, 2004)
[hereinafter FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE].
8. See, e.g., Symposium, Cyberspace and Privacy: A New Legal Paradigm, 52 STAN. L. REV.
987 (2000); Symposium, Legal Regulation of New Technologies: Protection, Privacy, and Disclo-
sure, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 281 (2002); Symposium, Privacy in Cyberspace, 61
MONT. L. REV. 285 (2000); Symposium on Internet Privacy, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 347 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087 (2001) (distin-
guishing and discussing the concepts of public knowledge, dignity, and freedom as privacy
values); DanielJ. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1088 (2002) (identifying
six general meanings of privacy and proposing a "pragmatic" approach to conceptualizing
privacy); James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures Of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty, 113
YALE L.J. 1151, 1219 (2004) (distinguishing, and discussing as distinct understandings of
privacy, "a European interest in personal dignity, threatened primarily by the mass media"
and "an American interest in liberty, threatened primarily by the government"); see also
AMiTA ETZIONI, THE LIMITS OF PRIVACY (1999);JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE
DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA (2000); Richard A. Epstein, DeconstructingPrivacy: And
Putting It Back Together Again, 17 SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 1 (2000); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking
About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000).
10. See, e.g., FIFTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 7; see also PRACTISING LAW INST.,
FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRIVACY LAW: PROTECTING YOUR CLIENT IN A SECURITY-CON-
SCIOUS WORLD (Intellectual Prop. Course Handbook Series, No. G-748, 2003) [hereinafter
FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE]; PRACTISING LAW INSTITUTE, THIRD ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON PRI-
VACY LAW: NEW DEVELOPMENTS & ISSUES IN A SECURITY-CONSCIOUS WORLD (Intellectual
Prop. Course Handbook Series, No. G-701, 2002); Marc Rotenberg, Foreword, Privacy and
Secrecy After September 11, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1115 (2002); Anne-Marie O'Connor, You're Being
Watched, L.A. TIMES, May 26, 2004, at El (discussing privacy concerns arising from post-
September 11 federal security initiatives); William Satire, Privacy in Retreat, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
10, 2004, at A27 ("[A]fter 9/11 ... [t]he right to be let alone had to be balanced against
the right to stay alive."). But see Heather MacDonald, Editorial, The "Privacy"jihad, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 1, 2004, at A14 (arguing that privacy concerns raised in opposition to post-
September 11 security initiatives are misguided).
11. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193
(1890).
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autonomy-affirmed in cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut 2 and Roe
v. Wade."3 Preventing the dissemination of "personal" information-
information about one's finances, medical conditions, preferences in
movies and books, Internet browsing, credit card purchases, and
more-this is the domain of common-law informational privacy.
In criminal procedure, talk of privacy typically involves yet a third
type of privacy, a constitutional species protected by the Fourth
Amendment's ban on unreasonable searches and seizures and, to a
lesser degree, the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination. Exchanges among eminent criminal procedure schol-
ars illustrate this focus, 4 and a cluster of Supreme Court decisions
from recent years confirms it: privacy in criminal procedure means
the sanctity of the home, 15 the body,' 6 an individual's movement and
personal effects,17 her mind"8-in short, the inviolability of personal
actions and thoughts against unjustified intrusion by the government
12. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding a constitutional right to privacy in the marital rela-
tionship that encompasses the right of married couples to obtain and use contraceptives).
13. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (extending the constitutional right to privacy to include the
qualified right of a woman to terminate her pregnancy).
14. E.g., William J. Stuntz, The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 1265 (1999); Louis Michael Seidman, Making the Best of Fourth Amendment Law: A
Comment on The Distribution of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 67 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1296
(1999); Carol S. Steiker, "How Much Justice Can You Afford?'--A Response to Stuntz, 67 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 1290 (1999); see also WilliamJ. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem and the Law of Criminal
Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1016 (1995) [hereinafter Privacy's Problem]; Louis Michael Seid-
man, Response: The Problems with Privacy's Problem, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1079 (1995); Daniel
Yeager, Does Privacy Really Have a Problem in the Law of Criminal Procedure?, 49 Ru-rGERS L.
REv. 1283 (1997).
15. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34, 40 (2001) (acknowledging searches of the
interior of homes as "the prototypical and hence most commonly litigated area of pro-
tected privacy" under the Fourth Amendment and forbidding the warrantless use of a ther-
mal-imaging device to detect excessive heat, associated with marijuana-growing operations,
emanating from the home); Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 610, 612 (1999) (forbidding
media presence at the execution of a search warrant absent a legitimate law enforcement
purpose because "[t]he Fourth Amendment embodies [a] centuries-old principle of re-
spect for the privacy of the home" and stating that the "importance of the right of residen-
tial privacy [is] at the core of the Fourth Amendment").
16. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 78 (2001) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment prohibits hospitals from sharing the drug-test results of pregnant women with
police without a patient's consent because "[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy en-
joyed by the typical patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of
those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her consent").
17. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001) (deeming warrantless, custo-
dial arrests for minor criminal offenses constitutional so long as the officer has probable
cause and the arrest is "no more harmful to ... privacy or ... physical interests" than any
other arrest (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 818 (1996))); Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338-39 (2000) (holding that the
physical manipulation of personal luggage by law enforcement officers violated a reasona-
bly held expectation of privacy).
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in its efforts to investigate crime and prosecute alleged offenders.
Even humiliation at the hands of law enforcement is considered a
matter of constitutional privacy.' 9
18. United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 691-93 (1998) (discussing the "testimonial
privacy" aspect of the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination but
holding that the privilege is unavailable when based on fear of criminal prosecution by a
foreign government).
19. See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614 (forbidding media presence at the execution of a search
warrant unless the presence aids a legitimate law enforcement purpose); Lauro v. Charles,
219 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that a staged "perp walk" allowing the media to
film a suspect after his arrest violated the arrestee's Fourth Amendment privacy rights
when the action lacked.a legitimate law enforcement purpose).
William Stuntz has characterized the protections of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
as predominantly protections of informational privacy, as opposed to protections against
government coercion, which he argues should be their focus. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem,
supra note 14, at 1020-25, 1068-77; William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Ongins of Criminal
Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 393, 394-95, 43940 (1995). It is certainly true, at least, that the
Fourth Amendment protects one's interest in "keeping information out of the govern-
ment's hands," and this serves as the definition of informational privacy in Professor
Stuntz's formulation. Stuntz, Privacy's Problem, supra note 14, at 1017; id. at 1048 ("The law
of criminal procedure has long sought to protect people's ability to keep secrets, at least
from the government."); see, e.g., Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (finding the government's warrantless
use of a thermal-imaging device to detect excessive heat, emanating from the home and
associated with marijuana growing, as a search forbidden by the Fourth Amendment be-
cause it reveals information about the interior of the home); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347 (1967) (finding the government's warrantless eavesdropping on a conversation in a
phone booth a violation of the Fourth Amendment because of the right to privacy in the
content of the conversation); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002) (finding that a
school drug-testing policy that revealed information gained through the students' urine
tests in addition to the physical intrusion of teachers collecting urine samples implicated
Fourth Amendment privacy interests); cf Hiibel v. SixthJudicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177, 194
(2004) ("[W]e have stated generally that '[i]t is the "extortion of information from the ac-
cused," the attempt to force him "to disclose the contents of his own mind," that implicates
the Self-Incrimination Clause [of the Fifth Amendment].' (emphasis added) (quoting
Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 211 (1988)) (citation omitted by the Court)). Nomen-
clature aside, there is of course a difference between protecting personal information
against unjustified access by the government and protecting it from disclosure to the pub-
lic, the latter of which was the concern of Warren and Brandeis and remains the concern
of common-law informational privacy doctrine. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 195-
96; see also Volokh, supra note 9, at 1054-57, 1102 (focusing on the restrictions placed by
government on information communicated by nongovernmental speakers); cf Solove, Con-
ceptualizing Privacy, supra note 9, at 1110 (characterizing informational-control privacy as a
subset of the limited-access conception of privacy). There also appears to be agreement
among scholars that the Court's protection of even the government-access variety of infor-
mational privacy has receded in constitutional criminal procedure. See Seidman, The
Problems with Privacy's Problem, supra note 14, at 1082, 1086 ("The modern Fifth Amend-
ment is about individual will and freedom of thought, not informational privacy," and
"[m]odern Fourth Amendment law focuses on what might be called the 'collateral dam-
age' imposed by searches and seizures rather than on informational privacy."); Stuntz, Pri-
vacy's Problem, supra note 14, at 1069, 1069-71 (" [P] rivacy has taken a back seat," especially
in the context of police interrogation doctrine.); Daniel J. Solove, The Origins and Growth of
Informational Privacy Law, in FOURTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE, supra note 10, at 67-70 (discussing
the Supreme Court's adoption of a narrower view of what constitutes a reasonable expecta-
760
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But the common-law species of informational privacy, protecting
individuals against embarrassment or other harm from the disclosure
of personal information about them to the public, is no stranger to
criminal proceedings. This privacy concern underlies the combina-
tion of statutory protection and media self-restraint that has long kept
the names of sexual assault victims and complainants from the public
by state laws and media policy.20 Similar concerns, reoriented toward
children, explain the routine exclusion of the public from juvenile
delinquency proceedings, the sealing of juvenile records, and media
policies forbidding the naming of juvenile offenders and accusees.
2'
Common-law privacy interests of adult criminal convicts have also
been endorsed by courts and legal scholars, beginning with an oft-
cited pair of California cases 22 and continuing with recent critiques of
state laws that require the names and addresses of sex offenders to be
publicized. 23 And the same privacy interest is recognized for at least
some adult criminal accusees before they are convicted. The Su-
preme Court has endorsed the notion that a person's privacy interest
in "avoiding disclosure of personal matters" extends to his criminal
record,24 and on this basis the Court has repeatedly and unequivocally
upheld restrictions on public access to arrest records. 25 The Court
has also long recognized a person's interest in preventing disclosure
of the fact of mere criminal suspicion of him: reason number five in
the Court's classic justification of grand jury secrecy is "to protect the
innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been
under investigation, and from the expense of standing trial where there
was no probability of guilt."
2 6
All of these parties to the criminal process-sexual assault vic-
tims, juvenile offenders, arrestees (in their arrest records), and grand
tion of privacy). In any event, for our purposes, informational privacy means the common-
law and statutory concern about the disclosure of personal information to the public.
20. See infra Part I.B.1.
21. See infta Part I.B.2.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 75-101 (discussing Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971), and Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931)).
23. See, e.g., Alan R. Kabat, Note, Scarlet Letter Sex Offender Databases and Community Noti-
fication: Sacrificing Personal Privacy for a Symbol's Sake, 35 Am. CRim. L. REv. 333 (1998) (re-
viewing sex offender registration statutes throughout the United States and suggesting
additional measures to balance the public need for information against the released of-
fenders' privacy interests).
24. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 762 (1989) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977)).
25. See infra Part I.B.5.
26. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 n.6 (1958) (emphasis
added) (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)); see also infra
Part I.B.4.
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jury targets-have a recognized right to keep information about their
involvement in criminal proceedings from the public. For all of these
parties, that right sounds in privacy doctrine, specifically informa-
tional privacy of common-law origin. And for all of them the informa-
tion protected by that privacy right is their identity--i.e., the very fact
of their involvement in the criminal process. It would seem to follow
that a person who is arrested for a crime or suspected of committing
one has a similar right to prevent being publicly named as an arrestee
or suspect. Indeed, the privacy interest of a person accused or sus-
pected of crime-her interest in avoiding the social, professional,
emotional, and other harms that attend being named as a possible
criminal-is arguably most pressing, and the need for protection ac-
cordingly greatest, not in arrest records that the public must seek out,
or upon the relatively infrequent instance of grand jury investigation
prior to arrest, but at the moment when police routinely identify al-
leged wrongdoers to the public: upon arrest, accusation, or initial
suspicion.
That a privacy interest might lie here is not entirely unrecog-
nized; it was in fact one of the arguments the Department of Justice
(DOJ) put forward to justify withholding the names of hundreds of
individuals arrested and detained on immigration charges following
the attacks of September 11, 2001.27 Indeed, every so often a govern-
ment official invokes this interest in not naming an accusee of some
kind; but the interest apparently arises only when officials decide it
should.28 And the Supreme Court as much as invited the states to
acknowledge and protect this interest nearly thirty years ago in Paul v.
Davis.29 In Paul, police had passed out a list of "Active Shoplifters" to
area merchants, and a listed individual who had been arrested for
shoplifting, but against whom the charges were eventually dismissed,
sued on due process grounds for harm to his reputation."' The arres-
tee's interest in protecting his reputation enjoyed no constitutional
protection, the Court said, but that interest was "one of a number [of
27. See infra text accompanying notes 323-328.
28. Compare, e.g., Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, Dogs and Other Harsh Tactics Linked to
Military Intelligence, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2004, at Al (reporting that an Army spokesman,
"citing privacy concerns," declined to identify military intelligence soldiers fined and de-
moted for incidents of abuse at Iraq's Abu Ghraib prison), with, e.g., David Johnston,
Threats and Responses: The Inquiry; U.S. Questions Saudi Friend of Hijackers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2003, at A8 (noting that "government officials" disclosed an FBI interview of a named but
not arrested Saudi Arabian citizen "identified by Congressional investigators" as "a likely
intelligence operative for Riyadh who befriended two of the 9/11 hijackers in California"
before the 9/11 attacks).
29. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
30. Id. at 694-97.
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interests] which the State may protect against injury by virtue of its
tort law."'" But states have not responded to the invitation, and the
notion of such a privacy interest is typically minimized or dismissed in
short order.32 "Surely the rights of those accused of crimes and those
who are their victims must differ with respect to privacy concerns,"
Justice White wrote in 1989, endorsing the practice of shielding the
identities of complainants in sexual assault cases, and "whatever rights
alleged criminals have to maintain their anonymity pending an adju-
dication of guilt ... would seem to be minimal. 33 But the reasoning
behind this assertion remains largely unexplored,34 as does the con-
31. Id. at 712.
32. Justice Brennan provided one notable exception; he argued that, for reasons of
both privacy and due process,
a State cannot broadcast even such factual events as the occurrence of an arrest
that does not culminate in a conviction when there are no legitimate law enforce-
ment justifications for doing so, since the State is chargeable with the knowledge
that many employers will treat an arrest the same as a conviction and deny the
individual employment or other opportunities on the basis of a fact that has no
probative value with respect to actual criminal culpability.
Id. at 735 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A majority of the Court had leaned in this direc-
tion a few years earlier in Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 435-36 (1971), finding
that due process rights were violated by a state statute that authorized police to post a list in
retail liquor outlets, without notice or opportunity to be heard, of the names of those to
whom liquor should not be sold because of their excessive drinking. "Where a person's
good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is
doing to him," the Court stated "notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Id.
at 437. The Court distinguished this ruling in Paul on the ground that the defamation in
Constantineau was combined with the deprivation of a right conferred by state law-the
right to purchase liquor-whereas the complainant in Paul suffered no such deprivation.
Paul, 424 U.S. at 707-09; see also DONALD A. MARCHAND, THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY, COM-
PUTERS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORDS: CONTROLLING THE SOCIAL COSTS OF TECHNOLOGI-
CAL CHANGE (1980) (detailing the "social costs" of computerized arrest records); W. Kent
Davis, Protecting A Criminal Suspect's Right "To Be Let Alone" in the Information Age, 33 GoNZ. L.
REV. 611 (1998) (advocating tort recovery from the government or the media by exoner-
ated suspects who have been publicly named as criminal suspects).
33. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 545 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (dissenting
from the majority ruling forbidding tort recovery from a newspaper for identifying a rape
victim in violation of a state criminal statute).
34. Consider, for instance, the tautology in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n: "It is . . .
generally in the social interest to identify adults currently charged with the commission of
a crime.... [Doing so] may legitimately put others on notice that the named individual is
suspected of having committed a crime." 483 P.2d 34, 39 (Cal. 1971), reu'd on other grounds,
Gates v. Discovery Communications, Inc., 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004). Similarly, in Tennes-
sean Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, a trial court found that disclosing the age, address, and marital
status of arrestees along with other background information about them was required
under the Freedom of Information Act because
individuals who are arrested or indicted become persons in whom the public has
a legitimate interest, and the basic facts which identify them and describe gener-
ally the investigations and their arrests become matters of legitimate public inter-
est. The lives of these individuals are no longer truly private. Since an
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tradiction between that position and the existing privacy protections
for grand jury targets, arrestees with respect to records of their arrest,
and others accused of criminal or quasi-criminal behavior, as we shall
see. Meanwhile, the government's assertion of such a privacy interest
to justify withholding the names of arrestees and other accusees when
it so chooses only confirms the absence of an established right: discre-
tionary withholding decisions by the government do not confer a right
of anonymity for arrestees and suspects, of course, any more than they
create a rule that governs when and how that right operates.35
Such a right, and a rule to protect it, must instead derive from the
legal doctrine that supports it-namely, informational privacy of com-
mon-law origin. And establishing the right requires an inquiry into
current practice, too. Why does a person accused or suspected of a
crime have no right to prevent disclosure of the fact of that accusation
or suspicion, at least before some threshold point such as a judicial
finding of probable cause? Why should police routinely name ar-
restees and suspects, before charges have been reviewed by ajudge or
magistrate, when the allegations might be unfounded or the case dis-
missed, but an accusee's reputation can be permanently damaged, his
name forever tarnished by the accusation, and a cloud of suspicion
left to loom over his personal and professional life? Why is the nam-
ing decision, and the power to trigger its harmful consequences, left
to the discretion of law enforcement officials, rather than regulated by
statute or judicial authority? More specifically: what exactly was the
public's right to learn the name of a young man-along with his age
and home address ("25, of 312 Delancey Street in Manhattan")-who
was one of several people arrested for assaulting others in New York
City's Central Park after the city's annual Puerto Rican Day parade in
2000, when police released the man soon after his arrest upon con-
cluding that a victim had been mistaken in identifying him as one of
the wrongdoers?36 Why did Dallas police in 1997 need to announce
immediately that a woman-an unnamed one at that-had accused a
individual's right of privacy is essentially a protection relating to his or her private
life, this right becomes limited and qualified for arrested or indicted individuals,
who are essentially public personages.
403 F. Supp. 1318, 1321 (M.D. Tenn. 1975) (footnote omitted).
35. The government did, however, quickly issue a regulation to justify withholding the
names of the post-September 11 immigration arrestees. See 8 C.F.R. § 236.6 (2004) (bar-
ing the disclosure of names of all immigration arrestees, and any other information about
them, on grounds of detainee privacy and national security).
36. See William K. Rashbaum, Up to 5 Officers Could Be Punished over Response to Park
Attacks, Commissioner Says, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 2000, at B7 (arrest); Jayson Blair, Prosecutors
Add Details of Attacks, N.Y. TimEs, June 18, 2000, at 27 (release).
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star wide receiver for the Dallas Cowboys of raping her, only to de-
clare the allegations discredited two weeks later and charge the ac-
cuser herself with the crime of making a false complaint?3 7 Why
shouldn't law enforcement authorities have had to await the results of
further investigation before declaring as their chief suspect a law-abid-
ing security guard who stepped forward as a crucial witness in the
bombing of Centennial Olympic Park in Atlanta in 1996?38
This Article addresses these questions and others, arguing that a
privacy right for criminal arrestees and suspects extending beyond the
existing protections in arrest records and grand jury proceedings, and
other ad hoc protections for criminal and quasi-criminal accusees we
will discuss, should be recognized and protected. The locus of this
right is a privacy interest developed by the common law and now em-
bodied in an array of federal and state statutes: the interest in prevent-
ing the dissemination of personal information, enshrined in the
common-law tort of public disclosure of private facts. The factual pre-
mise of the right is that being publicly identified as an alleged crimi-
nal causes a plethora of harms-lasting damage to one's reputation
and relationships, to employment prospects, to the psyche, and
more-and that these harms are difficult to justify when they are vis-
ited upon one who is innocent or against whom charges are not even
pursued. And the damage is not typically cured by acquittal or the
dismissal of charges; rarely does exoneration receive as much public
attention as arrest or initial suspicion, and even after exoneration
public suspicion often remains.
39
How might these harms be prevented? Anonymity for arrestees
and suspects all the way to conviction might be suggested, through
''secret" criminal proceedings and laws penalizing any public naming
of an arrestee or suspect; but certainly neither the Constitution nor
the public would tolerate that approach. And there is a much less
drastic alternative, one that would prevent the naming of at least some
arrestees or suspects who are never prosecuted, or whose cases are
dismissed soon after arrest. It is an approach that is supported by ex-
isting privacy protections in criminal, quasi-criminal, and other pro-
ceedings, and that rests on a safeguard in the criminal process that
already protects criminal defendants, arrestees, and suspects from the
deprivation of other rights: the probable cause standard. That ap-
proach, and the proposal of this Article, is that a privacy interest of
37. See Robert Ingrassia & Jason Sickles, Cowboys' Accuser Will Be Charged Today, Police
Say; Woman Could Face 6-Month Term, DALIus MORNING NEWS, Jan. 14, 1997, at IA.
38. See infra text accompanying note 62.
39. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
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arrestees and suspects be recognized and protected by legislation that
forbids the public naming of arrestees and suspects by government
officials until there is a judicial finding of probable cause of guilt, un-
less an arrestee or suspect requests publicity-in which case disclosure
should be required, absent a countervailing law enforcement interest.
A proposed statute appears in Part III; for now, the gist of any such
legislation would do the following: (1) forbid government officers and
employees to identify publicly arrestees or suspects until ajudge, mag-
istrate, or grand jury finds probable cause of guilt, unless an arrestee
or suspect requests otherwise; (2) declare "nonpublic" those portions
of government records that identify arrestees or suspects until such a
probable cause finding or request is made; (3) require public officials
to notify arrestees and suspects of their right to anonymity or public-
ity; and (4) require public officials to identify any detained arrestee
who so requests, absent a countervailing law enforcement interest.
The information-withholding provision of such legislation would
mirror statutory provisions that now protect the identities of sexual
assault complainants, juvenile accusees and offenders, and other sub-
jects of criminal or quasi-criminal scrutiny from public disclosure, as I
explain more fully below. The notice provision has similar precedent.
The added provision requiring the government to name arrestees
upon their request completes the privacy protection by fully vesting
the choice between privacy and publicity in the hands of the inter-
ested individuals, in keeping with the core purpose of informational
privacy; it also provides a protection against "secret" arrests. The legis-
lation terminates the privacy protection at a point that is well-estab-
lished as a threshold for the deprivation of other rights in the criminal
process: a judicial finding of probable cause. And, as I will argue, the
protection does not run afoul of the First Amendment because it ap-
plies only to government actors (leaving the press and public free to
name arrestees and suspects), and it commands only what the Su-
preme Court has repeatedly advised states to do to protect the privacy
of individuals named in government proceedings and records: with-
hold the information from the public.
In practice, moreover, the proposal is modest. As discussed more
fully below, in federal court and in some states, a judicial probable
cause finding occurs by rule, and summarily, at a defendant's first ap-
pearance before a judicial officer.4" In these jurisdictions, the pro-
posed legislation requires no more than that law enforcement officers
and other public officials refrain from naming the arrestee publicly
40. See infra notes 193-209 and accompanying text.
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until a probable cause finding occurs (as indeed it does, nearly always,
at that hearing). The practical effect of the proposal in virtually every
case in these jurisdictions would thus be a period of anonymity that
would typically last no more than forty-eight hours, because the Con-
stitution typically requires a post-arrest hearing within that time pe-
riod for all warrantless arrests41 (which the vast majority of arrests
are42 ). In states where a probable cause finding is not required or
routinely made at the first judicial appearance, the only requirement
in addition to the temporary anonymity would be that the government
seek a judicial finding of probable cause should it wish to name the
arrestee publicly. In either type of jurisdiction, when an arrest is
made pursuant to a warrant, the government could name the arrestee
immediately, because the judicial probable cause requirement would
be satisfied by the warrant. Or the government could seek a "naming"
warrant if it wished for some reason to name an arrestee or suspect
absent an arrest warrant.
Recognizing this privacy right and protecting it as proposed
would therefore burden the government little. True, it could be said
that the proposed legislation would also benefit the accusees little, be-
cause the government could easily satisfy its requirements by ob-
taining pre-arrest warrants, or could routinely cut off the protection at
forty-eight hours by obtaining probable cause determinations at initial
hearings. But we have long since decided to protect the innocent in
our criminal justice system at great expense to prosecuting the guilty;
preventing severe and unwarranted damage to even a few innocent
individuals through this privacy protection should therefore be
enough to welcome it, particularly given how little additional effort it
would take. (Not to mention that it exacts no cost at all from prose-
cuting the guilty.) Moreover, there are those, Supreme CourtJustices
among them, who urge that a judicial probable cause finding should
be a prerequisite to prosecution itself in every case.
4" Nor should a
greater proclivity on the part of law enforcement officers to seek war-
rants before arrest be an unwelcome development, as we continue to
extol the virtues of pre-arrest judicial authorization and cling to the
notion of a presumptive warrant requirement under the Fourth
Amendment. Objections to the proposal instead lie elsewhere-spe-
cifically, in its implication for public rights of access to government
information, and in any dangers posed to unnamed arrestees them-
selves. Ultimately, I argue, recognizing and protecting a privacy right
41. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
42. See infra note 196 and accompanying text.
43. See infra note 204.
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
for arrestees and suspects as proposed-a right of temporary anonym-
ity-is not only necessary to protect innocent or unprosecuted ac-
cusees; it is also compelled by the evolving theory and practice of
privacy law, including the particular privacy protections now in force
in the criminal process. And it can pass muster with constitutional
and common-law doctrines of public access to government
information.
Part I of this Article explores the pertinent privacy doctrine-
namely, the public disclosure tort-and the existing privacy protec-
tions in the criminal process that are grounded on that doctrine. Part
L.A lays out the parameters of the public disclosure tort, and Part I.B
presents various "pockets of privacy" in criminal and quasi-criminal
proceedings that rest on its doctrine. Part II then presents the argu-
ment for recognizing the privacy right for arrestees and suspects. Part
II.A explains my proposed threshold of a judicial finding of probable
cause before naming. Part I.B presents, and then deconstructs, argu-
ments in favor of the current practice of routine (or discretionary)
naming. Part II.C assesses withholding the identities of arrestees and
suspects against the three pertinent doctrines of public access to gov-
ernment information-the Supreme Court's government information
jurisprudence, the common-law doctrine of access to government in-
formation, and the constitutional doctrine of access to the courts. It
then assesses it under the public disclosure tort itself. Part III pro-
poses a statute and other means to protect this privacy right and ex-
plores ramifications of such protection-for prosecutors and police
officers, for the press, for the public, and for criminal accusees
themselves.
I. INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS
The essence of informational privacy is a person's control over
the dissemination of information about him to others.44 The 1890
Warren and Brandeis plea for a "right to be let alone" 45 has spawned a
quartet of common-law torts46 and a vast body of federal and state
statutes that protect individuals from the public disclosure of personal
44. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the
Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763 (1989) ("[B]oth the common law and the literal understandings of
privacy encompass the individual's control of information concerning his or her person.");
Jonathan B. Mintz, The Remains of Privacy's Disclosure Tort: An Exploration of the Private Do-
main, 55 MD. L. REv. 425, 428-29 (1996) (providing varying definitions of privacy); Solove,
Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 9, at 1109-15 (defining informational privacy).
45. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 11, at 193.
46. The four torts, identified by Dean Prosser, are (1) unreasonable intrusion upon the
seclusion of another, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, (3) appropriation
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information by government officials or fellow citizens.
47 Justifications
for these protections vary: maintaining one's individual identity, main-
taining a community, allowing the development of intimacy, and pre-
serving individual autonomy-all are among the proffered
purposes.48 Within these justifications is the notion that informa-
tional privacy is about one's ability to protect his reputation by main-
taining control over information about his actions, habits, character,
and other personal matters, the disclosure of which might prove em-
barrassing or unflattering to him and might thus interfere with his
personal relationships or his professional standing.
49 But flattering
information too is subject to privacy protection;
50 whatever the con-
tent of information, privacy means the individual's control over how,
when, and to whom information is divulged. Moreover, information
about a person need not be false or misleading to invoke privacy pro-
tection; while common-law privacy doctrine does encompass this pos-
sibility, its overwhelming focus is on truthful or accurate information
of another's name or likeness, and (4) public disclosure of information that unreasonably
places another in a false light. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 389 (1960).
47. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE & M-ARc ROTENBERG, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAw 22-25 (2003)
(listing various federal privacy statutes); Mintz, supra note 44, at 432-35 & nn.38 & 41-47
(citing various state privacy statutes); Prosser, supra note 46, at 392-98 (reviewing state
court decisions finding invasions of privacy actionable).
48. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 9, at 215, 223. As Rosen puts it:
privacy is important not only... to protect individual autonomy but also to allow
individuals to form intimate relationships ..... Friendship and romantic love
can't be achieved without intimacy, and intimacy, in turn, depends upon the se-
lective and voluntary disclosure of personal information that we don't share with
everyone else.
Id. at 215; see also id. at 223 ("The ideal of privacy ... insists that individuals should be
allowed to define themselves, and to decide how much of themselves to reveal or conceal
in different situations."); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and
Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 1008 (1989) [hereinafter The Social Founda-
tions of Privacy] (arguing that privacy for purposes of the common-law tort is "simply a label
that we use to identify one aspect of the many forms of respect by which we maintain a
community"); Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, supra note 9, at 2087 ("Privacy is a value so
complex, so entangled in competing and contradictory dimensions, so engorged with vari-
ous and distinct meanings, that I sometimes despair whether it can be usefully addressed at
all."); Mintz, supra note 44, at 428-29 (collecting definitions of informational privacy);
Volokh, supra note 9, at 1110 (same).
49. Prosser, supra note 46, at 398-401 (discussing the protection of reputation in the
common-law privacy torts); cf Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 384 n.9 (1967) ("In the
'right of privacy' cases the primary damage is the mental distress from having been ex-
posed to public view, although injury to reputation may be an element bearing upon such
damage.").
50. See, e.g., Time, Inc., 385 U.S. at 384 n.9 ("[T]he published matter need not be de-
famatory ... and might even be laudatory and still warrant recovery.").
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
about a person.51 In other words, the land of informational privacy is
a land of truths about a person that the person has a right to keep
others from knowing.
52
The crucible of common-law informational privacy is the tort of"public disclosure of embarrassing private facts," one of the four dis-
tinct common-law privacy rights identified by Dean Prosser in 1960. 5
Like the other three of those rights, that tort is the progeny of the"right to be let alone" identified by Warren and Brandeis in 1890 and
was enshrined in the Restatement of Torts in 1977. 5' Alternatively called
the "public disclosure" or the "private facts" tort, the tort protects
against unreasonable publicity of one's private life,55 and it is the tort
of choice for individuals who seek redress for the public disclosure of
information about them that they believe merits privacy protection.
Truthful information that has found such protection, or the disclo-
sure of which has at least been found actionable under the tort, in-
cludes information about one's medical conditions or procedures,
finances, employment status, drug or alcohol use or treatment, sexual
activities, domestic disputes 56-matters, in other words, most people
would prefer others did not know about them.
51. The "false light" tort, see supra note 46, deals expressly with the dissemination of
false or misleading information about a person, providing an action for statements that
unreasonably place a person in a false light before the public. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652E (1977). Liability under that tort is generally deemed subject to the rule and
progeny of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), which held that the First
Amendment forbids recovery in defamation suits brought by public-figure plaintiffs absent
proof that the defendant published the falsehood knowingly or with reckless disregard for
the truth. Id. at 279-80; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. d (discussing
the Court's holding in Sullivan); infra note 403 (explaining the application of the standard
set out in Sullivan).
52. See generally SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 47, at 1-33.
53. Prosser, supra note 46, at 389.
54. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
55. Prosser, supra note 46, at 392-98.
56. See DAVID A. ELDER, PRIVACY TORTS § 3:6, at 3-63 (2002) (discussing the require-
ment that disclosure of embarrassing, private information must be "highly offensive" in
order to be actionable); Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the Ghost ofJustice
Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 1195, 1209 n.74 (1990) (noting cases that allowed recovery for the
disclosure of true statements when defendants published nude or revealing photographs,
odd and disfiguring medical conditions, and details from the plaintiffs past life); PatrickJ.
McNulty, The Public Disclosure of Private Facts: There Is Life After Florida Star, 50 DRAKE L.
REV. 93, 105-06 (2001) (finding that courts have protected information about one's "medi-
cal status or condition," "sexual activities and related sexual matters, intimate photographs,
personal letters, financial status and condition, and certain domestic situations" (footnotes
omitted)); Mintz, supra note 44, at 439 (finding that courts have generally "recognized only
nudity, sex, and health as categories of facts that are private by nature" for purposes of the
public disclosure tort (footnotes omitted)); John A. Jurata, Jr., Comment, The Tort That
Refuses to Go Away: The Subtle Reemergence of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, 36 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 489, 510-30 (1999) (discussing cases recognizing a private facts tort in situations in-
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To be arrested for a crime or suspected of committing one is, of
course, an indisputable truth about an arrestee or suspect. It is also a
truth that he will almost always find embarrassing and unflattering, to
say the least, and one the public disclosure of which can seriously in-
terfere with his life and work. Personal ties can be strained, family
members shunned, current employment lost and future job prospects
threatened, social status damaged-and worse. Accused with great
fanfare in 1988 of raping teenager Tawana Brawley, upstate New York
attorney Steven Pagones spent ten years fighting to clear his name,
even though within seven months of the accusation a grand jury had
refused to indict him. Pagones won a defamation suit against his
accusers in 1998, but not before he had first taken a leave of absence
and then left his job as a state prosecutor, undergone therapy, suf-
fered daily threats and taunts from members of the public (to him
and to his school-aged daughter), and endured constant attention
from the media.58 Political scientist James Van de Velde hoped to
become a television foreign affairs analyst, but this dream was shat-
tered as soon as New Haven, Connecticut police named him, and only
him, as among "a pool of suspects" in the murder of Yale University
student Suzanne Jovin in late 1998." 9 Van de Velde promptly lost his
teaching position at Yale, was dismissed from a graduate program in
broadcast journalism at Quinnipiac University, and found much more
than his career prospects severely damaged.6 ° As late as 2004, New
Haven police refused to declare Van de Velde innocent, even though
he had by then passed numerous background checks to work in
counterterrorism at the Defense Intelligence Agency and state investi-
gators had determined that DNA evidence from the victim's body did
not match his.6 Hero-turned-victim Richard Jewell, on the other
volving confidential medical information, "politically sensitive protected classes," and sen-
sational media defendants).
57. Lance Morrow, Stories Sacred, Lies Mundane; Ten Years Later, A Casualty of the Tawana
Brawley Case Finds Vindication, TIME, July 27, 1998, at 72.
58. Id. at 72; Telephone Interview with Steven Pagones (n.d.). The knowledgeable
reader will recall that Mr. Pagones was first publicly accused not by law enforcement offi-
cials but by private citizens, among them the Reverend Al Sharpton.
59. James Bennet, His Life as a Murder Suspect, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Sept. 12, 1999, at 48.
60. As one journalist describes it:
[L]ayer by layer, his life has been whittled down. He has no job now and few
prospects, just a growing pile of rejections. His casual friends and colleagues have
dropped away, leaving a small, hard core of loyalists. He cannot, of course, date.
His savings are dwindling, and his legal bills are rising. His upbringing, his career
and his social life have been publicly fly-specked by journalists searching back-
ward, through the darkest of lenses, for signs of a murderer in the making.
61. Id. Stacey Stowe, '98 Killing Suspect Wins Some Redemption, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2004,
at 36; Paul Zielbauer, DNA from Slain Yale Student Doesn't Match That of Suspect, N.Y. TIMES,
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hand, the witness who became a suspect in the 1996 bombing at At-
lanta's Centennial Park, eventually received a letter from the FBI that
declared his innocence, along with a reported settlement of over $1
million from media organizations he sued for libel-but he still gets
"the stares and whispers," and his lawsuit is still pending against one
media defendant.62 Worse, from Mr. Jewell's example, law enforcez
ment officials have apparently learned only to cast suspicion in differ-
ent terms. "Person of interest" is the new appellation for someone the
government wishes to name as a criminal suspect with impunity, but
these interesting persons find their lives as damaged as if they had
been labeled suspects.6"
The fact that stigma attaches to one named as a criminal arrestee
or suspect is well recognized.64 So too is the deterrent value of that
stigma; it is the operating premise of law enforcement initiatives like
Oct. 30, 2001, at D5. Van de Velde did win an $80,000 settlement from Quinnipiac Univer-
sity for its false claim in 1998 that he had been fired from two television internships after
the University dismissed him; his suits against a local newspaper, Yale University, and the
New Haven Police Department are pending as of this writing. See Stowe, supra.
62. Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Journalism, Libel Law, and a Reputation Tarnished:
A Dialogue with Richard Jewell and His Attorney, L. Lin Wood, 35 McGEORGE L. REv. 1, 3, 6
(2004); Cameron McWhirter, Reporters Win Source Ruling injewell Case, ATLANTAJ. & CONST.,
June 2, 2004, at 3D; Bill Rankin, Jewell Is Cleared in Bomb Case; No Longer a 'Target, 'FEDS Say,
ATLANTA J. & CONST., Oct. 27, 1996, at Al.
63. See, e.g., Leon Alligood, 'Person of Interest, 'TENNESSEAN, Aug. 5, 2004, at 6B (report-
ing police interest in locating a named individual "in connection with" recent homicides);
Jamie Jones, 'Person of Interest' Label Harms Innocent, Critics Say, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb.
16, 2004, at IA (discussing an individual's complaints that, after being named as "a person
of interest" and later cleared in a double homicide investigation, people "look at [him]
differently now" and "will always remember [him] as if [he] had something to do with the
murder"); Carol D. Leonnig & Marilyn W. Thompson, Hatfill Sues over Anthrax Probe; Scien-
tist Accuses Ashcroft, FBI of 'Smear' Campaign, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2003, at BI (reporting on
the lawsuit brought by a former Army scientist named by U.S. Attorney General John Ash-
croft in 2002 as a "person of interest" in the investigation of the 2001 anthrax attacks);
Jeremy Pawloski, 'Person of Interest' Gets Mad at Cops, ALBUQUERQUE J., Mar. 2, 2004, at 1
(reporting a demand of apology by a man named as a "possible suspect" in art thefts and
pictured in a flier distributed by police to local art galleries, and noting that police admit-
ted the man should only have been called a "person of interest"); see also Gina Holland,
Police Now Using 'Person of Interest, 'Assoc. PRESS ONLINE, May 17, 2003, available at 2003 WL
55372739 ("The term now can be found nearly every week in newspaper headlines and
heard in police news conferences."); Eric Lichtblau, Words as Tactics in War on Terror, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 14, 2003, at 2 ("[A]fter the attacks of Sept. 11, investigators and prosecutors
are as likely to speak of 'persons of interest' as they are of suspects.").
64. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (noting that those ac-
cused and prosecuted for crime are "stigmatized"); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307,
320 (1971) ("Arrest is a public act that may seriously interfere with the defendant's liberty,
whether he is free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment, drain his financial
resources, curtail his associations, subject him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him,
his family and his friends."); Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1024 (D.C. Cir. 1974) ("An
arrest record often proves to be a substantial barrier to employment.").
[VOL. 64:755
2005] PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL ARRESTEE OR SUSPECT
'john-shaming," whereby localities publish the names, and sometimes
the pictures, of men arrested for soliciting prostitutes in theirjurisdic-
tions.6 Naturally, as in the john-shaming example, the more publicly
embarrassing the crime, the stronger the deterrent effect-and the
greater the harm-of being named in connection with it. Shaming
has long been a feature of criminal punishment, and recent years
have seen a resurgence of interest in it.66 But however legitimate
shaming may be as a sanction for convicted criminals, to shame some-
one before he is convicted, before a judicial finding of probable
cause, before even a prosecutor has filed formal charges, must surely
be to punish unlawfully.67 And the possibility that the individual
named and shamed is innocent of the crime, or might be found not
guilty at trial, or might never be prosecuted at all, makes the damage
of public naming all the more unjustifiable.
Nor is that possibility minimal or speculative. Statistics show that
the percentage of state felony cases dismissed after arrest in major
urban centers ranges from 10% for driving-related offenses to 40% for
assault cases.68 In federal court, prosecutors decline to prosecute
some 35% of suspects they investigate for violent offenses, 42% of
those they investigate for property offenses, and 17% and 34% of
those they investigate for drug and weapons offenses, respectively.69
Among those suspects federal prosecutors do prosecute, nearly 8% of
defendants charged with felonies and over 23% of those charged with
misdemeanors find their cases dismissed at some point in the pro-
65. Courtney Guyton Persons, Note, Sex in the Sunlight: The Effectiveness, Efficiency, Con-
stitutionality, and Advisability of Publishing Names and Pictures of Prostitutes' Patrons, 49 VAND.
L. REV. 1525, 1536-38 (1996) (discussing various state and local schemes for publishing the
names of those arrested for patronizing prostitutes); see also Art Hubacher, Comment, Every
Picture Tells a Story: Is Kansas City's 7ohn TV" Constitutional?, 46 U. KAN. L. REv. 551, 553
(1998) (arguing that Kansas City's televised john-shaming scheme "amounts to an uncon-
stitutional punishment without due process of law").
66. Recent shaming literature is discussed in Note, Shame, Stigma, and Crime: Evaluating
the Efficacy of Shaming Sanctions in Criminal Law, 116 HARv. L. REv. 2186 (2003).
67. See Persons, supra note 65, at 1555-70 (discussing constitutional objections to pre-
conviction shaming and concluding that it violates the Sixth Amendment right to trial).
68. GERARD RAINVILLE & BRIAN A. DEAVEs, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2000, at 24 (Bureau of Justice
Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ 202021, Dec. 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
abstract/fdluc00.htm. The percent of cases dismissed for other types of crime included:
murder, 28%; rape, 33%; robbery, 35%; motor-vehicle theft, 27%; drug trafficking, 20%.
Id. at 24 tbl.23.
69. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE
PROCESSING, 2001, WITH TRENDS 1982-2001, at 9 tbl.3 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin




cess. 7 1 Statistics compiled by the FBI, meanwhile, have for years put
the average rate of "unfounded or false" complaints of serious crimes
at 2%.71 With some 119,000 federal suspects in a year, yielding ap-
proximately 66,000 felony defendants and 11,000 misdemeanor de-
fendants, on top of the staggering number of over one million annual
arrests just for serious felonies in state courts, the numbers involved
are far from trivial.7 2
There is good reason, in other words, to be concerned about the
routine public naming of arrestees and suspects. A number of justifi-
cations for that naming can be put forth; these are discussed below in
Part II.B. The point here is to articulate the baseline argument that
the fact of one's arrest for or suspicion of crime potentially qualifies
for protection within informational privacy doctrine. It is a truth
about a person, the public disclosure of which can damage the per-
son; because of this damage, it is a truth over the public dissemination
of which an individual should arguably have some control. Or, at
least, dissemination should not occur without some safeguard to mini-
mize the damage to those with respect to whom it would be unwar-
ranted-arrestees and suspects who go unprosecuted. Hence the
70. See id. at 11 tbl.5. A dismissal or a declination of prosecution does not, of course,
necessarily mean a defendant is innocent, or even that there was not probable cause of her
guilt; a criminal case may be dismissed for other reasons, including pursuant to a plea
agreement in another case.
71. FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED
STATES 1996, at 24 (Uniform Crime Reports, Sept. 28, 1997); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTI-
GATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1995, at 24 (Uniform Crime
Reports, Oct. 13, 1996); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME
IN THE UNITED STATES 1994, at 24 (Uniform Crime Reports, Nov. 19, 1995); FEDERAL Bu-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 1993, at 24
(Uniform Crime Reports, Dec. 4, 1994); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES,
1992, at 24 (1993); FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE
UNITED STATES, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1991, at 24 (1992). This
statistic, which regularly appeared in the portion of the report dealing with forcible rape,
vanishes in the report for 1997 (and thereafter). See FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE UNITED STATES, 1997, at 23-25
(1998). Perhaps that is because the 2% figure was consistently presented in distinction to
the rate of unfounded complaints of forcible rape (8%), and the latter figure has come
under considerable attack. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal
Justice System, 87J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1304-07 (1997). But see Edward Greer,
The Truth Behind Legal Dominance Feminism's "Two Percent False Rape Claim" Figure, 33 Lov.
L.A. L. REv. 947, 949 (2000) (insisting that "as many as a quarter of the men currently
accused of rape are actually innocent").
72. FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING, 2001, supra note 69, at 9, 11; MATrHEW R.
DUROSE & PATRICK A. LONGAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEL-
ONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 2000, at 5 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ
198821, June 2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/fssc0.htm.
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suggestion of a right of anonymity for arrestees and suspects,
grounded in privacy doctrine and lasting until the designated safe-
guard has been satisfied-a judicial finding of probable cause of
guilt-as discussed below in Part II.A.
Discussions of anonymity in the criminal process regularly fall
within the ambit of the public disclosure tort, which provides doctri-
nal justification for laws that shield the identities of complainants in
sexual assault cases, and juvenile offenders and accusees. A right of
informational privacy, grounded in the public disclosure tort, is also
the right invoked by the Supreme Court with regard to criminal ac-
cusees-explicitly, in the case of arrest records, and implicitly with re-
gard to grand jury targets. It is therefore the tort whose parameters
demand exploration here. That is the focus of Part I.A, which traces
the origin of the public disclosure tort and lays out the test for privacy
claims under it-namely, that disseminated information is not "of le-
gitimate concern to the public," or "newsworthy." Then, in Part I.B,
we will visit various pockets of privacy in the criminal process that pro-
tect the same privacy interest. Together, the two parts demonstrate
that the criminal process already embraces privacy protections analo-
gous to the one I propose, and that the public disclosure tort is the
doctrinal home for these protections and the appropriate starting
point for the one I propose for criminal arrestees and suspects.
A. Protection Under the Public Disclosure Tort: Reid, Briscoe, and the
Restatement of Torts
The evolution of the public disclosure tort has been well docu-
mented elsewhere, amply and relatively recently. 73 Most recent schol-
arly treatment has hailed the tort's apparent rebirth, a decade or two
after commentators had forecast its imminent demise.7 ' Equally for-
tuitous for our purposes is that the two best-known state cases to en-
dorse the tort-Melvin v. Reid and Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, both
from California-involved plaintiffs none other than convicted
criminals who objected to being named in connection with their crim-
73. E.g., McNulty, supra note 56; Mintz, supra note 44; Geoff Dendy, Note, The News-
worthiness Defense to the Public Disclosure Tort, 85 Ky. L.J. 147 (1997); Peter Gielniak, Com-
ment, Tipping the Scales: Courts Struggle to Strike a Balance Between the Public Disclosure of
Private Facts Tort and the First Amendment, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1217 (1999); Jurata, supra
note 56.
74. See, e.g., Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and
Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. Rrv. 291 (1983) (discussing the failures of the private
facts tort); Lorelei Van Wey, Note, Private Facts Tort: The End Is Here, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 299
(1991) (examining the "near extinction" of the private facts tort). But there is criticism
too in recent attention to the tort. See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 9, at 1088-1106.
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inal pasts;75 and three of the Supreme Court's four encounters with
the tort, including the Court's most approving and extensive treat-
ment of it, have involved government attempts to protect the privacy
of individuals involved in the criminal process. 76 In late 2004, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court overruled Briscoe, and thus effectively reversed
Reid too, finding (more or less correctly) that subsequent U.S. Su-
preme Court rulings precluded invasion of privacy claims that are
based on the publication of information obtained from public records
of a criminal proceeding.77 I discuss the Supreme Court rulings in
Part I.B. But Reid and Briscoe must still be discussed; for while their
value as precedent has never been great,7" they have played a crucial
role in establishing the contours of the public disclosure tort.
In Reid, which was the first endorsement of the public disclosure
tort anywhere, a California appeals court upheld the privacy claim of a
former prostitute, who had also once been tried for murder and ac-
quitted, against filmmakers who named her as the real-life subject of a
movie that depicted her "former life."79 By the time the movie
opened, according to the court, the plaintiff had "abandoned her life
75. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
76. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); United States Dep't of Justice v. Report-
ers Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469 (1975). In the fourth and most recent encounter, as in the first two,.the Court
essentially sidestepped the tort. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533 (2001) (refusing
to apply the sanctions of federal and state wiretapping laws to media defendants who
broadcasted an unlawfully intercepted wireless telephone conversation when the informa-
tion disclosed was truthful and of public concern, but failing to reach the question of
whether the disclosure of "trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely
private concern" would be prohibited); cf id. at 537-41 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing
favorably the public disclosure tort and asserting the constitutionality of properly tailored
state legislation to better protect personal privacy). The Court's first-ever reference to the
tort was one of approval, though the issue did not arise in the context of the criminal
process. In dicta, in Time, Inc. v. Hil4 the Court quoted from the first federal case to
endorse a version of the tort, noting that "[r]evelations may be so intimate and so unwar-
ranted in view of the victim's position as to outrage the community's notions of decency."
385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967) (quoting Sidis v. F-R Pub'g Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.
1940)); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 n.5 (1983) ("The question of whether
expression is of a kind that is of legitimate concern to the public is also the standard in
determining whether a common-law action for invasion of privacy is present.").
77. See Gates v. Discovery Communications, 101 P.3d 552, 555 (Cal. 2004) (forbidding
an invasion of privacy claim by a convict depicted in a television reenactment thirteen years
after his crime); see also infra text accompanying notes 250-252.
78. See Forsher v. Bugliosi, 608 P.2d 715, 726 (Cal. 1980) ("Our decision in Briscoe was
an exception to the more general rule that 'once a man has become a public figure, or
news, he remains a matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days."'
(quoting Prosser, supra note 46, at 418)); SOLOVE & ROTENBERG, supra note 47, at 390
("Few courts have followed Briscoe, and Briscoe is practically confined to its facts.").
79. Reid, 297 P. at 91-92.
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of shame and [become] entirely rehabilitated"-marrying, keeping
house, "liv[ing] an exemplary, virtuous, honorable, and righteous
life . . . assum[ing] a place in respectable society" and making new
friends who were unaware of her past.8 ° She claimed that the film
exposed her to "obloquy, contempt, and ridicule" and caused her new
friends to "scorn and abandon" her.8 ' The court considered the com-
mon-law right to privacy as it had evolved since the publication of the
Warren and Brandeis article and found the right protected under the
"inalienable rights" provision of the California constitution. 2 Specifi-
cally, the "right to pursue and obtain happiness" included the "right
to live free from the unwarranted attack of others upon one's liberty,
property, and reputation," and a person "living a life of rectitude" de-
served protection from "unnecessary attacks on his character, social
standing, or reputation."8  Publicly associating the plaintiff with her
former misdeeds was "unnecessary and indelicate," the court went on
to say, and a "wanton disregard of that charity which should actuate us
in our social intercourse and which should keep us from unnecessarily
holding another up to the scorn and contempt of upright members of
society."8 4 The plaintiff should have been permitted to continue in
her rehabilitated life without damage to her "reputation and social
standing," the court wrote, particularly when the damage occurred
only for the private gain of the filmmakers.85 For these reasons, the
court permitted the former-prostitute plaintiff to sue the filmmakers
for invasion of privacy.
The novel privacy protection of Reid was neither universally ap-
plauded nor widely followed, 6 but it endured nonetheless. Dean
Prosser called Reid "the leading case" on what he himself named as the
public disclosure tort in his seminal 1960 article on the privacy torts,
and he discussed the case extensively in that article.8 7 But Reid's 1971
successor case, Briscoe, while also not widely followed,88 ascended to
stardom by providing Prosser, and thus the Restatement of Torts, the
80. Id. at 91.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 93 ("All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain inaliena-
ble rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property; and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness."




86. See Prosser, supra note 46, at 418-19 (citing early cases disagreeing with Reid); supra
note 78.
87. See Prosser, supra note 46, at 392, 397, 418-19.
88. See supra note 78.
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conceptual framework for the public disclosure tort; it also stands as
the paradigm for the tort in many a casebook and treatise.
In Briscoe, the California Supreme Court upheld the privacy claim
of another "rehabilitated" individual, this one a convict who said he
had been "scorned and abandoned" by his eleven-year-old daughter
and his friends as a result of the disclosure of his criminal past."9 This
time the offending disclosure was through a magazine article that
named the plaintiff in a story on the problem of truck hijacking.9"
The plaintiff had been convicted of a truck hijacking eleven years
before the magazine article, but in the intervening years had allegedly
"abandoned his life of shame," "[become] entirely rehabilitated,"
"lived an exemplary, virtuous and honorable life," and "made many
friends who were not aware of the incident in his earlier life." 1 As
had the Reid court, the Briscoe court began its assessment by examining
common-law privacy as it had evolved from Warren and Brandeis's
seminal article-helping entrench a practice that continues today, in
virtually every case or article on the subject; it then considered the
public interest in information about former criminal offenders and
the state interest in their rehabilitation; and finally it assessed whether
the plaintiffs claim was "newsworthy" by considering the "social value"
of the information, the "depth of the . . . intrusion into ostensibly
private affairs," and the extent to which the plaintiff had "voluntarily
acceded to a position of public notoriety." 2
As for the first of the newsworthiness criteria, the court deemed
public knowledge of one's criminal past to be of "minimal social
value"; ajury could find that the plaintiff had "once again become an
anonymous member of the community," and "[once] legal proceed-
ings have concluded ... [and] the individual has reverted to the law-
ful and unexciting life led by the rest of the community, the public's
interest in knowing is less compelling."93 Second, a jury could find
that "revealing one's criminal past for all to see is grossly offensive,"
indeed more so than the disclosure that one has a "humiliating dis-
ease" or "business debts," as demonstrated by the "ostracism, isolation,
and alienation [from] family" that the plaintiff suffered.94 And finally,
"in no way" could the plaintiff be said to have "voluntarily consented
to the publicity"-indeed, "[h]is every effort was to forget and have
89. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 36 (Cal. 1971).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 36-37, 43 (quoting Kapellas v. Kofman, 459 P.2d 912, 922 (Cal. 1969)).
93. Id. at 43.
94. Id.
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others forget that he had once hijacked a truck."95 For these reasons,
capped by a note on the state's interest in rehabilitation,
9 6 California
officially offered the privacy protection of the public disclosure tort to
convicted criminals who wish to prevent public knowledge of their
criminal past.
As noted above, Briscoe was recently overruled. 97 But when the
Restatement (Second) of Torts enshrined the public disclosure tort in
1977, it relied on Briscoe for support and illustration." Briscoe was also
cited repeatedly by the first federal case to endorse the tort, Virgil v.
Time, Inc.,9 9 which approved of the Restatement's emerging test for
newsworthiness (and deemed that test similar to California's, as articu-
lated by the court in Briscoe).° In other words, Reid and Briscoe were
essential building blocks of today's public disclosure tort. The Restate-
ment itself, of course, is now the framework for that tort, and we must
assess protection according to its terms. Under the Restatement's ver-
sion of the tort, and most state court applications of it, a privacy right
inheres, and tort liability accordingly attaches, upon the public disclo-
sure of a matter concerning one's "private life," when the disclosure
"would be highly offensive to a reasonable person" and the matter "is
not of legitimate concern to the public."10 1 Practically and doctri-
nally, the first and second elements-"private life" and "highly offen-
sive"-often fold into the third and last element: information that is
"of legitimate concern to the public" is by definition not "private," and
its disclosure might not give rise to liability even if it is "offensive."102
In other words, the ultimate question is whether the information is "of
legitimate concern to the public"-i.e., whether it is newsworthy.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
98. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. k (stating that the lapse of time
since the past event is to be considered when determining whether the publicity is unrea-
sonable "in revealing facts about one who has resumed the private, lawful and unexciting
life led by the great bulk of the community").
99. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975).
•100. Id. at 1125 n.2, 1126 n.4, 1128-30, 1131 n.14.
101. The full provision of the Restatement, titled Publicity Given to Private Life, reads:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is sub-
ject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the matter publicized is of
a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
102. Haynes v. Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 8 F.3d 1222, 1232 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The two crite-
ria [of the public disclosure tort], offensiveness and newsworthiness, are related."); Mintz,
supra note 44, at 441.
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Are the names of criminal arrestees and suspects, before there is
a judicial finding of probable case, newsworthy for purposes of the
public disclosure tort? That question is taken up in Part II of this
Article. For now, the important point is that the public disclosure tort
is the appropriate starting point for exploring a privacy right for crim-
inal arrestees and suspects. Indeed, as we have seen, at the very incep-
tion of the tort, and thus at the heart of all common-law privacy
doctrine,"3 is a right of anonymity for criminal accusees-convicted
ones in fact, as in Reid and Briscoe. It should therefore come as no
surprise that the same privacy right underlies privacy protections for
other parties in criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. We con-
sider those protections next, before turning in Part II to assess the
protection I propose.
B. Pockets of Informational Privacy in the Criminal Process
1. Sexual Assault Complainants. -Statutes in some thirty states
forbid government officials-police officers, prosecutors, and any
other state employees-to reveal the identities of complainants in sex-
ual assault cases to the public.104 This identity protection evolved
from and along with the public disclosure tort. Prosser noted the
emerging protection in his 1960 article, °5 and analysis and commen-
tary of a more recent vintage have placed the protection squarely
within the tort's ambit. Publicizing the names of sexual assault victims
is seen as exacerbating the deep social and psychological damage in-
flicted by sexual assaults, resulting in what many call a "second rape"
by the media and the public.'0 6 According to this view, still-pervasive
societal attitudes about rape and rape victims-e.g., "respectable girls
do not get raped"-stigmatize sexual assault complainants, causing
them to internalize the public's skepticism, blame, and condemna-
tion, and thus pose a substantial barrier to their readjustment to soci-
ety.107 Protecting the identity of rape victims is thought to prevent or
103. Dean Prosser saw the public disclosure tort as one central to common-law privacy,
and certainly as the motivation for the famous Warren and Brandeis article. See Prosser,
supra note 46, at 392.
104. For a listing of state statutes, see Michelle Johnson, Protecting Child Sex-Crime Victims:
How Public Opinion and Political Expediency Threaten Civil Liberties, 20 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 401,
403-04 nn.15-18 (1997), and Mintz, supra note 44, at 433 n.40.
105. Prosser, supra note 46, at 417 & n.278.
106. See, e.g., LEE MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE SECOND RAPE: SOCIETY'S CONTIN-
UED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM (1989).
107. Susan Cohn, Note, Protecting Child Rape Victims from the Public and Press After Globe
Newspaper and Cox Broadcasting, 51 GEO. WASH. L. Rev. 269, 281 (1983); see also Paul
Marcus & Tara L. McMahon, Limiting Disclosure of Rape Victims' Identities, 64 S. CAL. L. REv.
1019, 1020 (1991) (asserting that public dissemination of a rape victim's identity corn-
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mitigate these harms and to promote victims' interests in "individual
autonomy, mental health, and the capacity to form and maintain
meaningful relationships with others."' 8 These are, of course, also
interests of common-law informational privacy-hence the assertion
that the doctrine justifies the protection of victims' identities.
10 9 For
the same reasons, media organizations refrain from naming sexual as-
sault complainants in their reports. 1 ' Though the policy falls under
attack every few years, typically in high-profile cases, it remains the
prevailing rule.111
pounds the traumas associated with the experience); Suzanne M. Leone, Note, Protecting
Rape Victims' Identities: Balance Between the Right to Privacy and the First Amendment, 27 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 883, 910-11 (1993) (noting that the stigma resulting from the public disclo-
sure of a rape victim's identity could disrupt the victim's healing process).
108. Edelman, supra note 56, at 1208.
109. See Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 537 (1989); Marcus & McMahon, supra note
107, at 1037-39; Leone, supra note 107, at 888-89, 909-13. Withholding the identities of
sexual assault complainants is also considered important to prevent further physical harm
to a victim, and to encourage victims to report the crimes. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 537.
110. See, e.g., THE NEW YORK TIMES MANUAL OF STYLE AND USAGE 282 (Allan M. Siegal &
William G. Connolly eds., rev. & exp. ed. 1999) [hereinafter TIMES MANUAL] ("Most often
The Times shields the identity of a sex crime complainant; but rare circumstances may
warrant an exception. Every decision to divulge such an identity or to withhold it should be
discussed with a masthead editor or with the head of the news desk.").
111. See, e.g., Vicki Haddock, Kobe Bryant's Nameless Accuser; Why Should We Even Pretend
We're Protecting the Privacy of the Woman Who Says the Basketball Star Raped Her?, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 22, 2004, at El ("[S]ome journalists, feminists and criminal defense attorneys argue
that the contortions of the [Kobe] Bryant case expose flaws in the press' long policy of not
naming names," but "few editors are convinced that naming rape accusers is the right
thing to do, and even fewer are willing to risk society's wrath by doing something that
arguably hurts victims.") (discussing the ramifications and recent history of the nondisclo-
sure policy and its shortcomings with respect to the then-pending sexual assault trial of the
basketball star); see also Geneva Overholser, Editorial, Naming the Victim, WASH. POST, Sep.
28, 1997, at C6 (quoting opinions after the highly publicized 1997 sexual assault trial of a
celebrity sportscaster, including that of Washington Post Executive Editor Leonard Downie;
"It seems to me the whole policy of identification needs constant review. The [Marv] Al-
bert case shows how the notion of withholding names becomes more complicated because
one person is placed under intense media scrutiny and the other is not. We will continue
to reconsider this, [and] ... we welcome everybody's thoughts."); see also Ellen Goodman,
On a New Legal Frontier with Mary Albert and His Victims, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 1997, at C7
("After the 'lurid' details are forgotten, there will still be concern about the media policy
that named Albert but not his accuser."); Richard Cohen, Editorial, Double Standards on
Rape Charges, WASH. POST, Apr. 18, 1991, at A21 (discussing the 1991 rape trial of William
Kennedy Smith in Palm Beach, Florida, and stating that "[t] he double standard about rape
is a vestige of a Victorian mentality and goes to the heart of a bigger question: Should the
press be in the business of protecting certain groups but not others-alleged victims (fe-
males), but not the accused (males)? My answer is no."); Case May Shift Views on Naming
Alleged Rape Victims, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 17, 1991, at A6 ("[Wihile most of the nation's
media have long refrained from identifying alleged rape victims by name, the high-profile
Palm Beach case has triggered a reassessment of the practice."). See generally Deborah W.
Denno, Perspectives on Disclosing Rape Victims'Names, 61 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1113 (1993); Sarah
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The Supreme Court first visited this privacy protection in the
1975 case of Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn." 2 In Cox, a Georgia, televi-
sion station had broadcast the name of a rape complainant after a
reporter for the station learned it from the indictments in the case,
which a court clerk had allowed the reporter to inspect. 13 The com-
plainant's father sued the owner of the station for invasion of privacy,
relying on a state statute that made it a misdemeanor to identify a
rape victim, and the Georgia Supreme Court, citing Briscoe, allowed
the action to proceed on the grounds of the public disclosure tort.".'
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that a state could not pun-
ish a party for publishing accurate information "obtained from public
records-more specifically, from judicial records which are main-
tained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves
are open to public inspection.""' 5 In other words, Georgia could not
punish its citizens for publicizing information that the state itself had
made available to the public." 6
But the Court did not reject the asserted privacy interest. Indeed,
it found that the case presented "impressive credentials for a right of
privacy,""1 7 and discussed the theories of common-law privacy exten-
sively and approvingly.1 8 In fact, the Court went further, suggesting
that privacy interests generally might merit protection in the criminal
process, and it advised states on how to provide that protection:. "If
there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the
States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or
other exposure of private information." ' 9 In other words, states can
protect information about criminal proceedings by simply withhold-
ing it; privacy interests can provide the grounds for such withholding;
and the identities of sexual assault complainants might warrant such
privacy protection.
The Cox Court discouraged any inference about what govern-
ment information might be constitutionally withheld, 2 ° but fourteen
Henderson Hutt, Note, In Praise of Public Access: Why the Government Should Disclose the Identi-
ties of Alleged Crime Victims, 41 DuKE LJ. 368 (1991-1992).
112. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
113. Id. at 472 & n.3.
114. Id. at 471-76.
115. Id. at 491.
116. Id. at 495.
117. Id. at 489.
118. Id. at 487-95.
119. Id. at 496.
120. See id. at 496 n.26 ("We mean to imply nothing about any constitutional questions
which might arise from a state policy not allowing access by the public and press to various
kinds of official records, such as records of juvenile-court proceedings.").
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years later, in Florida Star v. B.JF.-the Court's next brush with the
public disclosure tort, and the case long cited as its only such encoun-
ter after Cox 21-the Court confirmed that the names of sexual assault
complainants are among the government information that may be val-
idly withheld. 122 Like Cox, Florida Star involved a statute that criminal-
ized naming victims of sexual offenses; on the basis of that statute, a
sexual assault complainant had won a civil judgment for invasion of
privacy after a newspaper named her in an article about the alleged
rape. 123 One of the newspaper's reporters had learned the complain-
ant's name from a police report the county sheriffs department had
placed in the press room. 124 The Supreme Court reversed the judg-
ment because, again, the government had made the information pub-
lic and the press's receipt of the information was therefore lawful;
punishing the press for disclosing it would set a standard of self-cen-
sorship that the First Amendment could not tolerate.125 Nevertheless,
the Court elaborated on the invitation it had extended to the states in
Cox to withhold information if it wished to protect privacy. The core
of the Court's analysis in Florida Star is that the state could have, and
should have, protected the complainant's privacy by making sure the
information did not reach the public in the first place. "To the extent
sensitive information is in the government's custody," wrote the
Court, "it has [the] power to forestall or mitigate the injury caused by
its release" by controlling others' receipt of the information.' 26 The
Court delineated no limits on that power. Indeed, "[t] he government
may classify certain information, establish and enforce procedures en-
suring its redacted release, and extend a damages remedy against the
government or its officials where the government's mishandling of
sensitive information leads to its dissemination." '27 And this applied
not only to information pertaining to a judicial proceeding, as in the
121. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 525 (2001). In fact, the Court addressed
the public disclosure tort more directly in Department ofJustice v. Reporters Committee for Free-
dom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), which was published two months before Florida Star
and is discussed infra text accompanying notes 172-184 and 256-285. But the majority
opinion in Florida Star did not mention Reporters Committee. Cf Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491
U.S. 524, 552 (1989) (White, J., dissenting) (citing Reporters Committee in arguing the
strength of the privacy interest at stake in Florida Star). See supra note 76 for a list of all of
the cases in which the Court has encountered the public disclosure tort.
122. 491 U.S. 524 (1989).
123. Id. at 526-29.
124. Id. at 527.
125. Id. at 536-39.
126. Id. at 534.
127. Id.
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indictments in Cox, but to information contained in records of the
executive branch-here, a police report.
Thus, "sensitive" information in the criminal process, such as the
identities of sexual assault complainants, can trigger a privacy interest
grounded in common-law informational privacy. The state can pro-
tect that interest by not releasing the offending information to the
public. The Court has therefore condoned, if not expressly endorsed,
withholding the identities of sexual assault complainants on privacy
grounds.' 2
8
2. Juvenile Proceedings.-Juvenile accusees and offenders receive
analogous protections. Almost every state permits or requires judges
to exclude the public from juvenile delinquency proceedings and pro-
hibits public disclosure of those proceedings' records.1 29 The press
follows this lead, withholding juveniles' names and the names of
others in order to protect the juvenile offender or accusee (or vic-
tim).' 3 ° Underlying these practices is the century-old philosophy that
128. The Court also condoned that protection under the First Amendment doctrine of
public access to courts in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, where it concluded that "[t]he
protection of victims of sex crimes from the trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny
may justify closing certain aspects of a criminal proceeding." 478 U.S. 1, 9 n.2 (1986); see
infra text accompanying note 356. Notably, in Florida Star, three Justices found the privacy
interest strong enough to uphold the judgment against the press; in a dissent joined by
ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor, Justice White criticized the Court for insuf-
ficiently valuing the rape victim's privacy interest. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 551 (White, J.,
dissenting). In the conflict between privacy rights and the public's right to know about
matters of public interest, Justice White wrote, the Court accorded "too little weight to" the
rape victim's "side of the equation" and "too much" weight to the other. Id. (White, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, while "[tlhe Court's concern for a free press is appropriate," "such
concerns should be balanced against rival interests in a civilized and humane society." Id.
at 547 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). Accordingly, "it is not too much to ask the press ... to
respect simple standards of decency and refrain from publishing a victim's name, address,
and/or phone number." Id. at 547 (White, J., dissenting).
129. For a list of pertinent state statutes, see Susan S. Greenebaum, Note, Conditional
Access to juvenile Court Proceedings: A Prior Restraint or a Viable Solution?, 44 WASH. U. J. URB.
& CONTEMP. L. 135, 138 & nn.14-20 (1993); Kathleen M. Laubenstein, Comment, Media
Access to juvenile justice: Should Freedom of the Press Be Limited to Promote Rehabilitation of Youth-
ful Offenders?, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1897, 1908-13 & nn.67-90 (1995); Stephan E. Oestreicher,
Jr., Note, Toward Fundamental Fairness in the Kangaroo Courtroom: The Due Process Case Against
Statutes Presumptively Closing juvenile Proceedings, 54 VAND. L. REv. 1751, 1755 nn. 12-13
(2001); Jan L. Trasen, Note, Privacy v. Public Access to Juvenile Court Proceedings: Do Closed
Hearings Protect the Child or the System?, 15 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 359, 373-74 & nn.109-12
(1995).
130. An example is the policy of the New York Times:
Often though not always, The Times shields the identity of ajuvenile offender or
suspect. Factors in the decision include the severity of the crime, the likelihood
that the case will be tried in ajuvenile court and the subject's prospects for even-
tual rehabilitation. Every decision to divulge such an identity or to withhold it
should be discussed with a masthead editor or with the head of the news desk.
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the goal of the juvenile system is to protect children and reform them
rather than to punish them."' Publicly identifying juvenile offenders
is thought to hinder their rehabilitation by impairing their relations
with the community-with friends, people at school and church, and
prospective employers-and complicating their reintegration into so-
ciety; by stigmatizing them such that they view themselves as wrongdo-
ers and act accordingly (the "labeling" theory); and by encouraging
other juveniles to seek attention from deviant behavior.'" 2 Although
the interest in juvenile confidentiality is not always characterized as a
privacy interest,"3 its rationale-protecting juvenile offenders from
attention that would stigmatize them and hinder their integration
into society-echoes the concerns about protecting the privacy of sex-
ual assault victims and is, again, a quintessential common-law privacy
concern.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the practice ofjuve-
nile confidentiality.' 34 In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., a case the
Florida Star Court relied upon,3 5 the Court endorsed the states' inter-
TIMES MANUAL, supra note 110, at 178.
131. See, e.g., Laubenstein, supra note 129, at 1899-1900.
132. See Stacey Hiller, Note, The Problem with Juvenile Sex Offender Registration: The Detri-
mental Effects of Public Disclosure, 7 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 271, 286-93 (1998) (arguing that dis-
closing the identities ofjuvenile sex offenders exposes them to risks of violence and public
ridicule, and thwarts rehabilitation); Laubenstein, supra note 129, at 1901-06 (discussing
the beneficial effects of confidentiality in the juvenile justice system); Trasen, supra note
129, at 370-71 (suggesting that the purpose of confidentiality within the juvenile justice
system is to rehabilitate the juvenile). But see Note, The Public Right of Access to Juvenile
Delinquency Hearings, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1540, 1556-58 (1983) (acknowledging the arguments
in favor of confidentiality but suggesting that the harm resulting from publicity and public
identification of juvenile delinquents might be minimal).
133. In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., for instance, discussed infra text at notes 134-
139, the Court noted the state's proffered interest in "protect[ing] the anonymity of the
juvenile offender," but then went on to say, "there is no issue here of privacy." 443 U.S. 97,
104-05 (1979). That did not, however, stop the Court from counting the case as among its
"privacy trilogy" ten years later in Florida Star. See Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 531
(1989); see also infta note 135.
134. See, e.g., Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105 (noting and approving statutes in all fifty states
providing for confidentiality ofjuvenile proceedings in some manner); Davis v. Alaska, 415
U.S. 308, 319 (1974) (acknowledging the state's interest in protecting the anonymity of a
juvenile delinquent, but finding the right of confrontation of the juvenile witness to be
paramount); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 24 (1967) (finding state provisions for juvenile confi-
dentiality consistent with due process); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966)
(approving a statutory protection shielding juvenile offenders from publicity); cf supra
note 120.
135. The Florida Star opinion labeled a string of three cases-Cox, Daily Mail, and
Oklahoma Publishing-as the Court's "privacy trilogy," Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 531, despite
the Court's statement in Daily Mail that "there is no issue here of privacy." Daily Mail, 443
U.S. at 105; see also Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justi[ying Privacy Protections
Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE LJ. 967, 1000 (2003) [hereinafter The Virtues of Knowing Less]
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est in keeping juvenile proceedings confidential even as it struck
down a statute that criminalized the public identification of youths
charged as juvenile offenders. 136 West Virginia had sought to prose-
cute a newspaper under the statute when a reporter identified an ac-
cused juvenile after learning his name from witnesses of the alleged
crime, police officers, and a prosecutor. 1 7 The Court found the stat-
ute an unconstitutional prior restraint under Cox and Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, but noted approvingly the existence of statutes in all
fifty states, the vast majority of which protected the interest in juvenile
confidentiality by means other than criminal punishment.' 38 Thus,
whereas the state interest in juvenile confidentiality was not of suffi-
cient magnitude to justify a prior restraint by means of a criminal stat-
ute, the information-the identity of a juvenile accusee-was not
necessarily so newsworthy as to require disclosure to the press. Nota-
bly, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist would have gone further to pro-
tect the asserted privacy interest. Concurring in the judgment, he
opined that a state's interest in juvenile confidentiality was sufficiently
compelling to justify punishment for unauthorized identification of a
juvenile offender.3 9
(calling Daily Mail, Florida Star, and Bartnicki "the Court's privacy law cases"); supra note
133.
136. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 104-05. In an earlier case involving juvenile confidentiality,
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, the Court reversed a trial court order that barred
the press from disclosing the name of an alleged juvenile delinquent, because the press
had learned thejuvenile's name from proceedings it had attended without objection, and
"with the full knowledge of the presiding judge, the prosecutor, and the defense counsel."
430 U.S. 308, 311 (1977). The per curiam opinion did not discuss the merits of state
protection of the identities of juvenile offenders, relying instead on Cox and Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976), to find the order an unconstitutional prior restraint.
Okla. Publ'g, 430 U.S. at 310-11. The opinion also cited the cautionary statement of Cox to
discourage any inference about its view of the constitutionality of restricting access to
records ofjuvenile proceedings. Id. at 310 (citing Cox, 420 U.S. at 496 n.26); see supra note
120. Nevertheless, as noted above, in Florida Star the Court called Oklahoma Publishing a
"privacy" case, thus suggesting its further acknowledgment of the importance of juvenile
confidentiality. Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 531; see supra note 135.
137. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 99-100.
138. Id. at 105. The Court did not list those other means, but it did refer favorably to an
approach of cooperation between judges and the press, advocated by the National Council
of Juvenile Court Judges. Id. at 105 n.3.
139. Id. at 107-10 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist noted that the
"[p]ublication of the names of juvenile offenders may seriously impair the rehabilitative
goals of the juvenile justice system and handicap the youths' prospects for adjustment in
society and acceptance by the public." Id. at 107-08 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice
Rehnquist nevertheless concurred in the judgment because he found that the West Vir-
ginia statute was flawed in prohibiting only newspapers from publishing the information
and thus allowing disclosure by other means. Id. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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3. Accusees in Quasi-Criminal Proceedings. 4°0-Accusees in quasi-
criminal proceedings also find privacy protections that are endorsed
by the Supreme Court. In Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia,"' a newspaper published the name of a judge whose alleged
misconduct was under review by the state's Judicial Inquiry and Re-
view Commission. 142 The Virginia state constitution declared pro-
ceedings before the commission "confidential," and state law made it
a misdemeanor to identify judges who were under review by that com-
mission.1 43 The issue before the Court was whether Virginia could
constitutionally punish the newspaper under the statute.' 44 The state
defended the statute on the ground that it protected both the reputa-
tions of judges and the institutional integrity of the courts from the
"pernicious effects" of unfounded allegations of judicial miscon-
duct.'4 5 The Court endorsed those interests even as it struck down
the statute under the First Amendment. As the Court put it,
"[a] dmittedly, the Commonwealth [of Virginia] has an interest in pro-
tecting the good repute of its judges, like that of all other public offi-
cials," and "[i]t can be assumed for purposes of decision that
confidentiality of Commission proceedings serves legitimate state in-
terests." '46 The problem, again, was that criminal sanctions were an
unconstitutional means of serving those interests. Virginia could pre-
vent or minimize the harms it feared by other means, such as through
"careful internal procedures to protect the confidentiality of Commis-
sion proceedings,"' 47 or by methods employed by other states such as
penalizing breaches of confidentiality by contempt sanctions, or re-
quiring commission members, staff, and witnesses to take an oath of
secrecy, the violation of which could be treated as contempt.14 In
other words, as with sexual assault complainants, states can protect the
reputations of judicial misconduct accusees by simply not disclosing
140. Technically, juvenile proceedings too are only quasi-criminal proceedings, since
they are considered civil rather than criminal proceedings. See Laubenstein, supra note
129, at 1900.
141. 435 U.S. 829 (1978).
142. Id. at 831.
143. Id. at 830 & n..
144. Id. at 830. The newspaper had apparently learned the information by lawful
means; the Court noted that the case presented no issue of illegal acquisition of the infor-
mation. Id. at 837.
145. Id. at 840.
146. Id. at 841.
147. Id. at 845.
148. Id. at 841 n.12. The Court also noted without disapproval that forty-seven states
and the District of Columbia provided for confidentiality ofjudicial disciplinary proceed-
ings in some way, and that similar bills were then pending in Congress. Id. at 834 & nn.4-5.
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information about the alleged misconduct or the proceedings related
to it; the privacy interest can be protected, not by punishing truthful
disclosures by third parties, but by withholding the information from
the third parties to begin with.
In another form of privacy protection in the quasi-criminal con-
text, pseudonyms are allowed in place of parties' names in civil suits
that arise out of criminal cases-for instance, when individuals seek
civil redress for wrongs inflicted during criminal investigations but
wish to hide the fact that they faced such investigations. In Roe v.
Borup,"'9 plaintiff parents sued the state after state authorities re-
moved their daughter from them when they stood criminally accused
of child sexual abuse. 150 The parents moved for permission to use
fictitious names because the underlying criminal case involved "allega-
tions of a serious nature which if revealed would subject the plaintiffs
'to personal and social harassment and embarrassment.'' 5 1 The
court granted the request over the defendants' objections, finding "an
important privacy interest" present because the case involved "alleg-
edly false charges of sexual abuse of a small child," that made it "be-
yond argument that this [was] a highly sensitive issue."' 52 Similarly, in
San Bernardino County Department of Public Social Services v. Superior
Court,1 53 the court denied public access to a dependency hearing that
involved parents who were accused of abuse, in part because of con-
cerns about the harm to the parents themselves. Parents in such cir-
cumstances, the court explained, "face a potential social stigma from
public proceedings.' 1 54 (Courts, including the Supreme Court, also
use pseudonyms and initials to protect the privacy of parties to civil
proceedings generally, as I discuss below.155) And doctors and lawyers
who face professional disciplinary proceedings also enjoy special pro-
tections against public disclosure of their identities with respect to
such proceedings, at least until there are findings of wrongdoing. 156
149. 500 F. Supp. 127 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
150. Id. at 128.
151. Id. at 129.
152. Id. at 130.
153. 283 Cal. Rptr. 332 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
154. Id. at 340.
155. See infra notes 436-440.
156. Attorney disciplinary hearings are closed by rule in nearly every state. See Patricia
W. Hatamyar & Kevin M. Simmons, Are Women More Ethical Lawyers? An Empirical Study, 31
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 785, 788 n.10 (2004) (noting that only Oregon makes disciplinary pro-
ceedings a matter of public record at the time a complaint is filed). New York's highest
court has recently ruled that the state's confidentiality protection for doctors who face
professional disciplinary proceedings remains in force after a determination of no wrong-
doing, so that it remains consistent with the state's analogous protection for attorneys and
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Informational privacy protection thus inheres routinely for accusees
in various quasi-criminal proceedings.
4. Grand Jury Proceedings.-The identities of criminal suspects
are well protected in grand jury proceedings. The Supreme Court has
long acknowledged an individual's interest in keeping information
about his investigation by a grand jury from public disclosure; the
Court's. classic enunciation of the reasons for grand jury secrecy is:
(1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be
contemplated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the
grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons sub-
ject to indictment or their friends from importuning the
grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tam-
pering with the witnesses who may testify before the grand
jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons
who have information with respect to the commission of
crimes; (5) to protect the innocent accused who is exonerated from
disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and from
the expense of standing trial where there was no probability
of guilt.
157
The first four of these reasons support grand jury secrecy for the func-
tioning and integrity of the grand jury process itself (although com-
mentators have noted that the truth-finding strain of the second,
third, and fourth reasons also protects the innocent accused from un-
fairness'). The fifth reason speaks directly to the accused's interest
in avoiding public disclosure of unproven allegations against him and
judges. Anonymous v. Bureau of Profl Med. Conduct/State Bd. for Prof'I Med. Conduct,
814 N.E.2d 440, 441 (N.Y. 2004).
157. United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6 (1958) (quoting
United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)) (emphasis added).
158. See Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its
Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1996). In support of the assertion
that secrecy protects the innocent, Kadish quotes seventeenth-century commentary on the
grand jury in England:
The Prosecutors themselves, notwithstanding their big words, and assuming to
themselves to be for the King, if their Prosecution shall be proved to be malicious,
or by Conspiracy against the Life or Fortune of the Accused, they are therein
against the King. . . . 'Tis esteemed in the Law one of the most odious Offences
against the King, to attempt in his name to destroy the Innocent, for whose Pro-
tection he himself was ordained.
Id. at 16 (quoting JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISH-MENs LIVES, OR THE TRUST,
POWER, AND DUTY OF THE GRAND JURYS OF ENGLAND 63-64 (London, Benjamin Alsop
1682)); see also id. at 20-21 (arguing that secrecy is based on the Fifth Amendment right of
an individual to be free from unfounded prosecutions because it protects the truth-finding
function of the grand jury).
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the resultant harm to his reputation (and his pocket), as courts and
commentators have repeatedly observed. 159 For these reasons, grand
jury proceedings are, under the federal rule and the rules of most
states, secret.6 " By consistently endorsing this practice, the Court has
recognized an individual's interest in hiding the fact that he is under
criminal investigation before a grand jury has found probable cause of
his guilt-i.e., before a judicial finding of probable cause.
And targets of investigation are not the only individuals thus pro-
tected in grand jury proceedings. Reputational protection also ex-
tends to other individuals who are implicated but not indicted in a
grand jury investigation. In the leading case, United States v. Briggs,16 1
individuals petitioned to have their names expunged from a federal
indictment that named them as unindicted co-conspirators in a
"highly publicized conspiracy" relating to political demonstrations at
the 1972 Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida. 162 The
Fifth Circuit deemed "substantial" and "legally cognizable" the peti-
tioners' complaints of "injury to their good names and reputations
and impairment of their ability to obtain employment" as a result of
their being named in the indictment.'63 After discussing the protec-
tive function of the grand jury and the accusatory purpose of indict-
ment, the court listed a string of quotations from other courts
condemning grand jury accusations of individuals who are given "no
forum in which to vindicate themselves"-i.e., individuals who are ef-
fectively accused in the indictment but not ultimately charged with a
crime.' 64 When accusations are baseless, the court continued, named
individuals should not be "subjected to public branding," and if there
159. See Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 (1979) (noting that
grand jury secrecy is required to protect the reputations of the innocent by preventing
public condemnation of persons who are wrongfully accused); Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
United States, 360 U.S. 395, 405 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that secrecy pro-
tects an unindicted person from the disclosure of negative information); United States v.
Coughlan, 842 F.2d 737, 739 (4th Cir. 1988) (stating that the secrecy rule prevents
unindicted targets from suffering damaging publicity); Lance v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 610 F.2d 202, 213 (5th Cir. 1980) (observing that the secrecy rule prevents harm to
the reputations of unindicted targets); United States v. Providence Tribune Co., 241 F.
524, 526 (D.R.I. 1917) (declaring that grand jury secrecy shields innocent individuals from
possible harm to their reputations); see also George Edward Dazzo, Note, Opening the Door to
the Grand Jury: Abandoning Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake, 3 D.C. L. REv. 139, 155 (1995); JoEllen
Lotvedt, Note, Availability of Civil Remedies Under the Grand Jury Secrecy Rule, 47 CATH. U. L.
REV. 237, 239, 242 (1997).
160. See FED. R. CR1M. P. 6(e); 1 SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRAcTICE
§ 5:1, at 5-3 (2d ed. 2004).
161. 514 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1975).
162. Id. at 796.
163. Id. at 797.
164. Id. at 802-03. For instance:
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is probable cause then accusees should have a chance at vindication
via trial. 16 5 Because unindicted co-conspirators have no mechanism
for challenging the accusation, and the government had no apparent
need to name them in the indictment in that case, the court ordered
the names expunged from it.
1 6 6
The Briggs court noted that its decision rested on due process
grounds rather than on the formal rule of grand jury secrecy;
167 the
decision also predated the Supreme Court's holding in Paul v. Davis
that reputation is not an interest protected by the Due Process
Clause.168 But this has not stopped state and federal courts from fol-
lowing Briggs and forbidding indictments to name individuals whom a
grand jury accuses or suspects of crime but does not indict.'
69 The
American Bar Association, for its part, has also promulgated a rule
against naming unindicted co-conspirators in indictments.
170 Thus,
individuals suspected of crime but not indicted for it-i.e., with re-
spect to whom there is no judicial finding of probable cause-are well
protected in grand jury proceedings.
171
5. Arrest Records.-The Supreme Court has also repeatedly and
unequivocally upheld restrictions on public access to arrest records on
the ground that a person's interest in avoiding the disclosure of per-
sonal matters extends to his criminal record-i.e., for reasons of com-
[Accusation by a grand jury] is a foul blow. It wins the importance of a judicial
document; yet it lacks its principal attributes-the right to answer and to appeal.
It accuses, but furnishes no forum for denial. No one knows upon what evidence
the findings are based.... It is like the "hit and run" motorist. Before applica-
tion can be made to suppress it, it is the subject of public gossip. The damage is
done. The injury it may unjustly inflict may never be healed.
Id. at 803 (quoting People v. McCabe, 266 N.Y.S. 363, 367 (Sup. Ct. 1933)). And:
The medieval practice of subjecting a person suspected of crime to the rack and
other forms of torture is universally condemned; and we see little difference in
subjecting a person to the torture of public condemnation, loss of reputation,
and blacklisting in their chosen profession, in the manner here attempted by the
grand jury. The person so condemned is just as defenseless as the medieval pris-
oner and the victim of the lynch mob ....
Id. (quoting State v. Interim Report of Grand Jury, 93 So. 2d 99, 102 (Fla. 1957)).
165. Id. at 803.
166. Id. at 804-08.
167. Id. at 808.
168. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976); supra text at notes 29-31.
169. See 2 BEALE ET AL., supra note 160, § 8:4, at 8-28 (collecting cases).
170. Am. BAR Ass'N, GRAND JURY PRINCIPLES, no. 7 (1977) (cited in 2 BEALE ET AL., supra
note 160, § 8:4, at 8-28 to 8-29).
171. The individuals could, of course, later be named in a bill of particulars, or at trial.
But, as the Briggs court noted, a protective order could still keep the names from the public
in a bill of particulars, and neither a bill of particulars nor accusation by a trial witness is as
damaging as being named as a wrongdoer in an indictment. Briggs, 514 F.2d at 805.
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mon-law informational privacy. In United States Department of Justice v.
Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, the Court upheld the FBI's
refusal to disclose to press organizations the full arrest record, or "rap
sheet," of a person whose family business had been publicly linked to
organized crime and had allegedly obtained a number of defense con-
tracts as a result of an improper arrangement with a corrupt Congress-
man.172 The press had sought a copy of the rap sheet-an FBI
compilation of arrests, criminal charges, convictions, incarcerations,
and descriptive information about the person-under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA).17 The DOJ responded to the FOIA request
by stating that it had no record of "financial" crimes committed by the
suspects-apparently endorsing the press argument that information
about such crimes would be of special public interest given the allega-
tions-but refused to confirm or deny whether it had any information
about "nonfinancial" crimes committed by the suspects. 174
In an opinion replete with invocations of common-law privacy in-
terests, the Supreme Court upheld the DOJ's refusal under Exemp-
tion 7(C) of FOIA, which excludes from FOLA's disclosure
requirements records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes when the disclosure "could reasonably be expected to consti-
tute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'175 "[T]he com-
mon law . . . understanding[ I] of privacy encompass[es] the
individual's control of information concerning his or her person, "176
the Court found, and an individual's privacy interest in his rap sheet is
"substantial."177 Precisely what that interest is, the Court did not spec-
ify,178 but in citing leading authorities on common-law privacy (in-
cluding the Warren and Brandeis article) and discussing its earlier
decision in Department of the Air Force v. Rose,' 79 the Court endorsed the
172. 489 U.S. 749, 757 (1989).
173. Id.; see5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
174. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 757.
175. Id. at 755-56 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)).
176. Id. at 763.
177. Id. at 771.
178. The Court noted in passing that rap sheets may be "incorrect or incomplete," at
times containing information about other people with similar names, but this fact was not
mentioned by the Court again, and it was not the basis of the Court's decision. Id. at 752.
179. See id. at 767 (discussing Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976)). In Rose, the Court refused the
FOIA demand of New York University law students for summaries of cadet disciplinary
cases from the Air Force Academy Honor and Ethics Code. Rose, 425 U.S. at 354-55. The
Air Force had previously posted these summaries on Academy bulletin boards, naming
those cadets who had been found guilty and had left the Academy, but redacting the
names of other "accused" cadets. Id. at 359-60. The NYU students sought similarly re-
dacted versions (for a law review project on military discipline), but the Court upheld the
Academy's refusal to provide them, noting that information that would not necessarily
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idea that individuals have the right to keep information about at least
their prior involvement in the criminal justice system secret from the
public on common-law privacy grounds. Indeed, "the ordinary citizen
surely has a [privacy] interest in the aspects of his or her criminal
history that may have been wholly forgotten."8 0 And the Court did
not exclude convictions, it should be noted, from that interest.' 81 The
Court noted that in service of that interest only three states provided
public access to all information about a person's criminal history in
their jurisdiction, while forty-seven states placed "substantial restric-
dons" on such access.18 2 Congress itself, the Court stated, "under-
stood and did not disapprove the FBI's general policy of treating rap
sheets as nonpublic documents,"'1 3 and in enacting the FOIA exemp-
tion for law enforcement records on "personal privacy" grounds Con-
gress could also be presumed to have understood that law
enforcement professionals "generally assume[ ]" that individuals
"have a significant privacy interest in their criminal histories."
'184 The
Court thus joined Congress and the DOJ in adopting and approving
this assumption.
Reporters Committee was neither the Court's last nor its strongest
endorsement of a privacy right in arrest records. In Los Angeles Police
Department v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.,"8 5 the Court upheld a
California statute that restricted access to arrestees' addresses to those
requestors whose purpose was not commercial."8 6 The statute did not
forbid public access to arrestees' names; in fact it required it.' But
in rejecting a facial challenge to the statute by a private publishing
service, which provided arrestee information to customers including
attorneys, insurance companies, and driving schools, the Court stated:
[W]hat we have before us is nothing more than a govern-
mental denial of access to information in its possession. Cali-
identify a cadet to the public might identify him to fellow cadets or Academy staff familiar
with other aspects of the cadet's time at the Academy. Id. at 355, 380-81. Indeed, "even
with names redacted, subjects of such summaries can often be identified through other,
disclosed information." Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 769 (discussing Rose). The Court had
also said in Rose. "the risk to the privacy interests of a former cadet ... posed by his
identification by otherwise unknowing former colleagues or instructors cannot be rejected
as trivial." Rose, 425 U.S. at 381.
180. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 769.
181. Id. at 752.
182. Id. at 753.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 767.
185. 528 U.S. 32 (1999).
186. Id. at 40.
187. Id. at 35.
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fornia could decide not to give out arrestee information at all without
violating the First Amendment.
1 88
Even the two Associate Justices who dissented with the ruling agreed
with this proposition.
1 8 9
There are, of course, other privacy protections for parties in crim-
inal and quasi-criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court has ac-
knowledged that prospective jurors, for instance, might have a
protected interest in not revealing embarrassing personal information
in open court during voir dire, 9 ° and even actual trial jurors can re-
main unnamed to the public for privacy reasons. 9 ' Subjects of wire-
taps, along with subjects of bankruptcy proceedings and certain
immigration proceedings also find their privacy protected by restric-
tions on disclosure of information about them, including their identi-
ties.' 9 2 A right of anonymity-informational privacy of common-law
188. Id. at 40 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Kennedy, J.); see also Reno v. Condon,
528 U.S. 141, 143-44 (2000) (upholding a federal statute restricting access to a driver's
license information without the driver's consent).
190. Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 511-12 (1984). The Court stated:
The jury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling
interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal
matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public do-
main.... Some questions ... to prospective jurors [may] give rise to legitimate
privacy interests of those persons. For example a prospective juror might pri-
vately inform the judge that she, or a member of her family, had been raped but
had declined to seek prosecution because of the embarrassment and emotional
trauma from the very disclosure of the episode.
Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 353.
191. See, e.g., Karen Monsen, Privacy for Prospective Jurors at What Price? Distinguishing Pri-
vacy Rights from Privacy Interests; Rethinking Procedures to Protect Privacy in Civil and Criminal
Cases, 21 REv. LITIG. 285, 305 (2002); David Weinstein, Protecting a Juror's Right to Privacy:
Constitutional Constraints and Policy Options, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1997) (noting various
state procedures for keeping juror names anonymous); see also Daniel Okrent, The Juror, the
Paper and a Dubious Need to Know, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, at 3 ("[E]ven after a trial has
ended, an individual juror's role in deliberations-arguments presented, behavior exhib-
ited, votes taken-should remain private if the juror wishes to keep it private.") (criticizing
the press for naming and reporting unflattering information about a holdout juror in a
closely watched corporate-scandal trial of a Tyco executive), available at 2004 WLNR
5501287.
192. See United States v. Gerena, 869 F.2d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1989) (recognizing "the signifi-
cant privacy interests of those who have been targeted for [wiretap] surveillance"; also,
"protection of privacy was a very important congressional concern in the passage of Title
III [of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 211, which regu-
lates government wiretapping and surveillance]"; holding that the district court must bal-
ance the presumptive right of access to pretrial briefs and memoranda against defendants'
statutorily protected privacy interest and order sealing or redactions of transcripts of
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origin-is thus recognized and protected for sexual assault complain-
ants, juvenile offenders and accusees, accusees in other quasi-criminal
proceedings, grand jury targets, prospective and actual jurors, and ar-
restees when it comes to records of their arrest. That some version of
this right should be recognized and protected for all criminal ar-
restees and suspects is argued next, in Part II.
II. ARTICULATING A RIGHT FOR ARRESTEES AND SUSPECTS
The Supreme Court has clearly approved of state efforts to pro-
tect informational privacy in the criminal process, and has told states
that the correct method of that protection is for the state to withhold
the privacy-infringing information-the names of certain parties to
criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings-from the public. Given this
precedent, the privacy right for arrestees and suspects that I propose
seems at least conceptually a fait accomplit. The reasoning that sup-
ports anonymity in criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings for so
many alleged wrongdoers-juvenile accusees (and offenders),judicial
misconduct accusees, grand jury targets who have not yet been in-
dicted and alleged co-conspirators of those who have, arrestees with
respect to their arrest records-supports it for criminal arrestees and
suspects too. But the right must also be established on its own terms.
That is the subject of Part II.C below, in which I explore the right
under the three pertinent doctrines of public access to government
information-the Supreme Court's government information jurispru-
dence, the common-law doctrine of access to government informa-
tion, and the constitutional doctrine of access to the courts-and
finally under the public disclosure tort itself.
First, though, a brief exploration of the probable cause standard
and a common-sense inquiry: why might we want the names of crimi-
nal accusees to be disclosed? What practical or policy considerations
support public knowledge and weigh against the right of temporary
anonymity I propose here? What, in other words, is the logic of nam-
ing criminal arrestees and suspects before a judicial finding of proba-
ble cause-and what are the weaknesses of that logic? In Part II.B, I
wiretapped conversations accordingly); 11 U.S.C. § 107(b) (2) (2000) (permitting a bank-
ruptcy court to limit public access to court filings to protect, inter alia, "a person with
respect to scandalous or defamatory matter contained in" a filing); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27(c)
(2004) (closing immigration proceedings concerning "abused alien spouse[s]" and
"abused alien child[ren]"). But see Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529-30 (2001) (re-
jecting the application of sanctions from federal and state wiretapping laws to media de-
fendants who had broadcast an unlawfully intercepted wireless telephone conversation,
when the information disclosed was truthful and of public concern).
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address these questions. I list possible reasons for naming summarily
first, in order to present and explain the probable cause threshold I
propose as a prerequisite to public identification of arrestees and sus-
pects. Then I address each possible reason for naming in more detail.
A. The Probable Cause Standard
Publicly naming criminal accusees can be justified on several
grounds. First among these is public safety. Because the state's pri-
mary responsibility is to protect its citizens, one could argue, the gov-
ernment should inform the public when it suspects someone of
criminal activity so that people may take measures to avoid possible
harm-physical, financial, or other-from the suspect. A second rea-
son is investigatory: naming a suspect or arrestee invites people with
relevant information to come forward, thus providing additional wit-
nesses or other evidence, which could be inculpatory or exculpatory
of the named accusee. A third possible benefit from naming inures to
the accusee: the state is presumably less likely or able to dishonor an
accusee's procedural or substantive rights under the watchful eye of
the public. Fourth, people should arguably be told of government
suspicions regarding an arrestee or suspect so they can practice "in-
formed living," the right to exercise an informed choice of those with
whom they live, associate, etc. Fifth, the government should arguably
have to name criminal arrestees and suspects so that the public can
meaningfully participate in the operation of the criminal justice sys-
tem and effectuate its right to self-governance-i.e., under common-
law and constitutional doctrines of public access to government infor-
mation and proceedings.
My central contention is that none of these reasons justifies the
routine naming of criminal arrestees and suspects before a judicial
finding of probable cause. I will address each of these reasons in turn;
first, however, the selection of that standard-a judicial finding of
probable cause-requires explanation. Probable cause is the firmly
established threshold for any sustained deprivation of a suspect's
rights in the criminal process. 193 A finding of probable cause-facts
193. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (providing that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause"); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959) (finding a warrantless arrest and
search unlawful for lack of probable cause); see also Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301
(1978) (a probable cause finding by a grandjury is both necessary and sufficient for indict-
ment in federal courts); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (probable cause
permits warrantless arrest); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971) (search warrants
require probable cause); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112 (1975) (the probable cause
standard for arrest and detention "represents a necessary accommodation between the
individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to control crime"); Brinegar v. United
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and circumstances that indicate a reasonable probability that a crime
has been committed; a relatively low standard that falls somewhere
below a prima facie showing of guilt' 9 4-by a judge or magistrate is
required to issue an arrest or search warrant. But a warrant is not
required for an arrest. Police can arrest suspects upon their own de-
termination of probable cause, 195 and in fact many more arrests occur
without warrants than with them.1" 6 Upon a warrantless arrest, the
police must either release the arrestee or present him "promptly" to a
judicial officer for a post-arrest judicial determination of probable
cause, typically within forty-eight hours of the arrest.197 The purpose
of this rule is to prevent the harms of extended pretrial detention-
damage to one's employment, income, and relationships, in the Su-
preme Court's own enumeration-when there has not been a proba-
ble cause finding by a "neutral" party.198 But there is no similar
judicial check on the harms of being named as a suspected criminal
when there has not been a neutral probable cause finding. Allowing
police to identify arrestees or suspects absent a judicial finding of
probable cause, as is the practice now, thus gives law enforcement vir-
tually unchecked power to subject countless individuals who may
never even be formally charged by a prosecutor, let alone found guilty
by a judge or jury, to all the harms that result from being publicly
named as an alleged criminal.' 99 For this reason, ajudicial finding of
probable cause should be required before an arrestee or suspect is
publicly named. Just as a probable cause finding is the point at which
a suspect's constitutional rights of liberty and privacy are deemed out-
States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (noting that the probable cause standard is "the best
compromise that has been found for accommodating" the opposing interests of privacy
and law enforcement).
194. SeeSpinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 419 (1969) ("[Oinly the probability, and
not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause."); Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983) (probable cause for a search means "a fair probability
that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place"); WAYNE R.
LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 742 (3d ed. 2000) ("In the federal courts, the gov-
erning standard [for grand jury indictment] apparently is the probable cause standard, but
some judges use a prima facie instruction .... [I]t generally is assumed that the prima
facie evidence standard is a substantially more rigorous test than the traditional probable
cause standard.").
195. See Watson, 423 U.S. at 418-22.
196. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 194, at 12 n.2 ("Arresting without first obtaining a
warrant is the predominant practice in all localities.").
197. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 112-14; County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56
(1991) (ruling that forty-eight hours is presumptively sufficiently prompt for judicial deter-
mination of probable cause after warrantless arrest).
198. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.




weighed by the public's interest in law enforcement, it should also be
the point at which the informational privacy right of an arrestee or
suspect in the fact of his arrest should cede to the interests in publicly
naming him.
How and when a judicial probable cause finding is made must
also be explained. In federal court, and in at least one state, ajudicial
assessment of probable cause is a routine component of the arrestee's
first court hearing.2 ° ° At that hearing, often called the "initial appear-
ance," the arrestee is typically arraigned-i.e., the government files
formal charges, the court informs the arrestee of those charges and
the arrestee-defendant enters an initial plea of guilty or not guilty; the
court appoints counsel and decides whether the defendant should be
released or detained; and the court sets a date for trial or other pro-
ceedings in the case.2 ' A probable cause determination at this hear-
ing typically consists of a judicial officer's summary review of a sworn
statement of facts that accompanies the charging document, much
like a judicial officer reviews a sworn statement of facts to decide
whether to issue an arrest warrant. In cases where the defendant has
been arrested pursuant to a warrant, the probable cause finding has
already been made by the judge or magistrate who issued the warrant.
But the Supreme Court has never required a judicial probable
cause finding at a criminal defendant's initial court appearance-or
at all in a criminal case. Rather, in the seminal case of Gerstein v. Pugh,
the Court mandated such a finding only when a defendant suffers a
"significant pretrial restraint of liberty," and expressly disavowed the
notion that ajudicial probable cause finding is, short of such restraint,
a general requirement in a criminal prosecution.20 2 And while the
200. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 3-5 (requiring a sworn statement of facts satisfying the probable
cause standard, contained in the complaint or accompanying affidavits, to be presented to
a judicial officer presiding over the initial court appearance of the arrestee); N.Y. CRIM.
PROC. LAw § 140.20 (McKinney 2004) (requiring an "appropriate accusatory instrument"
to be filed at the warrantless arrestee's initial court appearance); id. § 100.15 (requiring
the accusatory instrument to contain a "factual part" alleging facts supporting the criminal
charge); id. § 100.40 (requiring the factual part of the accusatory instrument to provide
"reasonable cause" of guilt); see also People v. Maldonado, 658 N.E.2d 1028, 1031 (N.Y.
1995) (clarifying that "[r]easonable cause means probable cause").
201. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.10, 180.10 (McKinney 2004) (describing ar-
raignment procedures).
202. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 125; see also id. at 126 ("[T]he Fourth Amendment requires a
timely judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to detention .... "); id. at
125 n.26 ("[T]he probable cause determination is not a constitutional prerequisite to the
charging decision, it is required only for those suspects who suffer restraints on liberty
other than the condition that they appear for trial."); id. at 123 ("The Fourth Amendment
probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody."); id. at 119 ("[W] e do
not imply that the accused is entitled to judicial oversight or review of the decision to
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Court in Gerstein did say that "burdensome conditions" of pretrial re-
lease might restrain liberty enough to trigger the requirement, 20 3 the
Court has never considered Gerstein's probable cause requirement
with respect to anything short of actual detention. 2 4 Not surprisingly,
prosecute. Instead, we adhere to the Court's prior holding that a judicial hearing is not
prerequisite to prosecution by information."); see also Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,
534 (1884) (Fifth Amendment requirement of grand jury indictment for "capital, or other-
wise infamous crime[s]" does not bind the states); Lem Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586
(1913) (states need not give defendants preliminary hearings).
203. Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 114.
204. See id. at 125 n.26 ("There are many kinds of pretrial release and many degrees of
conditional liberty .... We cannot define specifically those that would require a prior
probable cause determination, but the key factor is significant restraint on liberty.").
Some members of the Court nevertheless believe ajudicial probable cause requirement is,
or should be, a constitutional prerequisite to criminal prosecution. This position appears
in a series of opinions in Albright v. Oliver, in which a plurality of the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment, rather than the Due Process Clause, is the locus of any protection
against prosecutions without probable cause. 510 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1994). The plurality
opinion expressed no view on the merits of such a claim; but Justice Stevens, writing in
dissent and joined by Justice Blackmun, argued that due process does indeed require a
judicial probable cause finding to maintain a criminal prosecution. Id. at 295-97 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In a concurring opinion that has received more attention, Justice Ginsburg
found a probable cause requirement under the Fourth Amendment, and advanced what
has been called a "continuing seizure" theory of criminal prosecution. Id. at 276-79 (Gins-
burg, J., concurring). OtherJustices rejected both the Stevens and Ginsburg positions. See
id. at 275 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he only deprivation of life, liberty or property, if any,
consisted of petitioner's pretrial arrest."); id. at 282 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The spe-
cific provisions of the Bill of Rights neither impose a standard for the initiation of a prose-
cution, nor require a pretrial hearing to weigh evidence according to a given
standard ... ." (citation omitted)); id. at 282-83 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[B]ecause the
Constitution requires a speedy trial but no pretrial hearing on the sufficiency of the
charges (leaving aside the question of extended pretrial detention), any standard gov-
erning the initiation of charges would be superfluous in providing protection during the
criminal process." (citation omitted)). Justice Souter took a middle position, suggesting
that probable cause is required when seizure occurs or bond terms are imposed, but not
from "the mere initiation of prosecution." Id. at 289-90 (Souter, J., concurring).
In the lower courts, while almost every federal circuit has taken note of Justice Gins-
burg's position that a prosecution in itself is a Fourth Amendment seizure that requires a
probable cause finding, no circuit has adopted it, and at least four circuits have expressly
declined to do so. See Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1235-36 (11th Cir. 2004)
(finding that no seizure occurred although arrestee was required to post bond, appear at
an arraignment, and travel twice from New Jersey to Florida to face criminal charges);
Karam v. City of Burbank, 352 F.3d 1188, 1193-94 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even if
some combination of pretrial release restrictions might constitute a seizure, requirements
to appear in court for a misdemeanor and to obtain judicial permission before leaving the
state did not); Castellano v. Fragozo, 311 F.3d 689, 721-23 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing Jus-
tice Ginsburg's approach and declining to follow it); Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 310
F.3d 484, 491-93 (6th Cir. 2002) (discussing Justice Ginsburg's approach but finding that
the Fourth Amendment was not implicated by an ordinance banning arrestees from the
city's designated "drug-exclusion" zones); Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 54-57 (1st Cir.
2001) (discussing and declining to follow Justice Ginsburg's approach); Riley v. Dorton,
115 F.3d 1159, 1162-64 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); Tech. Ordnance, Inc. v. United States, 244
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VoL.. 64:755
then, many jurisdictions do not require ajudicial probable cause find-
ing at an initial appearance unless the government seeks the arrestee's
pretrial detention or some other significant pretrial deprivation of lib-
erty.2 5 True, for felonies, some jurisdictions require ajudicial proba-
ble cause finding at some point in the case via an adversarial
preliminary hearing or, more crucially, a grand jury indictment.
20 6
F.3d 641, 650-51 (8th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the plaintiff's attempt in a malicious prosecu-
tion action to rely on Albright's plurality opinion, as well asJustice Ginsburg's concurrence,
to prove an illegal seizure where the plaintiffs were required to post bond, make a court
appearance, and answer charges in a prosecution without probable cause); Washington v.
Summerville, 127 F.3d 552, 560 n.3 (7th Cir. 1997) (reiterating its pre- and post-Albright
rejections of the "continuing seizure" concept); Taylor v. Meacham, 82 F.3d 1556, 1561 n.5
(10th Cir. 1996) (mentioning but not reaching Justice Ginsburg's position).
The Second and Third Circuits do, however, rely on the favorable opinions in Albright
to find seizures in pretrial release conditions that fall short of actual detention. See Gallo v.
City of Philadelphia, 161 F.3d 217, 222-25 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that restrictions on
arrestee's post-indictment liberty-including travel prohibition and requirements of bond,
court attendance, and weekly contact with pretrial services-constitute a Fourth Amend-
ment seizure for the purpose of an arrestee's malicious prosecution claim); Murphy v.
Lynn, 118 F.3d 938, 944-46 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding that the imposition of travel restrictions
and an obligation to make eight court appearances constituted a seizure).
205. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 991 (a) (West 2004) (requiring a probable cause find-
ing at misdemeanor arraignments only when defendants are held in custody); D.C. R.
CiuM. P. 5(c) (requiring a probable cause finding at the initial hearing only if release
conditions "constitute a significant restraint on pretrial liberty"); FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.133(a) (1)-(2) (requiring a probable cause finding at the initial appearance of defendants
detained, but not those released, unless there is a request and a showing that release condi-
tions are a significant restraint of liberty); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 230.2 (West
2004) (requiring a timely probable cause finding after a warrantless arrest is made and
stating that, without such a finding, the arrestee shall be released); People v. Fleet, 522
N.E.2d 244, 248 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (holding that a probable cause finding is not required
for "insignificant" pretrial release conditions, such as appearance at court hearings or re-
stricting out-of-state travel); Jenkins v. ChiefJustice of the Dist. Court, 619 N.E.2d 324, 336
(Mass. 1993) (ruling that a judicial probable cause finding is not required at arraignment
of arrestees released on bail); Tarlton v. State, 578 S.W.2d 417, 418 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)
(holding that a probable cause finding is not required when defendant is released pending
trial).
New York law appears atypical not only because it requires a judicial probable cause find-
ing at every initial hearing, but also because it mandates dismissal of a criminal case absent
that finding. See supra note 205; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw §§ 140.45, 150.50 (requiring
a court to dismiss a legally insufficient charging instrument); id. §§ 100.40, 100.15 (requir-
ing a complaint to allege facts that establish reasonable cause or the complaint will be
deemed insufficient to commence a criminal action); id. § 170.10 practice cmts. (noting
that a court's initial duty at arraignment on information or misdemeanor complaint is to
scrutinize the charging instrument for legal sufficiency, without which the court has no
jurisdiction); id. § 180.10 practice cmts. (describing the same duty as in § 170.10, but for
felony complaints); People v. Machado, 698 N.Y.S.2d 416, 419 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1999) ("[I]f
a local criminal court finds that the pleading and the available facts do not establish rea-
sonable cause, it has no choice but to dismiss following a warrantless arrest.").
206. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 194, at 710-12. Eighteen states require indictments for
felony prosecutions; the remainder permit felony prosecution upon a prosecutor's filing of
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But even in these jurisdictions, neither of these findings need take
place "promptly" after arrest, nor need either occur at all for misde-
meanors.207 The result is that literally hundreds of thousands of mis-
demeanor and felony arrestees nationwide face trial without ajudicial
finding of probable cause, and another few hundred thousand felony
arrestees must wait days, weeks, or months for such a finding-or for
dismissal of their case in its failure or absence. Another untold num-
ber of felony and misdemeanor arrestees find their cases dismissed at
or soon after their initial court appearances.20 8 In all of these cases,
the government is free to name these arrestees and to describe their
alleged crimes. In none of these cases is the government obligated to
give equal publicity, or any publicity at all, to acquittals, failures of
probable cause, or dismissals for other reasons.
Hence the proposal that the government should be required to
obtain a judicial finding of probable cause before publicly naming an
arrestee. This requirement is not particularly onerous; it entails no
more than what Gerstein requires, and state law typically provides, for
detention beyond the immediate post-arrest period-an ex parte,
nonadversarial judicial review, where defense counsel is not required
and hearsay evidence suffices. 2 9 The judicial finding of probable
cause could thus require no more than a judge's passing on a sworn
statement of facts in the same way a judge passes on an affidavit sub-
mitted in support of a request for an arrest warrant. And, of course,
either an arrest warrant or a grand jury indictment could also serve as
the necessary judicial probable cause finding, just as the Gerstein Court
said either would be sufficient for detention purposes.2 0
With this premise in mind, we return to the arguments in favor of
publicly identifying arrestees and suspects.
an information. (Several in the latter group, however, require indictments for crimes car-
rying a possible sentence of death or life imprisonment.) Id.
207. Again, the exception is the atypical jurisdiction that requires a probable cause find-
ing for all criminal cases, like New York. See supra notes 205 & 205.
208. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
209. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120 (1975).
210. Id. at 116 n.18, 117 n.19. It could be argued, though, that once the state has filed
charges and counsel has been appointed, an arrestee-defendant should have notice and an
opportunity to contest the probable cause finding. The Gerstein Court did hold that a post-
arrest, judicial probable cause determination did not require an adversary proceeding, and
that it was not a "critical stage" that required appointed counsel, id. at 120-23; but this was
in the context of a probable cause determination that allowed what the Court has subse-
quently characterized as only "limited postarrest detention." See United States v. Salerno,
481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) (emphasis added). That the harm of naming lasts could mean
that greater procedural protections should be provided in the probable cause determina-
tion that allows it, just as they are provided in the hearing that permits extended ("preven-
tive") pretrial detention in the federal courts. Id. at 751-52.
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B. Reasons for Naming
1. Public Safety.-The government should certainly be able to
name suspected criminals for legitimate public safety reasons. In-
deed, it should arguably be required to name them when public safety
concerns dictate. The problem with this rationale is how few cases it
actually applies to. In the overwhelming majority of cases, the govern-
ment names criminal accusees after they have been arrested; a glance
at the daily news confirms this. Public safety concerns with respect to
someone who has been arrested have presumably been satisfied by the
arrest itself, and will be further addressed in judicial hearings should
the government seek to hold the arrestee in custody before trial. Po-
lice also name suspects before they are arrested, but only rarely is it
because the suspect is dangerous and at large-as another glance at
the daily news confirms. The public safety rationale thus explains the
practice of naming arrestees and suspects in only a small number of
cases.
Nor, for even those few cases, is there an established standard for
determining when a suspect constitutes enough of a public safety con-
cern to justify publicly naming him.211 What should the standard be?
Using arrest as the triggering point would leave the naming decision
in the hands of the police in most cases, and would prove both overin-
clusive and underinclusive: not all arrestees are dangerous (if any at
all remain dangerous after their arrest), and dangerous suspects who
have not yet been arrested could not be named. A "reasonable suspi-
cion" standard might be suggested, but this low level of suspicionjusti-
fies intrusions by law enforcement officers that are only brief in
duration and limited in scope,212 and would allow the naming of even
211. For instance, "Amber Alert" laws, which establish or mandate procedures to notify
the public rapidly of child abductions, leave it to law enforcement agencies to determine
the content of the notifications and the standards for issuing them. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5791a (2003) (empowering the Department of Justice to establish minimum standards
for the issuance of child abduction alerts); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8594(b)-(c) (West Supp.
2005) (authorizing California law enforcement agencies to develop policies and proce-
dures for an emergency alert system); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 28.753 (West 2004) (giv-
ing the state police the power to establish policies for Michigan's Amber Alert plan).
Meanwhile, private entities are immunized from suit for disseminating information in con-
junction with these alerts. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 5791d (limiting the liability of the Na-
tional Center for Missing and Exploited Children "in any civil action for defamation, libel,
slander, or harm to reputation" to cases of "actual malice" or dissemination "for a purpose
unrelated to an activity mandated by Federal law"); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.765 ("A
radio or television station that accurately broadcasts information concerning a child abduc-
tion obtained from the Michigan state police pursuant to the Amber alert of Michigan is
immune from any liability based on the broadcast of that information.").
212. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273-74 (2002); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-
31 (1968).
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greater numbers of individuals whom police never arrest, including
many of whom the police never even suspect of a particular crime.
Certainly, at the very least, a probable cause standard should be
required to name someone, for public safety reasons, as an alleged
criminal. A person with respect to whom there is not probable cause
cannot fairly be considered dangerous, or at least not dangerous
enough to be publicly named.2"' And for the reasons I presented
above, that probable cause determination should be a judicial one.
2. Evidence Gathering.-Publicly identifying an arrestee or sus-
pect might produce more witnesses, additional inculpatory evidence,
additional criminal charges, additional complainants, or even addi-
tional defendants. High-profile cases provide examples of this.2 14 (It
213. Even a judicial finding of probable cause of guilt is not necessarily enough, on its
own, to permit extended pretrial detention of defendants on grounds of their alleged dan-
gerousness. The Supreme Court, upholding the preventive detention provisions of the
Bail Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)-(f) (Supp. III 1982), noted in approval not
only that detention for "dangerousness" under the statute required a judicial determina-
tion of probable cause with respect to the charged crime, but also that the statute "oper-
ate[d] only on individuals who have been arrested for a specific category of extremely
serious offenses," and required, through "a full-blown adversary hearing," a judicial find-
ing, by clear and convincing evidence, that no conditions of release could reasonably as-
sure the safety of the community-i.e., a separate finding that the defendant "presents a
demonstrable danger to the community." United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750
(1987). The Court appears, however, to have overstated the separateness of the danger-
ousness requirement. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e) (stating that a rebuttable presumption of
dangerousness is established in various circumstances, including mere finding of probable
cause of guilt of certain charged crimes).
214. See, e.g., Pam Belluck, Boston Study Traces Patterns of Sexual Abuse by Priests, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at A22 (reporting a finding by a nationwide study that nearly 500 of
965 complaints of abuse by priests in Boston "were reported after the abuse scandal
emerged in January 2002"); Laurie Goodstein, Two Studies Cite Child Sex Abuse by 4 % of
Priests, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at Al (reporting a nationwide study that found one-third
of accusations of abuse against priests "were reported in 2002-2003, after the scandal
erupted in the Boston Archdiocese with news reports about two priests who were serial
pedophiles"); Tina Kelley, In Yet Another Case, Police Officer Is Charged in Sex Assault, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 27, 2001, at BI ("In several cases, including this latest one, news reports about
the women's complaints [of mistreatment by police officers] have prompted others to
come forward, sometimes about incidents that took place months or years earlier."); Tina
Kelley, More Women Report Abuse by Patrolman in Suffolk, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2001, at B5
(describing allegations by an unnamed woman who, after others' allegations of mistreat-
ment by a police officer had been publicized, "identified the patrolman ... from pictures
on television"); Andy Newman, Suffolk County Officer Is Charged in Abuse of Female Drivers,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2002, at B5 (noting that a woman's allegation of mistreatment by a
police officer "prompted several other women to come forward"); Joanna Weiss, Emotional
Accuser Tells of Alleged Abuse by Shanley, BosT. GLOBE, Jan. 27, 2005, at Al (reporting trial
testimony that in 2001 an accuser recovered memories of a priest's sexual abuse of him in
the early 1980s only after learning of newspaper reports of others' accusations of the same
priest, particularly the accusation by a former Sunday-school classmate); see also Caldarola
v. County of Westchester, 343 F.3d 570, 576 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[A] llowing the public to view
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can also work to the benefit of an innocent accusee, whose public
naming might prompt those with knowledge of his innocence or an-
other's guilt to come forward.2 15) The government should certainly
be permitted to name arrestees and suspects for this investigative pur-
pose. But there are problems with this rationale in both practice and
theory. In practice, while police officers might choose which arrestees
and suspects to identify publicly (for whatever reason), the press
makes the more meaningful decision of who among those identified
will make the evening news or the morning papers, and how much
attention those individuals will receive. A genuine interest in evi-
dence gathering, not to mention a more productive method of it,
would keep control over the meaningful portion of the publicity deci-
sion with the police instead of the press. The government could, for
instance, solicit evidence against arrestees and suspects by naming
them in purchased space in the newspaper, much as it announces auc-
tions or forfeitures of seized property. Indeed, the government does
"advertise" to invite information about suspects or crimes it deems
worthy of such effort.216 That the government does not similarly pub-
lish the names of arrestees and suspects as a routine matter, if ever,
suggests three interrelated possibilities: first, that the government
does not allocate the funds to purchase such publicity; second, that it
does not consider such publicity a particularly productive investigative
tool in the everyday case; and third, that it would just as soon let the
press make the publicity decision and, accordingly, bear the costs of
the publicity. All of these possibilities, of course, point to the conclu-
sion that, as a practical matter, evidence gathering is not a particularly
images of an arrestee informs and enables members of the public who may come forward
with additional information relevant to the law enforcement investigation.").
215. See, e.g., Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Dep't of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 98 (6th Cir. 1996)
(finding that FOIA requires the government to release detainee mug shots in part because
the photos can "reveal the government's glaring error in detaining the wrong person for
an offense").
216. See, e.g., FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI's TEN
MOST WANTED FUGITIVES, available at http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten/fugitives/fugi-
tives.htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2005). For another example, I have on file an advertisement
tided, Your Help Is Needed, which appeared in The Washington Post on July 15, 2003, at page
B8. Among other things, the ad states: "The Metropolitan Police Department of the Dis-
trict of Columbia is seeking the public's help in identifying and locating the person(s)
responsible for the murder of Maurice Humbles." The ad features a picture of the victim
and describes the facts of the killing; apparently there was no particular suspect in mind.
The victim is described as an independent distributor for The Washington Post who was
"preparing his vehicle for his daily routine when he was attacked." The ad also gives the
name and phone number of the detective in charge of the case, and offers a $10,000
reward for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the person(s) responsible.
The ad itself refers to "Crime Solvers" as the organization that placed it in the newspaper,
but it also lists the website of the D.C. police.
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high priority on the government's list of reasons for naming criminal
arrestees and suspects.
Even if it were desirable and feasible, naming arrestees and sus-
pects in order to gather evidence against them should still be subject
to a judicial probable cause standard. That standard is already the
threshold for evidence-gathering methods that infringe upon other
significant privacy interests, such as searches of homes and wiretaps
on telephones.21 7 To require the same degree of suspicion and judi-
cial endorsement before publicly naming arrestees or suspects in
hopes of obtaining evidence against them poses no conceptual diffi-
culty. Nor does such a requirement impose an impractical burden on
law enforcement, because it requires police officers to do no more
than what they do regularly to obtain search warrants, wiretap authori-
zations and the like: present their evidence to a judge or magistrate
for her approval.
3. Protecting the Accused.-Publicity protects criminal defendants
against unfair trials; that, at least, is the premise of the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a public trial.218 As the Supreme Court has put it, the
right to a public trial is "a safeguard against any attempt to employ our
courts as instruments of persecution," and "[t]he knowledge that
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum
of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse ofjudicial
power."219 Public trials are also thought to encourage witnesses to
come forward, and to discourage pejury.2" ° The defendant's right of
publicity can extend to pretrial proceedings, too.2 2 1 Certainly the in-
terests in support of public trials and pretrial proceedings also sup-
217. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (2000) (providing that the interception of wire, oral, or elec-
tronic communication requires ajudicial probable cause finding); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (forbidding the warrantless use of a thermal-imaging device to
detect excessive heat associated with marijuana-growing within a home).
218. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial .... ). This right clearly belongs to criminal defend-
ants. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 380 (1979) ("Our cases have uniformly
recognized the public-trial guarantee as one created for the benefit of the defendant.").
The public's right to open trials derives from the First Amendment and is the subject of
Part II.C.3.
219. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270 (1948); see also Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court,
478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986) ("[T]he defendant has a right to a fair trial but, as we have repeatedly
recognized, one of the important means of assuring a fair trial is that the process be open
to neutral observers.").
220. Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984).
221. Id. at 4748 (reversing a trial court order closing a seven-day suppression hearing to
protect the privacy of individuals other than defendants implicated in tapes of government
wiretaps played at the hearing).
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port public knowledge of the identities of arrestees and suspects
before trial. This is particularly true for individuals who have been
arrested but not yet brought before a judicial officer for a probable
cause determination, because these individuals are at the mercy and
whim of the law enforcement officers who arrested them. 222
A defendant can, however, waive her right to a public trial; 22' an
arrestee should, similarly, have the power to waive any right to be
named publicly that might be asserted to protect her upon arrest.224
Again, control over information about oneself is the essence of com-
mon-law informational privacy. 22 5 This means not just an individual's
ability to withhold personal information, but also her power to dis-
close it, and to decide when and to whom it is disclosed.2 26 Thus, the
only way for an arrestee to exercise her privacy rights in this context
would be to decide whether and when to invoke the protections of her
public naming. Giving the privacy/publicity decision to the impli-
cated person is, in fact, a standard method of protecting the privacy of
individuals who are either named in government records or subject to
government proceedings. 227 Nor does an arrestee's decision to keep
her name private mean that the government can withhold all informa-
tion about an arrest; only information identifying the arrestee could
be withheld on this ground.
True, a defendant's right to a public trial does not confer an
equivalent right to a private trial;228 rather, a defendant's request for
closure must defeat the public's presumptive right of access to trials
under the First Amendment, which allows closure only upon a show-
ing of a compelling interest that overrides any right of public access,
222. See infra notes 336-340 and accompanying text (discussing further the protective
function of post-arrest naming).
223. Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965); see also Gannett, 443 U.S. at 382 &
n.1I (finding that the ability to waive the right to a public trial does not allow a defendant
to compel a private trial).
224. Note too that the public trial right does not likely extend to this stage of the crimi-
nal process because a "prosecution" has not yet begun. See infra note 331.
225. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text.
226. See supra notes 44-52 and accompanying text; see alsoJean L. Cohen, The Necessity of
Privacy, 68 Soc. REs. 318, 319 (2001) (arguing for a constitutional right to privacy and
noting that "[p]rivacy rights do not silence; instead they protect communicative liberty:
the freedom to choose whether, when, and with whom one will discuss intimate matters").
227. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (2000) (allowing disclosure of otherwise protected per-
sonal records maintained by the government upon written consent of person to whom the
records pertain); CAL. PENAL CODE § 293(a) (West 1999) (giving sex offense complainants
the option to choose whether to be identified in the public record); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.27(c)
(requiring immigration judges to ask abused alien spouses whether they request closed
proceedings).
228. Gannett, 443 U.S. at 382.
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case-by-case findings, and narrowly tailored provisions.
2 29 The point is
that just as criminal defendants have the ability to waive the protec-
tions of a public trial upon showing a sufficiently compelling interest,
so should criminal arrestees and suspects have the ability to waive the
protections of public knowledge of their status upon a similar show-
ing.2 30 My argument is that personal privacy is such a sufficiently com-
pelling interest.
4. "Informed Living."-The government should arguably inform
the public about its suspicions regarding an arrestee or suspect so that
people may practice "informed living," the right to exercise an in-
formed choice about those with whom they live and associate.
23' That
is, X should have access to information that Y has been arrested for or
suspected of a crime so that X can decide intelligently whether to so-
cialize with Y, let her children play with Ys children, patronize Ys
business or use Y's professional services, and so forth. X's use of such
information is, of course, precisely what Y would hope to prevent by
keeping the information about her arrest private; the tension between
the two ideals is a basic tension of any privacy protection for true
information.2 32
There are at least two reasons why X should not be entitled to
information about Ys arrest or about police suspicion regarding Y,
before there is a judicial finding of probable cause of Ys guilt. The
first of these is the presumption of innocence. Although the govern-
ment's routine naming of arrestees or suspects might not violate the
presumption of innocence as a matter of constitutional law,
233 its
229. See infra Part II.C.3.
230. Again, however, it is not clear that the presumption of public access under the First
Amendment even attaches at this early stage; see supra note 224 and infta note 331.
231. See Richard A. Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of
First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2000) (discussing, as a counter-
weight to privacy goals, the social ideal of the practice of full disclosure of information
about others in order to allow individuals to make "full and informed decisions"); see also
Volokh, supra note 9, at 1088, 1106, 1115 (discussing restrictions on informational privacy
based on legitimate public interest). Daniel Solove calls this the "judgment and trust cri-
tique" of disclosure restrictions on privacy grounds. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less,
supra note 135, at 1032.
232. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 231, at 1047 ("[T]he disclosure norm and the privacy
norm often run on a collision course with respect to information that has value to some if
it is kept secret, and to others if it is disclosed."); Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, supra
note 48, at 996-97 ("[T]he task of the common law has been to balance the importance of
maintaining individual information preserves against the public's general interest in
information.").
233. Cf United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (finding that the Bail Reform
Act's provisions allowing extended pretrial detention on grounds of dangerousness or risk
of flight did not offend the presumption of innocence).
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naming of them for the purpose of Ys interest in informed living guts
the presumption as a matter of social policy. It seems that members of
the public have trouble honoring the presumption of innocence
outside the jury box. That is, many people assume arrestees are guilty
whether or not they have been convicted. 234 For the government to
name arrestees for the very purpose of encouraging this assumption,
when the criminal process has not established enough probability of
an arrestee's guilt to meet even the very low standard of probable
cause (found by someone other than an arresting officer) is to dis-
honor the spirit of the presumption of innocence and to encourage
the public to do the same.
Second, to name arrestees and suspects so that members of the
public can make decisions on the basis of that information repudiates
the very notion of informational privacy.235 Laws that protect individ-
uals against the dissemination of personal information aim not only to
protect individuals from embarrassment but also to protect them from
precisely these kinds ofjudgments by members of the public.2 6 Here,
protecting individuals against these judgments is all the more impor-
tant because news of an individual's arrest or suspicion is rarely fol-
lowed by equal coverage of her exoneration or acquittal. Moreover,
while news of one's arrest or suspicion is technically true, its dissemi-
nation before criminal charges have been ratified at least by a judicial
finding of probable cause is all the more likely to trigger unjustified
misjudgments about the individual. 37 If the thrust of informational
234. See Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OLA. L. REV. 257, 267 (2002) ("[T]here is a
tendency among the public, and even courts, to assume that a person is not summoned for
an investigation or put to trial without basis."); Terese L. Fitzpatrick, Note, Innocent Until
Proven Guilty: Shallow Words for the Falsely Accused in a Criminal Prosecution for Child Sexual
Abuse, 12 U. BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 175, 176 n.10 (1991) (citing Seth Mydans, Child Abuse:
Some Prosecutions Win, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 1990, at 12 (discussing a poll of some thirteen
thousand television viewers that showed, after two people who ran a California day-care
center were acquitted of spectacular charges of child abuse in 1990, over eleven thousand
viewers thought the jury was wrong)). But see infta note 468 (citing a 2001 DOJ poll con-
cluding that the majority of respondents were more inclined to permit access to conviction
records than to arrest records).
235. See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 56, at 1232-33 ("If the mere fact that a person's neigh-
bors or co-workers would shun him if they knew that he had AIDS makes that information
newsworthy, [then] the concept [of newsworthiness] is ... empty."); Post, The Social Foun-
dations of Privacy, supra note 48, at 1007 ("That the public is in fact curious [about nonpub-
lic matters] may well be true, but it merely restates the problem.").
236. See, e.g., ROSEN, supra note 9, at 8 ("Privacy protects us from being misdefined and
judged out of context in a world of short attention spans, a world in which information can
easily be confused with knowledge.").
237. See also id. at 137-42 (discussing theories of how the public, when given a small
amount of unfavorable information about an individual, draws broader unfavorable con-
clusions about that individual, and all the more so when the information given is prurient);
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privacy is to protect individuals against the harms of public knowledge
of accurate information about them, then it is all the more necessary
that its reach extend to protect information about the arrest or suspi-
cion of one who may be innocent, or at least one with respect to
whom a judicial finding of probable cause never occurs.
5. Public Oversight.-The fifth argument for naming criminal ac-
cusees is, of course, the strongest and most crucial one: that the gov-
ernment must name arrestees and suspects so that the public may
effectively monitor the government and participate in it. This ques-
tion-whether public access to the names of arrestees and suspects is
required by common-law or constitutional access doctrines-is en-
twined with the question of whether the names are "newsworthy" for
constitutional or common-law purposes. Therefore, to those ques-
tions we now turn, assessing the newsworthiness of the identities of
arrestees and suspects-before a judicial finding of probable cause-
and the public's right of access to those identities under the three
pertinent doctrines of public access to government information: the
Supreme Court's government information jurisprudence, the com-
mon-law doctrine of access to government information, and the con-
stitutional doctrine of public access to the courts. Then we will
address the newsworthiness question under the terms of the public
disclosure tort itself.
C. The Non-Newsworthiness of Names
Discussions about the newsworthiness element of the public dis-
closure tort-or more accurately, the newsworthiness defense to that
tort-typically note the absence of Supreme Court guidance on the
content and scope of the defense. They focus instead on a cluster of
newsworthiness tests developed by lower courts.
238 But the Court has
provided more guidance than commentators allow, and has done so
in cases that bear especially on the notion of privacy protection for
criminal accusees-to wit, the cases discussed in Part I. True, the
Court did not formally reach the newsworthiness issue during the
brief visits it paid to the public disclosure tort with respect to the pri-
Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less, supra note 135, at 103541 (discussing dangers of mis-
judgment and irrational judgment on the basis of partial information about others).
238. See, e.g., Dendy, supra note 73, at 153-67 (noting the conflict between the First
Amendment and the private facts tort and, because the Supreme Court has not considered
the constitutionality of the private facts tort, discussing the treatment of the tort by state
and federal courts of appeal); Jurata, supra note 56, at 502-08 (discussing attempts on the
part of state and lower federal courts, in the absence of a Supreme Court rule, to formulate
a test for the newsworthiness defense).
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vacy of sexual assault complainants in Cox and Florida Star. It did
reach the issue, however, when considering the privacy of arrest
records in Reporters Committee, and, as we have seen, in Cox and Florida
Star the Court implicitly endorsed the privacy interests of sexual as-
sault complainants by instructing states that they could protect that
interest by withholding the complainants' names from the public.
The Court has also, as we have seen, endorsed protecting the anonym-
ity of juvenile offenders (Daily Mail), accusees in judicial misconduct
inquiries (Landmark Communications), and grand jury targets.
None of these cases dealt with the question of whether access to
allegedly privacy-infringing information was constitutionally required;
recall that the issue in Reporters Committee was statutory access (under
FOIA), while in each of the others the Court considered sanctions for
the publication of information that had already (and lawfully) been
obtained. But in advising the withholding of information from the
public in all of these cases, the Court echoed its longstanding position
that the public has no general constitutional right to information
about government operations.2"' This position, appearing in what for
our purposes can be called the Court's "government information"
doctrine, contrasts with two doctrines of access to government infor-
mation and proceedings: the common-law right of access to judicial
records and the First Amendment doctrine of public access to crimi-
nal proceedings.24 ° Within all three of these doctrines are possible
measures of the newsworthiness of the names of criminal arrestees
and suspects for purposes of the public disclosure tort. Accordingly,
in the three sections that follow, I consider the answers provided by
each of these doctrines in turn: the Court's government information
doctrine, the common-law access doctrine, and the constitutional ac-
cess doctrine. Then, in the fourth section, I consider the newsworthi-
ness of the names of arrestees and suspects under the terms of the
public disclosure tort itself.
239. See Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 15 (1978) ("Neither the First Amendment
nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to government information or
sources of information within the government's control."); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 16-17
(1965) ("The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained right to
gather information."); see also Diane Zimmerman, Is There a Right to Have Something to Say?
One View of the Pubic Domain, 73 FoRD. L. REv. 297, 336-41, 374-75 (2004) (discussing the
minimal nature of any public "right to know," and the concomitant government "duty to
disclose" information, and urging development of "a coherent theory of the mandatory
public domain").
240. See also Zimmerman, supra note 239, at 340-41 (considering the public-access doc-
trine one of "a few circumscribed areas" where there is a constitutional right to govern-
ment information).
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1. Government Information Doctrine.-One measure of the new-
sworthiness of the names of arrestees and suspects is the Court's posi-
tion on withholding similar information in government proceedings.
This position emerges in the cases we saw in Part I. Recall that in both
Cox and Florida Star, although the Court forbade sanctions on the
press for identifying sexual assault complainants when the states them-
selves had made the identifying information available, the Court also
noted that states could protect the privacy of these individuals, or sen-
sitive information generally, by withholding altogether the informa-
tion from the public.241 The Court stated the same in Landmark
Communications,242 and then in Reporters Committee it upheld the gov-
ernment's refusal to disclose arrest records under the Freedom of In-
formation Act.243 These rulings suggest that the Court does not find
the names of individuals involved in criminal proceedings, including
arrestees and suspects, as necessarily newsworthy-or at least not so
newsworthy as to defeat competing privacy concerns.
In reaching its decision in Cox, the Court did emphasize the im-
portance of public knowledge about the criminal justice system. Full
and accurate reporting by news media on the conduct of government
is essential, the Court stated, to enable citizens and their representa-
tives to "vote intelligently" and "register opinions on the administra-
tion of government generally."244 In judicial proceedings especially,
the press "guarantee [s] the fairness of trials" and "bring[s] to bear the
beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the administration of jus-
tice."24 5 Moreover, the commission of a crime, any resulting prosecu-
tion, and especially the judicial proceedings that follow, are "without
question events of legitimate concern to the public," and thus fall
within the ambit of necessary press reporting on government opera-
tions.24 6 In other words, criminal proceedings seem to be newsworthy
because the public is entitled to information about them; uninhibited
press reporting on criminal proceedings is therefore a necessity, and
any possibly countervailing privacy concerns in the information are
overridden by the placement of the information in the public domain.
But by expressly sidestepping the question of whether the disclo-
sure of information not already in the public record could be forbid-
241. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 469 (1975); Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S.
524, 534 (1989).
242. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845 (1978).
243. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 780 (1989).
244. Cox, 420 U.S. at 491-92.
245. Id. at 492.
246. Id.
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den,2 4 7 the Court failed to indicate what information had to be
contained in that public record to begin with-i.e., what information
about criminal proceedings was of such legitimate concern to the pub-
lic that its disclosure to the press and public was required. Indeed,
after having extolled the virtues of public knowledge and oversight,
the Court issued its advice that states simply withhold information
from the public record if privacy concerns so moved them.248 In
other words, states can protect information about criminal proceed-
ings by not releasing it. This statement can only mean that not all
information about criminal proceedings is necessarily newsworthy
when privacy concerns come calling-again, at least insofar as the
public's right to the information is a measure of newsworthiness.
Florida Star reaffirmed this principle. In embellishing on the invi-
tation it had extended to states in Cox--to withhold information that
identified sexual assault complainants if they wished in order to pro-
tect their privacy-and delineating no limits on such withholding,249
the Court made its position on the newsworthiness of the names of at
least certain parties at certain stages of the criminal process, as mea-
sured by the public's right to know these names, unmistakable. How-
ever important information about criminal proceedings might be,
personal privacy interests can justify withholding identifying informa-
tion from the public.
It bears noting that withholding the privacy-infringing informa-
tion is not necessarily the only acceptable method of protection ac-
cording to the Court; rather, in Florida Star, the Court expressly left
open the possibility of another method. As in Cox, the holding in Flor-
ida Star was drawn extremely narrowly; 950 but the dicta that set up the
holding is more often quoted:
247. The Cox Court said:
Rather than address the broader question whether ... the State may ever define
and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted publicity in the press, it is
appropriate to focus on the narrower interface between press and privacy that
this case presents, namely, whether the State may impose sanctions on the accu-
rate publication of the name of a rape victim obtained from public records-
more specifically, from judicial records which are maintained in connection with
a public prosecution and which themselves are open to public inspection.
Id. at 491.
248. Id. at 496; see supra text accompanying note 119.
249. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 534 (1989); see supra text accompanying notes
126-126.
250. As the Florida Star Court stated:
We hold only that where a newspaper publishes truthful information which it has
lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, only when nar-
rowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order, and that no such interest is
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We do not hold that truthful publication is automatically
constitutionally protected, or that there is no zone of per-
sonal privacy within which the State may protect the individ-
ual from intrusion by the press, or even that a State may
never punish publication of the name of a victim of a sexual
offense.251
In other words, not only are states free to protect personal privacy in
criminal proceedings by withholding identifying information, but
more, it is not out of the question that they may punish the press for
publishing criminal justice information that the states have sought to
protect on privacy grounds.2 52 Punishing the press is, of course, be-
yond the privacy protection explored in this Article; what matters here
is the Court's unmistakable position that not all information about the
criminal justice system is necessarily of such legitimate public con-
cern-i.e., newsworthy-as to defeat competing privacy concerns.
That the Court has invited states to withhold identifying informa-
tion about sexual assault complainants, and endorsed similar protec-
tion for juvenile offenders, grand jury targets, and arrestees named in
arrest records, suggests that the identifying information of these par-
ticipants is not newsworthy for constitutional purposes. And more:
that a right of public access to such information does not necessarily
exist, even when it would aid the public in monitoring the perform-
ance of the involved government officials. This conclusion is most
pronounced in Landmark Communications, where the Court reviewed
the Virginia statute that criminalized the naming ofjudges whose con-
duct was under review by the state's Judicial Inquiry and Review Com-
satisfactorily served by imposing liability under [the Florida statute at issue] to
appellant under the facts of this case.
Florida Star, 491 U.S. at 541.
251. Id. The Court went on: "we .. .do not rule out the possibility that, in a proper
case, imposing civil sanctions for publication of the name of a rape victim might be so
overwhelmingly necessary to advance [the highly significant privacy interests of sexual as-
sault victims to retain their anonymity]." Id at 537.
252. The Court's most recent relevant ruling maintains this position. In Bartnicki v. Vop-
per, the Court prohibited the imposition of civil sanctions of federal and state wiretapping
laws on media defendants who had broadcast an unlawfully intercepted wireless telephone
conversation they had lawfully obtained, because the information disclosed was truthful
and of public concern. 532 U.S. 514 (2001). At the same time, the Court stated that its
decision did not reach the question of whether those sanctions could be lawful with respect
to the disclosure of "trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of purely private
concern." Id. at 533. And in reaching this decision, the Court noted its own "repeated
refusal to answer categorically whether truthful publication may ever be punished consis-




mission.253 The operation of the commission was a matter of public
interest, the Court found, and accurate reporting on it "clearly served
those interests in public scrutiny [of the judiciary] and discussion of
governmental affairs which the First Amendment was adopted to pro-
tect. '2 54 Nevertheless, the state could protect the privacy of judicial
misconduct accusees by withholding information about the proceed-
ings from the public, swearing government officials to secrecy, et
cetera255 -measures that would prevent the public from overseeing
several layers of government conduct: the investigation conducted by
executive branch officers, the conduct of the proceedings by judicial
officers and others, and the alleged misconduct of the accused judges
themselves (misconduct in their official capacities, no less). From
here it is a short hop, and arguably a backwards one, to finding that
the names of criminal arrestees and suspects-individuals who are not
government officials-may be protected in similar ways and for simi-
lar reasons. And the Court took most of that hop in Reporters Commit-
tee, the case in which the Court gave the public disclosure tort its most
extensive and favorable treatment to date, in the context of FOIA's
personal privacy exemption, and directed that treatment toward adult
arrestees.256
In upholding on common-law privacy grounds laws forbidding
the disclosure of arrest records in Reporters Committee, the Court did
not limit its approval to the notion that an individual has a protectable
privacy interest in only his past criminal history. Rather, Reporters Com-
mittee suggests an expansive privacy right that justifies withholding the
names of individuals implicated in a wide array of government records
and proceedings. Noting that the core purpose of FOIA, under which
the press had sought access to the rap sheet in question, was "to open
agency action to the light of public scrutiny, '257 the Court stated flatly
that that purpose is "not fostered by disclosure of information about
private citizens that is accumulated in various governmental files
253. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 830 (1978).
254. Id. at 839.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 147-148.
256. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 771-72 (1989).
257. Id at 774 (quoting Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)); see also id.
at 773 ("Official information that sheds light on an agency's performance of its statutory
duties falls squarely within [FOLA's] statutory purpose."); id. at 775 (noting that Congress's
purpose in enacting FOIA is evident in the provisions that allow waiver or reduction of
production fees for requested documents "if the disclosure is in the public interest because
it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations or activities
of the government" (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(A)(iii) (Supp. V 1982))).
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that reveals little or nothing about an agency's own conduct. '258 In
other words, the names of individuals who happen to fall within the
sweep of a government agency's activities are not necessarily of legiti-
mate public concern- i.e., they are not newsworthy. Indeed, the
names are not even presumptively newsworthy according to the Court
in Reporters Committee, even when the names are of people involved in,
even the very subjects of, some ongoing government action. After ap-
provingly citing FOIA provisions that allow agencies to delete "identi-
fying details" before disclosing information, the Court quoted two
examples Congress had provided to illustrate who might qualify for
such anonymity:
[J] ust as the identity of the individuals given public relief or
involved in tax matters is irrelevant to the public's under-
standing of the Government's operation, so too is the iden-
tity of individuals who are the subjects of rap sheets
irrelevant to the public's understanding of the system of law
enforcement. For rap sheets reveal only the dry, chronologi-
cal, personal history of individuals who have had brushes
with the law, and tell us nothing about matters of substantive
law enforcement policy that are properly the subject of pub-
lic concern.
25 9
If the privacy interests of individuals "involved in tax matters"-per-
sons subject to some form of IRS action or review, the Court appar-
ently meant26°-sufficiently defeat the public interest in overseeing
the government so to allow deletion of their names from publicly dis-
closed records, why should the privacy interests of criminal arrestees
or suspects be treated any differently? If a request for an individual's
arrest record is no different from "the typical case in which one pri-
vate citizen is seeking information about another,"261 and the arrest
record "would not shed any light on the conduct of any Government
agency or official, 2 62 surely the same can be said of the public interest
258. Id. at 773.
259. Id. at 766 n.18.
260. The Court was referring to the following statement it had quoted from the legisla-
tive history of FOIA: "The public has a need to know, for example, the details of an agency
opinion or statement of policy on an income tax matter, but there is no need to identify
the individuals involved in a tax matter if the identification has no bearing or effect on the
general public." Id. at 766 n.18 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1497, at 8 (1966)).
261. Id. at 773.
262. Id. Providing the information at issue in Reporters Committee-records of "non-finan-
cial crimes" by a person whose family business had been publicly linked to organized crime
and had allegedly obtained a number of defense contracts as a result of an improper ar-
rangement with a corrupt Congressman-would, according to the Court, tell the public
"nothing directly about the character of the Congressman's behavior" and nothing at all
815
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in the names of arrestees and suspects where no judicial finding of
probable cause has been obtained. (Recall, too, that the arrest record
withheld in Reporters Committee might very well have reflected criminal
convictions as well as arrests. 263 )
True, it might be argued that the holdings of Reporters Committee
and its successor cases 264 reach only records, and not information
about ongoing proceedings. And in Florida Star the Court had noted
that the privacy-infringing information was contained in a report "pre-
pared and disseminated at a time at which not only had no adversarial
criminal proceedings begun, but no suspect had been identified"'265-
thus suggesting that the privacy calculus might shift when adversarial
proceedings have begun or a suspect has been identified, such that
the state's authority to withhold information on privacy grounds
might be weaker. And there are certainly reasons to find the public's
interest in knowledge of a current detention or arrest stronger than
knowledge of a past one.26 6 Both Landmark Communications and Daily
Mail, however, involved ongoing proceedings-judicial misconduct,
and juvenile, respectively-and in both cases the Court invited states
to protect privacy interests by keeping identifying information from
the public. Moreover, the Court's mention in Reporters Committee of
persons "involved in tax matters" as among those deserving of privacy
protection does not distinguish records from proceedings.267 The
Court has thus indicated that however great the public interest may be
in ongoing adjudicative proceedings, whether criminal, quasi-crimi-
nal, or administrative, privacy concerns can support the government's
withholding of information that identifies persons involved in those
proceedings.
268
about "the conduct of the Department of Defense (DOD) in awarding one or more contracts
to the [family business]." Id. at 774.
263. Id. at 752; see also supra note 181.
264. See, e.g., Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (upholding a federal statute restrict-
ing states' ability to grant access to driver's personal information without the driver's con-
sent); Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999)
(upholding a California statute prohibiting commercial use of arrestee information).
265. Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989).
266. See infra text accompanying notes 311-314.
267. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 766 n.18 (1989).
268. The withheld record in Reporters Committee was a record of "nonfinancial" crimes by
a person publicly suspected of improper financial dealings with government agencies. Id.
at 757. But the Court dispelled any notion that that distinction had a bearing in the pri-
vacy calculus:
[W]e hold as a categorical matter that a third party's request for law enforcement
records or information about a private citizen can reasonably be expected to in-
vade that citizen's privacy, and that when the request seeks no "official informa-
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Lower court FOIA rulings after Reporters Committee confirm this
interpretation with respect to criminal suspects, routinely upholding
the protection of information that identifies past and present subjects
of criminal law enforcement action under the same privacy provision,
Exemption 7(C).269 And at least one federal court has found that Re-
porters Committee authorizes the government to withhold the names of
current detainees under that exemption. In Brady-Lunny v. Massey,
270
an Illinois newspaper sought the names of prisoners in a county jail,
and other information about them, under the state's FOIA.
2 71 The
sheriff provided the requested information about state detainees, but
refused to disclose any information about federal detainees, citing a
Bureau of Prisons regulation that prohibited disclosing the names of
federal inmates for privacy reasons.272 The court, citing the federal
FOIA's Exemption 7(C) and Reporters Committee, upheld the refusal.
273
Illinois' FOIA deferred to federal laws and regulations, the court
found, and withholding the information from the press was proper
under Exemption 7(C) because disclosing the names of the federal
detainees, "[s] ome of [whom were] ... merely witnesses and detain-
ees who ha[d] not been charged with or convicted of crimes," would
"stigmatize" them and "cause what could be irreparable damage to
their reputations. ' 274 The court did not distinguish between recent
tion" about a Government agency, but merely records that the Government
happens to be storing, the invasion of privacy is "unwarranted" [for purposes of
FOIA's personal privacy exemption].
Id. at 780.
269. See, e.g., Neely v. FBI, 208 F.3d 461, 466-67 (4th Cir. 2000) (remanding to the trial
court to consider the privacy interests of individuals including "third-party suspects," under
Exemption 7(C), before ordering disclosure); Halpern v. FBI, 181 F.3d 279, 297 (2d Cir.
1999) (noting the strong privacy interests of individuals in the redaction of government
information that suggests they were once subject to criminal investigation); Spirko v.
United States Postal Serv., 147 F.3d 992, 994-95, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (upholding the re-
daction of information about possible suspects in an ongoing criminal investigation under
Exemption 7(C)); Safecard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1205-06 (D.C. Cir. 1991)
(declaring names and addresses of private individuals appearing in law enforcement files
categorically exempt from disclosure under Exemption 7(C) absent a showing that disclo-
sure is necessary to confirm or refute compelling evidence that the agency is engaged in
illegal activity). Language from the Safecard opinion especially merits quoting:
There is little question that disclosing the identity of targets of law-enforcement
investigations can subject those identified to embarrassment and potentially more
serious reputational harm.... Recognizing this danger, Exemption 7(C) affords
broad[ ] privacy rights to suspects, witnesses, and investigators.
Id at 1205 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
270. 185 F. Supp. 2d 928 (C.D. I11. 2002).
271. Id. at 930.
272. Id.; see 28 C.F.R § 513.34(b) (2004).
273. Brady-Lunny, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 931-32.
274. Id.
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criminal arrestees (pre-probable cause), various types of detainees at
issue-witnesses, immigration arrestees-and indicted defendants
awaiting trial. The government had, however, emphasized in its argu-
ments the strong privacy interests of unconvicted or uncharged ar-
restees.275  Brady-Lunny is thus perhaps the most analogous
government information case to the privacy right I propose.276
Brady-Lunny also suggests a response to another relevant aspect of
Reporters Committee. In Reporters Committee, the Court drew a distinction
between rap sheets, or "compilations" of an individual's criminal his-
tory, which law enforcement agencies generally do not disclose, and
the possible availability of much of the same information about an
individual in uncompiled form in police blotters and court records to
which the public might generally have access.2 7 7 The lower court had
relied on the availability of the information in uncompiled form to
find an individual's privacy interest in the compilation to be "minimal
at best. '2 78 The Supreme Court saw it the opposite way, finding a "dis-
tinction, in terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure of
the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of the
rap sheet as a whole."2 79 Indeed, the very ease with which an individ-
275. The government asserted that the privacy interest applied "especially" to "those
who may have been acquitted subsequently of any federal charges filed, who may have had
charges dismissed, who may not have been charged at all, or who may have been held
merely as witnesses." Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Brady-Lunny v.
Massey, 185 F. Supp. 2d 928 (C.D. I11. 2002) (No. 01-3222) (on file with author). It also
described the privacy interest as one of protecting the detainees from "unnecessary public
attention, criticism, harassment and embarrassment for merely being detained in a jail
facility regardless of the disposition of the charges" and "irreparable damage to their re-
spective reputations because of the stigma of having been detained, arrested, associated
with, or mentioned in connection with a federal criminal law enforcement matter." Id.
276. One pre-Reporters Committee decision goes roughly the other way. In Tennessean
Newspaper, Inc. v. Levi, the trial court found the privacy concerns of individuals arrested or
indicted insufficient to justify withholding information about them under FOIA Exemp-
tion 7(C). 403 F. Supp. 1318 (M.D. Tenn. 1975). Federal law enforcement officials had
withheld, on privacy grounds, "the age, address, marital status, employment status, circum-
stances of arrest, the scope of the investigation leading to arrest or indictment, and other
background material" about federal indictees and arrestees in the District of Columbia,
though officials were willing to disclose the names and charges after the information ap-
peared in "public records." Id. at 1320. The court found that the asserted privacy interest,
which it characterized as analogous to the privacy interest protected by the public disclo-
sure tort, was insufficient, and ordered disclosure. Id. at 1321 & n.1. (Note the court's
failure to distinguish between arrestees and indictees.)
277. See United States Dep't ofJustice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 753 (1989) ("Although much rap-sheet information is a matter of public record,
the availability and dissemination of the actual rap sheet to the public is limited."); id. at
767 (noting "the basic difference between scattered bits of criminal history and a federal
compilation").
278. Id. at 759.
279. Id. at 764.
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ual could obtain criminal history information about another individ-
ual through a rap sheet seemed to clinch the privacy argument:
[T]he issue here is whether the compilation of otherwise
hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy interest impli-
cated by disclosure of that information. Plainly there is a vast
difference between the public records that might be found
after a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives,
and local police stations throughout the country and a com-
puterized summary located in a single clearinghouse of
information.28 °
In other words, the easier the information is to obtain, the more it
needs protection from public access. One might therefore question
how much Reporters Committee bears on the daily or contemporaneous
arrest information at issue here, which is typically found in police or
court records, and thus not typically easy to obtain. But the Court's
repeated references to ongoing government actions of other types,
noted above, indicate that the principle of privacy protections sweeps
more broadly, beyond mere compilations of information. So too does
the Court's more recent statement that states need not "give out arres-
tee information at all."2 s Moreover, the implication of the Court's
distinction is that an individual's privacy interest in "scattered" infor-
mation about her arrest history contained in public records is less in
need of protection, because it is scattered, than is her privacy interest
in a government compilation of the same information-not that the
privacy interest itself is any lesser, and certainly not that the public
interest in the information in scattered form is any greater. And while
the distinction assumes that the information is available in scattered
form to begin with, the Court certainly does not require that it must
be for a compilation to be protected.
Even if the Court had said that an individual's privacy interest in
daily arrest information is less compelling, the ease with which the
public can now obtain that information suggests a greater privacy in-
terest in that information than at the time of Reporters Committee, under
the Court's own reasoning. The "substantial character" of an individ-
ual's privacy interest in her rap sheet, the Court found then, "is af-
fected by the fact that in today's society the computer can accumulate
and store information that would otherwise have surely been forgot-
ten."2 2 In today's society, of course, daily information about arrests
280. Id.
281. Los Angeles Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 40 (1999);
see also supra text accompanying notes 185-189.
282. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 771.
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and court proceedings is no longer scattered among various police
stations and courthouses, but rather is available in a few clicks of a
computer mouse from the comfort of one's desk.28 If an individual's
"privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap-sheet in-
formation will always be high,"284 and the government is accordingly
entitled to protect that interest by not releasing information about
one's criminal past, then the government certainly should be able to
prevent the information from reaching the public in the first place-
particularly, or at least, when the information is about merely an al-
leged criminal present.
I do not mean to say, of course, that there is no public interest in
information about arrests (or adjudicative proceedings). Rather, my
point is that the existence of a public interest in information does not
necessarily trump a privacy interest in that same information.28 5 This
is the unmistakable message of Cox, Florida Star, Daily Mail, Landmark
Communications, and Reporters Committee. In each of these cases, the
Court advised or permitted states to withhold privacy-infringing infor-
mation in criminal or quasi-criminal proceedings from the public,
even as it noted the strong public interest in disseminating informa-
tion about those proceedings generally. In each of these cases, the
information in question identified individuals as being involved in
these proceedings in some way, including as being the very targets of
the proceedings. It thus appears that the names of arrestees and sus-
pects are not necessarily so newsworthy as to prevent their withhold-
ing, let alone to compel their disclosure under the Supreme Court's
government information jurisprudence. True, Justice White, dissent-
ing in Florida Star and urging tort liability for the newspaper that
named the sexual assault complainant, stated in dicta: "Surely the
rights of those accused of crimes and those who are their victims [sic:
alleged victims] must differ with respect to privacy concerns. 286 But
that distinction, however acceptable, does not compel Justice White's
conclusion: "[W]hatever rights alleged criminals [sic: defendants or
283. See Kristen M. Blankley, Note, Are Public Records Too Public? Why Personally Identifying
Information Should Be Removed from Both Online and Print Versions of Court Documents, 65 OHIo
ST. L.J. 413 (2004) (discussing the proliferation and ease of online access to court
records).
284. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 780.
285. See id. at 770 ("[T]he fact that 'an event [such as an arrest] is not wholly "private"
does not mean that an individual has no interest in limiting disclosure or dissemination of
the information.' ") (quoting William H. Rehnquist, Is an Expanded Right of Privacy Consis-
tent with Fair and Effective Law Enforcement? Or: Privacy, You've Come a Long Way, Baby, 23
KAN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1974)).
286. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 545 (1989) (White, J., dissenting).
820 [VOL. 64:755
2005] PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL ARRESTEE OR SUSPECT 821
accusees] have to maintain their anonymity pending an adjudication
of guilt ... would seem to be minimal. ' 2 7 That conclusion, which
Justice White grounded on the Court's statement in Daily Mail that
there was "no issue ... of privacy" in that case, 28 8 contradicts the well-
established, Court-endorsed privacy protections for grand jury targets
and arrestees with respect to records of their arrest, not to mention
the subjects of juvenile proceedings (including in Daily Mail itself);
and, as argued above, it has little logic to recommend it.
Perhaps truer to logic and the Court's privacy precedent was the
position of then-Associate Justice Rehnquist in Daily Mail. Recall that
in Daily Mail the Court acknowledged the state interest in the confi-
dentiality of juvenile proceedings, while finding that interest of an in-
sufficient magnitude to justify a prior restraint by means of a criminal
statute. To protect information about those proceedings, the Court
advised states to take measures to withhold the information from the
public. Just as Justice White was later to write separately in Florida Star
to urge civil sanctions on the press for naming a sexual assault com-
plainant, Justice Rehnquist wrote separately in Daily Mail to support
criminal sanctions on the press for the unauthorized naming ofjuve-
nile offenders: "It is difficult to understand how publication of [a]
youth's name is in any way necessary to performance of the press'
'watchdog' role."289 That same difficulty should, of course, attend the
argument that the name of an adult, with respect to whom even a
judicial finding of probable cause has not been made, is required to
promote public oversight. The Court's government information juris-
prudence thus supports the privacy protection I propose.
2. Common-Law Access Doctrine.-A second measure of new-
sworthiness for our purposes is the reach of the common-law right of
public access to government information. This right can apply tojudi-
cial proceedings as well as judicial documents.29 ° And as with the Su-
287. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
288. Id. (White, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 133-136.
289. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring). But, Justice Rehnquist would apparently not have embraced the broader notion of a
privacy right in the fact of one's arrest. See Rehnquist, supra note 285, at 8 ("An arrest is
not a 'private' event. An encounter between law enforcement authorities and a citizen is
ordinarily a matter of public record, and by the very definition of the term it involves an
intrusion into a person's bodily integrity. To speak of an arrest as a private occurrence
seems to me to stretch even the broadest definitions of the idea of privacy beyond the
breaking point.").
290. See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597-608 (1978) (acknowl-
edging the right of public access and considering it with respect to the media's demand for
copies of presidential tape recordings that were admitted as evidence in the Watergate
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preme Court's government information cases, common-law access
cases show that the privacy interests of individuals involved in judicial
proceedings can outweigh the public interest in information about
those proceedings, at least so much as to permit withholding informa-
tion that identifies the individuals.
Courts balance a variety of factors to determine the application
and scope of the common-law access right. Not surprisingly, privacy
interests are consistently among those factors.29' And, as it turns out,
uncharged criminal suspects are among those whose privacy interests
can defeat the right of public access. In the leading case, United States
v. Smith,292 the Third Circuit upheld a trial court's refusal to release
the names of unindicted co-conspirators who were referred to in an
indictment that alleged an attempted bribery scheme involving state
officials. 293 The government had named these unindicted individuals
in a bill of particulars given to the defense and explained that while it
had not yet decided whether to charge them, all of the named individ-
uals were "under active investigation" by the FBI.294 The court found
that the common-law right of access extends to bills of particulars; 295
however, releasing the sealed list would "communicate to the general
public that the named individuals . . . are guilty, or may be guilty, of a
felony involving breaches of the public trust," without giving the pub-
lic a "context" for evaluating this suggestion or providing the named
individuals "an opportunity to prove their innocence in a trial. '296
Public disclosure of the list would thus create a "grave" risk of "serious
injury to innocent third parties"-indeed it "might be career ending
trials); United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140, 155 (3d Cir. 1997) ("Although the right of
access traditionally attached only to judicial records, we have suggested that the common
law right of access also applies to judicial proceedings.").
291. See, e.g., EEOC v. Nat'l Children's Ctr., 98 F.3d 1406, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The
factors considered are:
(1) the need for public access to the documents at issue; (2) the extent of previ-
ous public access to the documents; (3) the fact that someone has objected to
disclosure, and the identity of that person; (4) the strength of any property and
privacy interests asserted; (5) the possibility of prejudice to those opposing disclo-
sure; and (6) the purposes for which the documents were introduced during the
judicial proceedings.
Id. (citing United States v. Hubbard, 650 F.2d 293, 317-22 (D.C. Cir. 1980)); see also Repub-
lican Co. v. Appeals Court, 812 N.E.2d 887, 892 (Mass. 2004) (stating that the judge must
take into account "the nature of the parties and the controversy, the type of information
and the privacy interests involved, the extent of community interest, and the reason for the
request [to restrict access]." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
292. 776 F.2d 1104 (3d Cir. 1985).
293. Id. at 1105-06.
294. Id. at 1106.
295. Id. at 1111-12.
296. Id. at 1113-14.
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for some" of those named.29 7 The trial court thus had a "compelling
governmental interest in making sure [the judicial process] was not
utilized to unnecessarily jeopardize the privacy and reputational inter-
ests of the named individuals. '2 2" A number of courts have followed
similar reasoning to protect the identities of suspects in judicial and
executive documents from public disclosure.z99
Information about actual arrestees fares somewhat differently
under common-law access analysis. Case law suggests a right of public
access to information about arrests and arrestees that is harder to
overcome with privacy or reputational concerns. In a case that consid-
ers facts very close to the terms of my proposal, Caledonian Record Pub-
lishing Co. v. Walton,300 the Supreme Court of Vermont rejected police
officials' attempt to withhold the names and charges of arrestees who
were released with citations to appear in court-as opposed to those
who were kept in custody pending a first court appearance, whom the
police identified.7° t The officials defended the effort by arguing that
the risk of an unnecessary privacy violation was greater with respect to
arrestees who were only cited, rather than held, apparently on the
theory that a prosecutor is less likely to file charges against an arrestee
whom the police have seen fit to release.3"2 But both types of arrests
involve a law enforcement determination of probable cause with re-
spect to an individual, the court reasoned, and so they are equally
297. Id.
298. Id. at 1114 (footnote omitted). A case I discussed earlier, United States v. Briggs,
though also upholding a refusal to release the names of unindicted co-conspirators listed
in a bill of particulars, did not discuss the common-law right of access. 514 F.2d 794 (5th
Cir. 1975); see supra notes 161-169 and accompanying text (discussing Briggs).
299. See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 231-32 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding that
the common-law right of access to judicial documents does not presumptively apply with
respect to pre-sentence reports given their historic secrecy, and finding the public interest
outweighed by the defendant's privacy interest in the contents of those reports, which may
contain "minimally substantiated and unchallenged allegations of the defendant's involve-
ment in other, uncharged crimes"); Haber v. Evans, 268 F. Supp. 2d 507 (E.D. Pa. 2003)
(finding that, in a civil suit alleging sexual misconduct by state police officers, the com-
mon-law right of access was sufficiently outweighed by privacy interests to allow redacting
names from internal affairs investigation reports, including the names of officers against
whom accusations of wrongdoing were withdrawn or not sustained); In re 2 Sealed Search
Warrants, 710 A.2d 202, 211 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997) (finding that the common-law right of
access to pre-indictment search warrants was outweighed by factors including the privacy
interests of several named individuals "who may or may not be suspects" in a murder and
arson investigation). But see In re McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 288 F.3d 369 (9th Cir. 2002)
(conflating common-law and constitutional access tests and rejecting the redaction of the
name of a "high public official" accused of criminal conduct in certain letters proffered by
the defendant).
300. 573 A.2d 296 (Vt. 1990).
301. Id. at 297-99.
302. Id. at 302.
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subject to mandatory disclosure under common-law access principles,
as codified by the state's open-records law.3" 3 Another very close case
reaches the same result, but strictly on statutory grounds;3 4 open-
records statutes in other states, meanwhile, expressly, or are inter-
preted to, require public access to arrestee information.3 °5
But neither Caledonian nor the predecessors on which it relies
considered the distinction I propose-between law enforcement and
judicial findings of probable cause.30 6 Meanwhile, rulings that open-
records laws require the routine disclosure of arrestee names have
come in response to law enforcement attempts to withhold all infor-
mation about arrestees, or at least information other than their identi-
ties.3 0 y The cases also acknowledge the substantial privacy and
reputational harm caused by routine disclosure of compilations of in-
dividual arrest records, 30 as the Court found in Reporters Committee.30 9
303. Id. at 301-03. The court also noted that if the defendants' distinction between ar-
restees who were detained and those who were only cited suggested that citations were
being issued without probable cause, that itself was a matter demanding public attention.
Id. at 302.
304. See State v. Lancaster Police Dep't, 528 N.E.2d 175, 179 (Ohio 1988) (holding that
Ohio's public-records law does not distinguish between arrestees formally charged, on the
one hand, and arrestees who are uncharged, unprosecuted or unindicted, or persons
charged but not arrested, so that disclosure of information about all is equally required).
305. Eg., Hengel v. City of Pine Bluff, 821 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Ark. 1991) (state FOIA
requires disclosure of jail logs, arrest records, and shift sheets); County of Los Angeles v.
Superior Court, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409, 416 (Ct. App. 1993) (state public-records act "demon-
strated a legislative intent only to continue the common-law tradition of contemporaneous
disclosure of individualized arrest information"); Gifford v. Freedom of Info. Comm'n, 631
A.2d 252 (Conn. 1993) (state FOIA requires disclosure of an arrestee's name and address
along with the date, time, and location of the arrest, and the nature of the offense); Hous-
ton Chronicle Publ'g Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 188 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)
(state open-records law requires public access to the daily police blotter, show-up sheet,
and arrest sheet, all of which name arrestees); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 279 N.W.2d 179
(Wis. 1979) (interpreting state open-records law according to common-law principles and
finding it requires disclosure of certain arrestee information).
306. See County of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 409; Houston Chronicle, 531 S.W.2d 177;
Breier, 279 N.W.2d 179.
307. See Hengel, 821 S.W.2d 761 (rejecting a policy under which all information about a
single arrest, including that the arrest took place, was withheld for several days, then re-
leased with the arrestee's name and address redacted); County of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. Rptr.
2d 409 (rejecting an attempt to withhold all records regarding arrestees who are un-
charged, unprosecuted, or unindicted, and persons charged but not arrested); Gifford, 631
A.2d 252 (rejecting an attempt to withhold an entire arrest report while prosecution is
pending); Houston Chronicle, 531 S.W.2d 177 (rejecting an attempt to withhold all records
pertaining to arrests and offenses); Breier, 279 N.W.2d 179 (rejecting a police chiefs refusal
to disclose reasons for arrests before a prosecutor had formally charged arrestees).
308. See, e.g., Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (ac-
knowledging "the harm which comes from dissemination of arrest records,. . . including
the likelihood that employers cannot or will not distinguish between arrests resulting in
convictions and arrests which do not," and permitting D.C. courts to restrict dissemination
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And records of specific past arrests can be sealed or expunged, via
statutory or equitable relief, upon an arrestee's exoneration, or dis-
missal of the charges, or the absence of charges altogether-and a
lack of probable cause is one threshold for such relief.
3 °
The cases on common-law or statutory access to criminal records
or information routinely distinguish between contemporaneous arrest
information and historical arrest information for access purposes: the
former need be disclosed while the latter need not.
3" Animating this
distinction is a fear of secret arrests. As the D.C. Circuit put it in 1969,
"[t]he requirement that arrest books be open to the public is to pre-
vent any 'secret arrests,' a concept odious to a democratic society.
'
Other courts have cited the same justification for a common-law right
of arrest records in cases that do not result in convictions); Houston Chronicle, 531 S.W.2d at
188 (finding that to require disclosure of rap sheets would risk "massive and unjustified
damage" to individuals because "many persons who are arrested by the police are wholly
innocent" and "[n]o effort is made to 'purge' inaccurate or misleading entries"); Breier,
279 N.W.2d at 186 (stating that the question of whether to disclose rap sheets that con-
tained information about "all arrests of and police contacts with individuals, regardless of
whether an arrest or conviction resulted," would be "[a]n entirely different issue").
309. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 753 (1989).
310. See, e.g., TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. 55.01 (a) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (author-
izing expungement when, among other things, an indictment or information has not been
filed, or, if filed and dismissed, when the court finds absence of probable cause to be the
reason for dismissal); Rezvan v. District of Columbia, 582 A.2d 937, 939 (D.C. 1990) (de-
clining to seal an arrest record by equitable authority when the arrestee neither showed
that he did not commit the crime, as required pursuant to court rule, nor met the addi-
tional burden of showing manifest injustice by "constitutional violation, lack of probable
cause for his arrest, or bad faith on the part of the prosecutor"); see also Howrey v. State, 46
P.3d 1282, 1285 (Okla. Crim. App. 2002) (authorizing expungement of a record of arrest
for soliciting sex with a minor because no charges for that offense were filed, even when
the defendant pled guilty to and served probation for charges arising out of a concurrent
arrest charge of indecent exposure). But see United States v. Lopez, 704 F. Supp. 1055,
1056-57 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (stating that "[g]iven the constitutionality of an arrest, courts will
expunge a record only under extraordinary circumstances," and denying equitable ex-
pungement despite a prosecutor's dismissal of charges and the arrestee's reputational
concerns).
311. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416 (construing California law as
requiring disclosure of only contemporaneous arrest information, and therefore denying
plaintiffs requested access to historical arrest information); see also City of Hemet v. Supe-
rior Court, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 541 (Ct. App. 1995) (discussing County of Los Angeles's
holding as to disclosure of historical records in finding that the statutory scheme exempted
internal affairs records from release); Houston Chronicle, 531 S.W.2d at 188 (requiring pub-
lic access to the police blotter, arrest sheet, and show-up sheet, all of which identify the
arrestee, but not requiring disclosure of the rap sheet).
312. Morrow, 417 F.2d at 741-42. Note, however, that the court said this in a decision
that allowed local courts to restrict the dissemination of arrest records in cases that did not
result in convictions.
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of access to arrestee information. 1 ' But withholding only informa-
tion that identifies an arrestee is far from making the arrest itself se-
cret. Indeed, the second half of my proposal-that law enforcement
be required to advise arrestees of their right to be named and to name
them publicly upon their request-injects a protection against secret
arrests that does not now exist. This protection is discussed more fully
below. 3 14 For now, however, the point is that the common-law doc-
trine of access to judicial information need not defeat the privacy pro-
tection I propose.
According to both the Supreme Court's government information
jurisprudence and common-law access doctrine, then, the names of
arrestees or suspects with respect to whom there has not yet been a
finding of probable cause do not appear to be so necessarily news-
worthy as to overcome the privacy concerns that publicly naming
them entails. What remains now is to explore the newsworthiness
question under the constitutional doctrine of public access to court
proceedings, and to explore it under the public disclosure tort itself.
3. Constitutional Access Doctrine.-Under the public access doc-
trine of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia and its progeny,3 15 the
public has a qualified First Amendment right to attend criminal pro-
ceedings to which "experience" and "logic" dictate a right of access-
in other words, those criminal proceedings to which public access has
traditionally been allowed, and to the functioning of which public ac-
cess serves a "significant[ly] positive" purpose.3 16 Once a presump-
tion of access is established under the experience and logic test, only
an "overriding interest" can overcome it, allowing closure when it is
necessary "to preserve higher values," and when the interest is articu-
lated in specific findings and served through narrowly tailored provi-
sions." 7 The rationale for the doctrine is that the public requires
313. City of Hemet, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 541; County of Los Angeles, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 416;
Gifford v. Freedom of Info Comm'n, 631 A.2d 252, 262 (Conn. 1993); Caledonian Rec.
Publ'g Co. v. Walton, 573 A.2d 296, 302 (Vt. 1990); Breier, 279 N.W.2d at 184.
314. See infra text accompanying notes 338-339, 434.
315. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980); Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501
(1984) [hereinafter Press-Enterprise I]; Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986)
[hereinafter Press-Enterprise II]; El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147
(1993) (per curiam).
316. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9.
317. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
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access to the courts in order to oversee their operation; that oversight
is, in turn, essential to informed suffrage and self-governance.3,
8 For
our purposes, this doctrine offers a third measure of newsworthiness
insofar as it compels public access to the identities of individuals in-
volved in criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings, or permits with-
holding them.
The Supreme Court's five opinions on the doctrine have consid-
ered closures of criminal trials,319 voir dire proceedings °3 2 0 and pre-
liminary hearings, 321 and in each instance found the closure
unconstitutional. Lower courts have extended the right of access to a
wide range of criminal and civil proceedings, as well as documents
related to those proceedings. 322 But the Court itself has not consid-
ered the doctrine in any context beyond actual criminal proceedings.
In fact, it recently passed on opportunities to do so in three closely
watched post-September 11 cases. Two of these cases involved the
conflicting Third and Sixth Circuit rulings on whether the doctrine
compels public access to deportation hearings; in both cases, plaintiffs
had challenged the government's sealing of designated post-Septem-
ber 11 immigration proceedings by executive order.323 The third case
is to date the closest access-doctrine case to our core issue: whether
the doctrine compels public disclosure of the names of arrestees. In
Center for National Security Studies v. United States Department ofJustice,
324
the D.C. Circuit found the public access doctrine did not extend to
arrestee information; 25 it thus upheld the DOJ's refusal to disclose
the names of individuals arrested in post-September 11 law enforce-
ment sweeps and held for alleged immigration violations.3 26 To reach
318. See Eugene Cerruti, "Dancing in the Courthouse": The First Amendment Right of Access
Opens a New Round, 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 237, 272-95 (1995).
319. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. 555; Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. 596.
320. Press-Enterprise 1, 464 U.S. 501.
321. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1; El Vocero, 508 U.S. 147.
322. See Cerruti, supra note 318, at 266-68 (citing cases).
323. N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
538 U.S. 1056 (2003) (closure constitutional; no presumptive right of access under the
doctrine); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002) (closure unconstitu-
tional; presumptive right of access, and sealing order overbroad and unsupported by case-
by-case findings).
324. 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) [hereinafter CNSS], cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
325. Id. at 936-37.
326. Id. The plaintiffs had sought to compel the DOJ to disclose the names of post-
September 11 detainees, as well as other information about each detention, under FOIA,
but they also argued that the public had constitutional and common-law rights of access to
the names of arrestees. Id. at 920, 933-37. The DOJ countered that the information was
exempt from disclosure under three FOIA exemptions that allow the government to with-
hold information "compiled for law enforcement purposes": Exemption 7(A), which pro-
tects information the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to interfere with
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that ruling, the court relied on a threshold point often made about
the Richmond Newspapers doctrine: that it applies only to judicial pro-
ceedings and related documents, and the right to even those docu-
ments is not triggered unless and until the documents become the
subject of some judicial action.327 According to this reading, the doc-
trine is silent on access to information solely in the hands of the exec-
utive branch-for our purposes, the police officers and prosecutors
who investigate criminal suspects, arrest them, and disclose their
names to the public before anyjudicial action occurs.3 2 8 The doctrine
enforcement proceedings," 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (7) (A); Exemption 7(C), which protects in-
formation the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy," id. § 552(b) (7) (C); and Exemption 7(F), which protects
information the disclosure of which "could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or
physical safety of any individual," id. § 552(b) (7) (F). CNSS, 331 F.3d at 922. The D.C.
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs' access arguments and upheld the DOJ's withholding of the
information under Exemption 7(A); it did not reach the DOJ's privacy argument. Id. at
925, 935-37. As a result, Brady-Lunny and Tennessean Newspaper remain the only court rul-
ings on the question of withholding the names of arrestees to protect their privacy under
FOIA Exemption 7(C). See supra notes 270-276 and accompanying text. (The trial court in
CNSS had reached the privacy issue and taken the position I advocate: endorsing the as-
serted privacy interest but requiring the anonymity decision to be made by the arrestees
themselves. Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of'Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94,
106 (D.D.C. 2002). That part of the trial court's decision was reversed. CNSS, 331 F.3d at
925.)
327. See CNSS, 331 F.3d at 934-35 ("The narrow First Amendment right of access to
information recognized in Richmond Newspapers does not extend to non-judicial documents
that are not part of a criminal trial," and " [ n ] either the Supreme Court nor this Court has
applied the Richmond Newspapers test outside the context of criminal judicial proceedings
or the transcripts of such proceedings ... [nor] ever indicated that it would apply the ...
test to anything other than criminal judicial proceedings."); Cerruti, supra note 318, at 269
("[I]t is a fair summary of the doctrine to state that the First Amendment right of access
has been extended to almost every variety of legal proceeding or document, but it has not
been so extended beyond the courthouse."); id. at 266 (noting "the lower courts' continu-
ing failed attempts to extend the right beyond legal proceedings and documents to various
forms of non-judicial governmental information"); id. at 302-03 (describing the Supreme
Court as "adamantly opposed to recognizing an affirmative constitutional right of access to
information held by the other two branches [of government]," due to separation-of-powers
concerns); id. at 320 (characterizing a proposed rereading of the First Amendment access
right as one in which information becomes public and thereby subject to public access
"only when that information is brought to the attention of the court in relation to an
exercise of judicial authority"); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33
(1984) (finding that "pretrial depositions and interrogatories are not public components
of a civil trial" when upholding a protective order on documents exchanged by parties in
pretrial civil discovery).
328. CNSS, 331 F.3d at 935 ("Indeed, there are no federal court precedents requiring,
under the First Amendment, disclosure of information compiled during an Executive
Branch investigation. . . . We will not convert the First Amendment right of access to
criminaljudicial proceedings into a requirement that the government disclose information
compiled during the exercise of a quintessential executive power-the investigation and
prevention of terrorism.").
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thus arguably does not reach the identities of arrestees and suspects
unless and until some judicial action is taken with respect to them.
But not all courts read the public access doctrine this narrowly; at
the very least, some adjudicative proceedings other than criminal pro-
ceedings have been deemed subject to the Richmond Newspapers analy-
sis.329  Moreover, the public-oversight rationale of access to
government proceedings can easily apply to other government actions
and information 3 30-particularly, it would seem, to information about
the arrest and detention of an individual. In any case, criminal sus-
pects who are targets of grand jury proceedings are certainly involved
in a judicial proceeding, so the access doctrine is arguably triggered
with respect to them even if the doctrine is limited to criminal judicial
proceedings. Judicial action also occurs with respect to arrestees who
are brought before judicial officers for probable cause determina-
tions, since at that point documents that identify an arrestee-arrest
reports, charging documents, etc.-become the subject of judicial ac-
tion, or at least are related to the judicial proceeding. And to honor
the privacy right I propose here, in any proceeding that occurs before
a judicial finding of probable cause-scheduling hearings, discovery
motions, suppression motions and the like, in addition to probable
cause hearings themselves-the judge, prosecutor, defense counsel,
witnesses, and others involved in the proceeding would have to follow
measures to avoid naming the arrestee-defendant in open court, just
as they already do to protect the privacy of sexual assault complainants
and juveniles (and the anonymity of government informants and
other witnesses, for that matter). The precise nature of those mea-
sures, such as the use of pseudonyms or initials, all of which are al-
ready employed for juveniles, sexual assault complainants,
confidential informants, and other persons involved in judicial pro-
329. Both North Jersey Media Group and Detroit Free Press, for instance, found the doctrine
applicable to deportation hearings, which are administrative rather than judicial proceed-
ings, and indicated that access to other administrative proceedings, too could be assessed
under Richmond Newspapers. See N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 208-
09 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[I] n this Court, [the access test of] Richmond Newspapers is a test broadly
applicable to issues of access to government proceedings."); Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,
303 F.3d 681, 696, 699 (6th Cir. 2002) (a deportation hearing is "a demonstrably quasi-
judicial government administrative proceeding," and "there are many similarities between
judicial proceedings and deportation proceedings").
330. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir.
1994) (upholding extension of the public access right to civil proceedings "because the
contribution of publicity is just as important there"); see also Daniel J. Solove, Access and
Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REv. 1137, 1203 (2002)
("Although the Court's [access] cases involve judicial proceedings, the rationale can logi-
cally be extended beyond such proceedings.").
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ceedings, is discussed in Part III. For now, the point is that when an
arrestee is brought to court, or a suspect is investigated by a grand
jury, the access doctrine is arguably triggered; and the doctrine might
be found to apply even before an arrestee is brought to court-i.e., to
information solely in the hands of the executive branch. Its bearing
on the names of arrestees and suspects must therefore be
considered.3 3
331. It bears noting that in CNSS, the DOJ appeared to agree with the plaintiffs that the
access doctrine requires the government to disclose the names of post-September 11 ar-
restees "charged with criminal offenses," as opposed to the names of those held only for
alleged immigration violations, the latter of which were the names at issue in the case. See
Defendant's Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Center for Nat'l
Sec. Studies v. United States Dep't of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 01-
2500) (on file with author). The DOJ apparently took this position on the premises that
public access to information about criminal prosecutions is constitutionally required, and
that a criminal charge begins a criminal prosecution for constitutional purposes. See id.
("The Constitution requires that all criminal prosecutions be 'public.' ... Consistent with
this Constitutional mandate, [the DOJ has] compiled and released information regarding
the detainees charged with criminal offenses." (citations omitted)). Both premises are as-
sailable. First, while the Court has said that access to trials and trial proceedings is constitu-
tionally required, see supra text accompanying notes 319-321, it has not said anything about
access to criminal prosecutions. Second, even if such a requirement existed, it is not clear
that the mere filing of charges by a prosecutor would necessarily begin a criminal "prosecu-
tion" for constitutional access purposes. The right to counsel, for instance, guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment "[i]n all criminal prosecutions," U.S. CONST. amend. VI, attaches
only to "critical stages" after the government initiates adversarial judicial proceedings;
among the stages of a criminal prosecution the Court has found do not trigger that right is
a post-arrest probable cause hearing. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122-23 (1975); see also
supra note 210. But see United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) (Sixth Amendment
right to speedy trial attaches upon defendant's arrest or indictment, whichever comes
first). In other words, the DOJ's release of the names of post-September 11 arrestees
charged with crimes might have been more grounded on departmental policy (or litiga-
tion strategy) than compelled by the access doctrine. See also Cong. News Syndicate v.
United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp. 538, 544 (D.D.C. 1977) (acknowledging the
DOJ's "traditional practice" of disclosing the identities of individuals when an investigation
"reache[s] the arrest or indictment stages").
Moreover, in the category of individuals "charged with criminal offenses," Defendant's Re-
ply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 11, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies (No. 01-
2500), the DOJ did not distinguish, as I do in this Article, between those charged by grand
jury indictment and those charged only by a prosecutor's complaint or information; nor
did it distinguish between those who remained detained and those who had been released
pending resolution of the charges (but it also appeared that few or none had been re-
leased). Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for SummaryJudgment at 3-5 &
n.2, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies (No. 01-2500) (on file with author). In other words, the DOJ
apparently sees itself equally required to disclose the names of criminal arrestee-defend-
ants with respect to whom there is a judicial finding of probable cause (for indictment or
prolonged detention) and those with respect to whom there may not (yet) be. I, of course,
propose a distinction between those two categories of arrestees.
Finally, any distinction between criminal detainees and immigration detainees for disclo-
sure purposes is tenuous. In both cases, the government has taken an individual into cus-
tody upon a suspicion of wrongdoing; the possibilities of government error or abuse are
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Can the identities of arrestees and suspects constitutionally be
withheld from the public under the access doctrine of Richmond News-
papers and its progeny? More specifically: (1) do "experience and
logic" give rise to a presumptive right of public access to the identities
of arrestees and suspects, before ajudicial finding of probable cause is
made with respect to them; if so, (2) can the privacy concerns of those
individuals constitute a sufficiently overriding interest to require exec-
utive and judicial officers to withhold their identities; and if so, (3) are
there constitutionally sound methods for effecting this "closure"? In
other words: are the names of arrestees and suspects so constitution-
ally newsworthy as to require public access to them, notwithstanding
the privacy concerns we have identified?
a. Experience and Logic.-The experience prong is easily ad-
dressed: without a doubt, the identities of arrestees have historically
been available to the public, while the identities of suspects have not.
Suspects, as we have seen, are shielded in grand jury proceedings;
their identities are also protected from disclosure in court documents,
executive branch materials, and elsewhere. But arrestees are another
matter. In the English tradition that is our heritage, crime victims
themselves prosecuted criminal cases; complainants initiated those
cases by enlisting members of the public to help track down alleged
offenders, or by presenting their complaints to a dozen leading nobles
of the district, or by "rais[ing] the hue and cry" to bring members of
the public to their aid in apprehending the suspect. 32 By the nine-
teenth century here in the United States, with the state now in charge
of arrests and prosecutions, the public had regular access to daily po-
lice blotters that contained information such as the name, age, sex,
and race of each arrestee and the crimes alleged.' More recently
the same. (Indeed, given the comparatively less procedural protection accorded immigra-
tion arrestees, the reasons for requiring the government to release the names of arrestees
are arguably more compelling with respect to immigration arrestees than criminal ar-
restees, as I have argued elsewhere. Sadiq Reza, Privacy and the Post-September 11 Immigration
Detainees: The Wrong Way to a Right (and Other Wrongs), 34 CONN. L. REv. 1169, 1176 n.24
(2002).) And in any case, all indications are that detainees arrested in post-September 11
antiterrorism initiatives fell into both categories, and were classified as criminal or immi-
gration detainees only after their arrest. See Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment at 3-5, 8-10, Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies (No. 01-2500).
332. Daniel Klerman, Settlement and the Decline of Private Prosecution in Thirteenth-Century
England, 19 L. & HIST. REV. 1, 5-6, 10 (2001); see a/soJuan Cardenas, The Crime Victim in the
Prosecutorial Process, 9 I-IARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 357, 359 (1986).
333. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, USE AND MANAGEMENT OF
CRIMINAL HISTORY RECORD INFORMATION: A COMPREHENSIVE REPORT, 2001 UPDATE 25 (Bu-
reau of Justice Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ 187670, Dec. 2001) (describing contents of po-
lice blotters), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/umchriOl.pdf; BUREAU
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state judicial opinions regularly uphold public rights of access to blot-
ters and similar contemporaneous arrest information on statutory or
common-law grounds,33 4 and routine public access to arrest logs is
now the law or practice in nearly every state. 335 The experience prong
of the experience and logic test would thus seem easily satisfied with
respect to arrestees.
But the logic prong is another matter. What "significantly posi-
tive" purpose is served by public access to the identity of a person who
has been arrested, but with respect to whom probable cause of guilt
(or dangerousness) has not yet been found by anyone but a police
officer, if the arrestee prefers anonymity? Or the identity of a sus-
pect-an individual with respect to whom even the police themselves
do not have probable cause (or else they would arrest him) ?336 Cer-
tainly, as discussed above, public access to daily records of arrests serve
as a check on the executive branch in various ways, with protection of
arrestees and the public from unlawful arrests and post-arrest deten-
tions the most obvious of those ways. Regular dissemination of arrest
information can also serve public safety by alerting the public to the
alleged occurrence of particular crimes in specified places at specified
OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON
PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION 39 (Bureau of Justice Statistics
Bulletin No. NCJ 187669, Aug. 2001) ("Court records and police blotter information ...
traditionally have been public documents available . . . to anyone who went to the court-
house to view them."), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/rntfptcj.pdf;
Cardenas, supra note 332, at 366-71 (tracing the evolution of public prosecution in the
American colonies).
334. See supra notes 300-313 and accompanying text. Some of the cases also mention
constitutional grounds for access, but no case has considered the matter under Richmond
Newspapers. In Caledonian, for instance, while mandating public access on statutory
grounds, the Vermont Supreme Court asserted the existence of a "First Amendment"
"right of access to information relating to the activities of law enforcement officers and to
information concerning crime in the community"-and then cited, oddly, Reporters Commit-
tee to elucidate the interest in disclosure. Caledonian Record Publ'g Co. v. Walton, 573
A.2d 296, 299-300 (Vt. 1990). The pre-Richmond Newspapers decision of the Wisconsin Su-
preme Court in Breier suggests the possibility of a First Amendment right to access "to open
records in respect to most public business." Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 279 N.W.2d 179,
187 (Wis. 1979). The earlier Houston Chronicle decision, citing other Supreme Court prece-
dents, is more emphatic with respect to arrest information. See Houston Chronicle Publ'g
Co. v. City of Houston, 531 S.W.2d 177, 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975) ("We hold that the press
and the public have a constitutional right of access to information concerning crime in the
community, and to information relating to activities of law enforcement agencies."). As
noted above, the Richmond Newspapers access right has not been interpreted so expansively.
See supra notes 327-328 and accompanying text.
335. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ORIGINAL RECORDS OF ENTRY
16, 37, app. (Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ 125626, Dec. 1990).
336. Unless the police sought to investigate him further, in secret-in which case they
themselves would not want him named.
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times. And, the information can help the public monitor the conduct
of the executive branch more broadly; for instance, to facilitate the
public assessment of law enforcement priorities and expenditures,
particularly if arrest information were ultimately followed by informa-
tion concerning the ultimate disposition of each arrest-i.e., convic-
tion, acquittal, dismissal, or other resolution.
But the importance of routine public access to arrestees' identi-
ties for all of these laudable purposes is not as obvious. Beginning
with the rationale of protecting arrestees themselves: the person who
is arrested without a warrant and accorded her constitutional and stat-
utory rights-a law enforcement determination of probable cause; re-
lease or a judicial hearing within a reasonable period of time after
arrest; notice of the right to silence and counsel during custodial in-
terrogation and the honoring of those rights upon her request; consti-
tutionally acceptable conditions of post-arrest confinement-has no
more to fear from remaining anonymous than if she were named, as
long as the public knows that someone was arrested at such-and-such
time and place for such-and-such alleged crime. Law enforcement of-
ficers who might be inclined to exploit her anonymity to deprive her
of any of the above-mentioned rights can effect such deprivations
without the privacy protection proposed in this Article, by merely not
revealing the fact of an arrest, or by characterizing a forcible deten-
tion as something less than an arrest, or by simply choosing to abro-
gate those rights-much as the federal government did by denying
judicial review and counsel to post-September 11 U.S. citizen arrestees
it held as "enemy combatants," until the Supreme Court declared
those practices unconstitutional. 7
Indeed, the government's withholding of the names of hundreds
of post-September 11 immigration detainees has no doubt aided it in
effecting what many believe to be violations of those detainees' consti-
tutional and statutory rights,33 but this fact arguably supports the pre-
sent proposal. Not only does it show that the government is already
capable of maintaining arrestee secrecy and exploiting that secrecy to
violate arrestees' rights, but it also suggests that the very absence of a
definitive rule on arrestee anonymity enables the government to de-
prive arrestees of (other) rights. Stated otherwise: a rule that required
the government to advise arrestees of their right to public identifica-
tion or anonymity would properly remove the privacy decision from
the hands of the government and give it to arrestees, requiring the
337. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
338. See Reza, supra note 331, at 1181-82.
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government to name arrestees who chose publicity unless the govern-
ment could cite other legitimate grounds for withholding the
names.13 9 And the arrestee who chooses anonymity upon her arrest
only to find herself mistreated is free to change her mind upon her
release, or sooner, such as the moment she meets her lawyer or ap-
pears in court, at which point any alleged abuse will reach the public.
One answer, in other words, to the fear that a rule of anonymity upon
an arrestee's request might facilitate the abuse of arrest and detention
powers is that such abuse is already an unfortunate possibility, and still
too often a reality, under our present rules.
Admittedly, the public interest in monitoring the conduct of the
executive branch more broadly can be well served by public knowl-
edge of the identities of arrestees. Law enforcement arrest practices
that are unlawful or otherwise undesirable might more readily be un-
covered. Not only mistreatment, but also unduly favorable treatment
of arrestees by law enforcement officers (and judges), for reasons po-
litical or personal or other, might be discouraged or at least discov-
ered. It therefore cannot be said that public knowledge of the
identities serves no legitimate purpose. But the existence of some ben-
efit of public access is not enough to satisfy the logic prong of the
Richmond Newspapers test.34 ° Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to
find any government proceeding or information with respect to which
public access would not serve a legitimate purpose-namely, the very
significant purpose of public oversight of government.34'
Establishing a constitutional right of access under the logic prong
requires more than this. In the cases that established the Richmond
Newspapers test, the Supreme Court found that logic dictated access
because public access to the proceeding in question was, in the
Court's view, essential to the proceeding-indeed essential to the
criminal justice process itself.342 Moreover, recall that the only pro-
339. In CNSS, the post-September 11 case on detainee names, the court upheld the
government's withholding of the names on the ground that releasing them would interfere
with the DOJ's post-September 11 law enforcement efforts. 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
340. Cf N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 217 (3d Cir. 2002)
("[Wiere the logic prong [of the Richmond Newspapers test] only to determine whether
openness serves some good, it is difficult to conceive of a government proceeding to which
the public would not have a First Amendment right of access.").
341. See Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, supra note 48, at 1007 ("What is ultimately
at stake in [common-law privacy is] the protection of both individual dignity and commu-
nity identity, as constituted by rules of civility, from the encroachments of the logic of
public accountability.").
342. Press-Enterprise I, 478 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1986) (noting that "[w]e . . .determined in
Richmond Newspapers, Globe, and Press-Enterprise I, that public access to criminal trials and the
selection ofjurors is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system," and
[VOL. 64:755
2005] PRIVACY AND THE CRIMINAL ARRESTEE OR SUSPECT 835
ceedings the Court has considered under the access doctrine, and
therefore the only contexts in which the Court has thus far found the
constitutional right of access to attach, are the following: (1) criminal
trials; (2) voir dire proceedings, which the Court analyzed and dis-
cussed as part and parcel of criminal trials;343 and (3) preliminary
hearings, to which the Court found the right of access attached be-
cause of the similarities of those hearings to criminal trials. 44 This
focus on criminal trials and the essential role public access plays in
them suggests that the logic prong might not compel public access to
all pretrial proceedings in a criminal case, let alone all aspects of all
pretrial hearings-recall that the "closure" I propose is not of the en-
tire proceeding, or of all information about an arrest, but only of the
identity of the person arrested. Certainly the logic prong, as applied
by the Supreme Court, would not compel public access to arrest
records that are in the hands of only executive branch officials.
Logic, then, does not clearly dictate the qualified Richmond News-
papers right of public access to the identities of mere arrestees, even if
experience clearly shows a tradition of such access. This apparent in-
consistency need not trouble us; courts and commentators emphasize
logic as the dominant, if not dispositive, prong of the test.3 45 Again,
this is not to say that there is no value (logic) to public access to ar-
restees' names. As noted above, public oversight of the daily practices
making the same determination with respect to public access to preliminary hearings in
California); see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984) ("Openness . . . enhances
both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to
public confidence in the system."); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596,
606 (1982) ("[T]he right of access to criminal trials plays a particularly significant role in
the functioning of the judicial process and the government as a whole."); Richmond News-
papers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 593 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Publicity
serves to advance several of the particular purposes of the trial (and, indeed, the judicial)
process.").
343. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505-08.
344. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12.
345. See, e.g., Cerruti, supra note 318, at 269, 308-09 (noting that "the so-called history
prong of the test has essentially been abandoned by [courts applying] the access doctrine,"
and that "[h]istorical practice no longer operates to establish or corroborate a putative
entitlement to access to judicial information" (footnote omitted)). Indeed, some argue
that the history prong should be essentially abandoned, given its irrelevance to the public-
oversight rationale of the access doctrine. See, e.g., Jonathan L. Hafetz, The First Amendment
and the Right of Access to Deportation Hearings, 40 CAL. W. L. REv. 265, 318 (2004)
("[H] istorical evidence of openness must be read against the background of the structural
concerns that underlie the First Amendment."); Kimba M. Wood, Reexamining the Access
Doctrine, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 1105 (1996) (listing the shortcomings of historical analysis and
arguing that the public access doctrine should focus on the logic of access). But see N. Jersey
Media Group, 308 F.3d at 215-16 (finding insufficient history of access to deportation hear-
ings and declining to focus on the logic prong alone to find a right of access).
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of police officers, prosecutors, and judges would certainly be aided by
the contemporaneous disclosure of the identities of all individuals ar-
rested, and all arrestees who appear before judicial officers, whether
or not a judicial finding of probable cause is ever made-indeed, es-
pecially when an arrestee's case is dismissed before or after it reaches
court, some might argue, lest improprieties of abuse or unduly
favorable treatment of an arrestee by law enforcement or judicial of-
ficers be completely hidden from the public. But there is already little
or no public oversight of a police officer's decision to release an indi-
vidual without charges after arresting (or detaining) him, or to arrest
(or detain) him in the first place, nor of a prosecutor's decision to
dismiss charges against an arrestee or not to charge him at all, nor of a
magistrate's decision not to issue an arrest warrant sought by police or
prosecutors.
Or more analogously: there is no less public oversight of the crim-
inal justice process under the privacy protection I propose than when
allegations of sexual assault, made by unnamed complainants, go un-
prosecuted by the state, when anonymous juvenile accusees are con-
victed or acquitted, when arrest records are withheld from the public,
or when a grand jury-under the supervision of a judge, by the direc-
tion of a prosecutor, considering only the evidence that law enforce-
ment officials choose to present it, in proceedings closed to the public
by rule-decides not to indict its secret target. Nor, of course, do the
examples end there. This is not to celebrate the vast expanses of offi-
cial non-accountability in the criminal process; nor is it to say that
protecting the privacy of arrestees and suspects as proposed here
would provide no new opportunities for official non-accountability.
Rather, it is to say that privacy protections, by definition, engender
public costs, and if those costs are considered acceptable for the sake
of certain actors in the criminal process, then some principle must
explain their unacceptability when possibly innocent arrestees and
suspects might be their beneficiaries. A proper assessment of the pro-
posed privacy protection under the logic prong of the right of public
access requires weighing the value of public knowledge against the
value of privacy protection-or, put differently, weighing the addi-
tional costs to the public of arrestee anonymity against the privacy
gains it offers. 46 Of course, I contend that the benefits of this particu-
346. N. Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d at 217 ("Under the reported cases, whenever a court
has found that openness serves community values, it has concluded that openness plays a
'significant positive role' in that proceeding. But that cannot be the story's end, for to
gauge accurately whether a role is positive, the calculus must perforce take account of the
flip side-the extent to which openness impairs the public good."); see also Solove, The
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lar form of closure outweigh its costs, and that the logic prong there-
fore does not clearly support a First Amendment right of access under
the Richmond Newspapers access test. The logic of public access, in
other words, suggests that the names of arrestees and suspects are not
necessarily newsworthy for constitutional access purposes.
b. Overriding Interests.-But even if the logic prong of the
Richmond Newspapers test suggested otherwise-that is, even if the
courts found a presumptive right of public access to the identities of
arrestees and suspects (pre-probable cause) under the experience and
logic test-protecting the privacy of these individuals as proposed
should still be constitutionally permissible under the second part of
the access test, which allows the presumption of access to be defeated,
and closure permitted, for "overriding interests" articulated in specific
findings and served through narrowly tailored provisions-i.e., if the
closure satisfies strict scrutiny.347 That the privacy interest identified
here might, to begin with, constitute a sufficiently overriding interest
to allow closure is suggested by the Court itself in its quartet of access
cases. The plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers offers little gui-
dance on what might be a sufficient overriding interest;348 the concur-
ring opinions suggest that national security concerns, fair-trial
considerations, the protection of trade secrets, and "the sensibilities of
a youthful prosecution witness" are possible overriding interests.
349
But in the second case, Globe Newspaper, although the Court over-
turned a Massachusetts statute that required trial judges to close trials
involving certain sex offenses during the testimony of complainants
under the age of eighteen,3 ° the Court found the state's proffered
interest-"the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from further
trauma and embarrassment ... and the encouragement of such vic-
tims to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner"-
Virtues of Knowing Less, supra note 135, at 1048 ("Society must weigh the value of disclosure
against the distorting effects it might have, as well as against its other negative social
effects.").
347. Press-Enterprise 11, 478 U.S. at 9-10 (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510).
348. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n.18 ("We have no occasion here to define the
circumstances in which all or parts of a criminal trial may be closed to the public ....").
Indeed, in issuing the trial-closure order that the Supreme Court reversed, the trial court
neither articulated a particular interest nor made findings to support the closure. It ap-
peared, however, that the court had closed the trial to protect the defendant from the
possibility of another trial after several previous mistrials had been ordered in the case, the
last of which had apparently been the result of contamination of the jury pool by pretrial
publicity. See id. at 559-62, 580; see also id. at 584 & n.2 (Stevens, J., concurring).
349. Id. at 598 n.24 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 600 & n.5 (Stewart, J., concurring).
350. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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sufficiently compelling to allow closure.3 51 (But only on a case-by-case
basis, and therefore the Court found that the mandatory closure law
was not narrowly tailored. 52 ) Next, in Press-Enterprise , in which the
trial court had closed all but three days of a six-week voir dire and
then declined to release the transcript of the closed proceedings, the
Court found that not only fair-trial concerns but also protecting the
privacy of jurors in their answers to potentially "sensitive" voir dire
questions-both interests the trial court had articulated in support of
its rulings-might be sufficiently compelling to allow closure. 53 (The
problem was the absence of findings that these interests were indeed
threatened, and again, the scope of the closure orders. 54)
Similarly, in Press-Enterprise II, the Court found that the fair-trial
concerns underlying a California statute that permitted closed prelim-
inary hearings-pursuant to which a state trial judge had closed the
forty-one-day preliminary hearing of an alleged serial murderer upon
the defendant's request-were potentially sufficiently compelling for
closure; instead, the Court's concerns were the standard for potential
prejudice to the defendant and the scope of the closure order.355
Also in Press-Enterprise II, although the decision in Press-Enterprise I (on
juror privacy) had come only two-and-a-half years earlier, the Court
dropped a footnote to remind courts that the "interests of those other
than the accused" might be sufficiently compelling to justify closure,
and flatly stated: "The protection of victims of sex crimes from the
trauma and embarrassment of public scrutiny may justify closing cer-
tain aspects of a criminal proceeding."3 56
Thus, protecting sexual assault complainants from trauma and
embarrassment-i.e., protecting their psychological well-being and
their privacy-and protecting the privacy ofjurors, are among the in-
terests the Court has found potentially sufficient to allow closure, even
351. Id. at 607-08.
352. Id.
353. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. 501, 510-11 (1984).
354. Id. at 510-13.
355. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 3-4, 13-15 (1986). The California Supreme Court had
required only a showing of a "reasonable likelihood" of prejudice to the defendant to allow
closure on fair-trial grounds; the U.S. Supreme Court held that the minimum standard
required is the "substantial probability" of prejudice. Id. at 14.
356. Id. at 9 n.2. The remainder of the footnote is a citation to Globe Newspaper, which,
as just discussed, dealt with protecting minor victims of sexual offenses; there is no refer-
ence to Press-Enterprise L Id. (citing Globe Newspaper v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607-
10 (1982)). Notice, too, the Court's implicit expansion of the potentially compelling inter-
est to the protection of all victims of sexual offenses, from only the minor victims whose
well-being was at issue in Globe Newspaper. Was the Court signaling its endorsement of
privacy protections for sexual assault complainants beyond those it had already endorsed
in Cox and was soon to embrace further in 1lorida Star.
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if experience and logic compel access to a criminal proceeding, so
long as the closure order is sufficiently narrowly tailored and sup-
ported by appropriate findings. And in its most recent access case,
and the first one to apply the access test as refined in Press-Enterprise II,
the Court almost addressed the very interest at issue in this Article:
protecting the privacy of arrestee-defendants before a judicial finding
of probable cause. In its per curiam opinion in El Vocero de Puerto Rico
v. Puerto Rico, the Court struck down, "for precisely the reasons stated
in" Press-Enterpise II, a Puerto Rico Rule of Criminal Procedure that
mandated closed preliminary hearings unless a defendant requested
otherwise. 57 The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico had upheld the rule
on the grounds that it protected the defendant's right to a fair trial,
the presumption of innocence, and the Commonwealth's "special
concern for the honor and reputation of its citizenry." '358 The U.S.
Supreme Court acknowledged these interests and stated that fair-trial
concerns might allow closure, but only on a case-by-case basis; the
Court did not comment on the privacy rationale. 59 The Court thus,
after giving its blessing to the privacy protections for sexual assault
complainants and prospective jurors in its previous access opinions,
remained silent on whether concern for the privacy of a defendant
who has not yet been convicted might constitute a sufficiently compel-
ling interest to permit closure. 6 ° (This did not deter Puerto Rico,
which promptly amended its rule to allow limiting access to prelimi-
357. 508 U.S. 147, 149 (1993). Those reasons, you will recall, were that California's
preliminary hearings were sufficiently like trials to require access, that the closure order
had not been supported by a finding of a "substantial probability" of harm to the defen-
dant's fair-trial rights, and that the order had not been sufficiently narrowly tailored. Press-
Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 14. The text of the invalidated provision, then Rule 23(c) of the
Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure, read, in pertinent part:
(c) Proceeding during the hearing. If the person appears at the preliminary
hearing and does not waive it, the magistrate shall hear the evidence. The hearing
shall be held privately unless the defendant requests at the commencement thereof that it be
public.
See Rivera-Puig v. Garcia-Rosario, 983 F.2d 311, 313 n.2 (1st Cir. 1992) (citing 34 P.R. LAws
ANN. ApP. II, R. 23).
358. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. at 149.
359. Id. at 151 ("The concern of the majority below that publicity will prejudice defend-
ants' fair trial rights is, of course, legitimate. But this concern can and must be addressed
on a case-by-case basis .... "). The Court twice referred to the challenged Puerto Rico
closure rule as a "privacy provision," and characterized the California rule invalidated in
Press-Enterprise 1I as a "privacy law," but it said no more about privacy. Id. at 149-50. Inter-
estingly, the Court did not use that term in Press-Enterprise II itself. See supra notes 355-356
and accompanying text (discussing Press-Enterprise I).
360. Nor did the First Circuit comment on that asserted interest when it addressed the
same issue in a different case that the Supreme Court acknowledged in El Vocero. Rivera-
Puig, 983 F.2d 311; El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. at 149 n.3.
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nary hearings, upon request, when a magistrate determines, on "pre-
cise and detailed grounds," that the limitation is needed to protect
"any ... pressing interest and there are no other less encompassing
and reasonable options." '361 Presumably, protecting the defendant's
dignity, honor, reputation, and privacy would constitute such a press-
ing interest in Puerto Rico's view; the Commonwealth's constitution
expressly protects these interests. 362 )
The lower courts have not been as silent. In Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Pokaski,363 the First Circuit partly upheld a Massachusetts statute that
ordered records to be sealed in every criminal case that ended favora-
bly for a defendant, including acquittal after trial, a return of "no bill"
(no probable cause) by a grand jury, or a finding of no probable cause
by a judge, and allowed records to be sealed in every case that was
dismissed by a court or not ultimately prosecuted.36 4 The court ac-
knowledged and endorsed the purpose of the statute-to protect the
privacy of unconvicted defendants365-and easily upheld the statute
insofar as grand jury "no bills" were concerned, citing the law and
tradition of grand jury secrecy and the consequent lack of a First
Amendment right of access to grand jury records.366 The court ap
proved too of the privacy rationale for sealing the other records, find-
ing fault only in the manner by which that sealing was
accomplished.367 The automatic sealing provision inverted the pre-
sumption of First Amendment access that the First Circuit had previ-
ously found to apply to "records submitted in connection with
criminal proceedings" under the access doctrine, the court said, be-
cause it placed the burden on the public to initiate administrative or
361. 34 P.R. LAws ANN. App. II, R. 23 (2001).
362. See P.R. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("Every person has the right to the protection of law
against abusive attacks on his honor, reputation and private or family life.").
363. 868 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1989).
364. Id. at 500. Discretionary sealing depended on a court's finding that "substantial
justice would [thereby] best be served." Id. (quoting MAss. GEN. LAws ANN., ch. 276,
§ 100c).
365. See d. at 505 ("The broad concern of [the statute] is to protect the privacy interests
of criminal defendants whose cases have ended without a conviction.").
366. Id. at 509-10.
367. The court was clear in its endorsement of the privacy interests involved:
We agree that preventing the public disclosure of records that defendants do not
want released, and that the state is not required to release under the First Amend-
ment, is a compelling interest given the harm that disclosure of such records can
cause .... [W]e proceed on the assumption that there exist at least some in-
stances in which defendants will be able to show that their privacy interests out-
weigh the public's right of access.
Id. at 506.
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legal action to access the records of sealed cases.3
68 Better, and more
constitutionally firm, to put the burden on defendants, allowing them
to move for sealing at the successful end of their prosecutions, and for
the trial court to hold an immediate public hearing whenever a defen-
dant made a prima facie case for sealing. 69
The First Circuit thus recognized the privacy concerns of uncon-
victed defendants, including arrestees with respect to whom no proba-
ble cause finding has been made, as potentially sufficient to outweigh
a presumption of access under the public access doctrine. And all
records pertaining to a criminal case could be sealed on this
ground-not just information that identified the arrestee or defen-
dant, as proposed here. Moreover, the court suggested the simple
procedure of a motion by the defendant to trigger that protection.
37 °
And finally, to guarantee equal availability of this protection, the court
suggested that the law require trial judges and defense attorneys to
inform defendants of their right to seek the protection whenever their
cases ended successfully.
37 t
Pokaski is thus a powerful endorsement of the privacy right I pro-
pose, within the parameters of the constitutional access doctrine. It is
not the only one. The Ninth Circuit, finding no right of access to pre-
indictment search warrants or related documents and proceedings,
noted that the "significant privacy interests" of individuals named in
those materials supported its decision.3
72 The Eighth Circuit found
368. Id. at 502, 506-09.
369. Id. at 507. The court issued the same command with respect to the discretionary
sealing of cases that ended in a nolle prosequi, replacing the statute's "substantial justice"
threshold with the access doctrine's requirements of a compelling need and specific find-
ings. Id. at 510. The court also surmised that few cases would reach this point because
information about the proceedings in every case would already have been publicly availa-
ble and any asserted privacy interest therefore diminished. Id. at 506 n.17, 507-08.
370. Id. at 507, 510 n.24.
371. Id. at 509 n.22.
372. Times Mirror Co. v. United States, 873 F.2d 1210, 1218 (9th Cir. 1989). The court
based its no-access decision on the historical lack of a history of openness in search warrant
materials and law enforcement interests in keeping those materials sealed. Id As for the
privacy interests, the court likened them to those the Fifth Circuit had found implicated in
bills of particulars in United States v. Smith. Id. at 1216; see supra notes 292-298 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Smith). The Ninth Circuit stated that
[t] he risks identified in Smith are also present when search warrant materials are
made public. Persons who prove to be innocent are frequently the subjects of
government investigations. Like a bill of particulars, a search warrant affidavit
may supply only the barest details of the government's reasons for believing that
an individual may be engaging in criminal activity. Nonetheless, the issuance of a
warrant-even on this minimal information-may indicate to the public that gov-
ernment officials have reason to believe that persons named in the search warrant
have engaged in criminal activity. Moreover, persons named in the warrant pa-
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these privacy interests even more weighty: having ruled oppositely
from the Ninth Circuit by finding a presumptive right of access to
search warrant materials,3 73 the court later found that right trumped
by the privacy interests of named individuals.374 In the latter case, the
Eighth Circuit, ruling on a second attempt to access a pair of search
warrant affidavits, 375 overturned a district court's finding that the pub-
lic's right of access to information about a government investigation
into allegations of fraud and bribery in defense contracts outweighed
the privacy interests of certain individuals named in the materials. Pri-
vacy interests authorized the redaction of investigatory material, the
court found, and here those interests were heightened because there
was no indictment. 76 Indeed, the absence of an indictment was "criti-
cal," because it suggested that the government could not prove the
criminal behavior suggested in the materials, and the concomitant ab-
sence of a criminal proceeding gave the named individuals no forum
in which to vindicate themselves.37 7 The pre-indictment status of the
case thus "tip [ped] the balance decisively in favor of the privacy inter-
ests and against disclosure of even the redacted versions of the search
warrant affidavits," although the interested newspaper was free to seek
the withheld information from other sources or to seek disclosure
again after an indictment issued.37  In other words, privacy trumped
access during the time period before a judicial finding of probable
cause was made. 79
pers will have no forum in which to exonerate themselves if the warrant materials
are made public before indictments are returned. Thus, possible injury to privacy
interests is another factor weighing against public access to warrant materials dur-
ing the pre-indictment stage of an investigation.
Times Mirror, 873 F.2d at 1216.
373. In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569
(8th Cir. 1988) [hereinafter Gunn 1].
374. Certain Interested Individuals, John Does I-V, Who Are Employees of McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Pulitzer Publ'g Co., 895 F.2d 460 (8th Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Gunn I].
375. In the first case, the court had found the access right trumped by compelling law
enforcement interests because the investigation was ongoing; the court, therefore, did not
reach the privacy argument. Gunn 1, 855 F.2d at 574-75.
376. Gunn II, 895 F.2d at 466.
377. Id. at 466-67.
378. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
379. The court categorized the privacy interest as one protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment rather than by common-law or statute, perhaps because the individuals had so ar-
gued. Id. at 461, 464. But the court clearly located the interest in Congress's intent to
protect personal privacy in the statutory protection against the disclosure of information
obtained from wiretaps. Id. at 464. This interest is one properly seen as the common-law
interest in informational privacy. See supra note 19; see also United States v. Gerena, 869
F.2d 82, 86 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the trial court must balance the presumptive right
of access to pretrial briefs and memoranda against defendants' statutorily protected privacy
interest, and stating that "we do not want to understate the significant privacy interests of
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And there are more than these cases, and the Supreme Court's
silence, on which to rest the argument that concerns about arrestee
privacy might suffice to defeat any presumptive constitutional right of
access to arrestees' names. There are juvenile confidentiality and
grand jury secrecy. Although the Court has not yet considered either
of these pockets of privacy under the constitutional access doctrine,
lower courts have found closure in both contexts permissible notwith-
standing the doctrine.38 ° Moreover, the Court has at least suggested
that grand jury secrecy would survive the access doctrine. While find-
ing a presumptive right of access to California's preliminary hearings
in Press-Enterprise II, the Court breezily exempted grand jury proceed-
ings from the logic of that right.3"' In dissent, and in support of the
preliminary-hearing closure at issue, Justice Stevens, joined by then-
Associate Justice Rehnquist on this point, noted " [t] he obvious defect"
of the ruling: the logical reasons supporting access to preliminary
hearings apply to grand jury proceedings "with as much force," be-
cause California's preliminary hearing is "functionally identical" to
the traditionally secret grand jury (in that, just as in a preliminary
hearing to determine probable cause, a criminal case may end at the
grand jury stage, and either proceeding may be the sole occasion for
those who have been targeted for [wiretap] surveillance[,] . . . [t]he protection of privacy
was a very important congressional concern in the passage of Title IlI"); In re N.Y. Times
Co., 828 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1987) (holding the same regarding pretrial motion papers).
380. In the closest federal case on juvenile confidentiality, the First Circuit avoided the
access question by interpreting the federal statute that provides for juvenile confidentiality
as allowing closure on a case-by-case basis, rather than mandating it across the board, and
thus deemed the provision satisfactory. United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 92
(1st Cir. 1995). The Third Circuit interpreted the law similarly, but implying that a pre-
sumptive access right attached, remanded the case to the district court for specific findings
to justify closure. United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1356-59 (3d Cir. 1994). But the cases
expressly reject a presumptive right of access to grand jury proceedings. See, e.g., In re
Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (finding no constitutional, common-law, or
statutory right to public docketing of grand jury matters); In re Motions of DowJones &
Co., Inc., 142 F.3d 496 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (finding no constitutional or common-law right of
access to proceedings ancillary to the grand jury); In re Subpoena to Testify Before Grand
Jury, 864 F.2d 1559 (1lth Cir. 1989) (finding no presumptive right of access to grand jury
proceedings, and therefore no notice or opportunity to be heard required before issuing
an order to seal related pleadings and memoranda).
381. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1986) ("Although many governmental
processes operate best under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that
there are some kinds of government operations that would be totally frustrated if con-
ducted openly. A classic example is that 'the proper functioning of our grand jury system
depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.'" (quoting Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol
Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979))).
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public scrutiny in the case).382 Indeed, because ajudge presides over
a preliminary hearing in a way she does not over a grand jury, which
in practice is directed by a prosecutor, the grand jury might present a
more compelling case for public access.383 With this point made, Jus-
tice Stevens then argued that the Court's logic of access, and the short
shrift the Court gave the interests supporting closure of the prelimi-
nary hearing, suggested a right of public access that stretches too far
and bends too little.384 And what were those interests supporting clo-
sure of the proceeding? "The constitutionally grounded fair trial in-
terests of the accused if he is bound over for trial, and the
reputational interests of the accused if he is not .. *"385 The point
here, of course, is to highlight the ease with which the Court exempts
grand jury proceedings from the constitutional access right, when
logic supports access as much there as to preliminary hearings (if not
more) .386 And again, it is all information about grand jury proceed-
ings that is withheld by rule, as opposed to just the names of arrestees
and suspects, as I propose.
Both juvenile confidentiality and grand jury secrecy thus might
survive the constitutional access doctrine of Richmond Newspapers and
its progeny.387 The Court has in fact restated its support of grand jury
secrecy since formulating the access test, albeit without mentioning
382. Id. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting). To emphasize the point, Justice Stevens quoted
the language thatJustice Rehnquist had quoted in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368,
380 (1979) (quoting Cox v. Coleridge, 107 Eng. Rep. 15, 19-20 (1822)):
[The preliminary hearing] is only a preliminary inquiry, whether there be suffi-
cient ground to commit the prisoner for trial. The proceeding before the grand
jury is precisely of the same nature, and it would be difficult, if the right exists in the present
case, to deny it in that.
383. Press-EnterpriseII, 478 U.S. at 26 (Stevens,J., dissenting) (emphasis added by Court).
Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
384. Id. at 27-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
385. Id. at 29 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
386. History, though, most certainly does not support access to grand jury proceedings,
whereas it does to preliminary hearings, as the majority also pointed out. Id. at 10-11.
387. For a view that juvenile confidentiality should not survive Richmond Newspapers scru-
tiny, see Joshua M. Dalton, At the Crossroads of Richmond and Gault: Addressing Media Access
to Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings Through a Functional Analysis, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 1155,
1200-28 (1998). For a similar view regarding grand jury secrecy, see Fred A. Bernstein,
Note, Behind the Gray Door: Williams, Secrecy, and the Federal Grand Juy, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV.
563, 603-22 (1994) (analyzing grand jury secrecy under the public access doctrine and
concluding that access rights should prevail). See also Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand
Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the CriminalJustice System?, 82 B.U. L. REv. 1, 73-74 (2002)
(arguing that "the secret nature of the grand jury comes at a significant cost in terms of
procedural justice," and that "[b]y maintaining grand jury secrecy, the criminal justice
system is needlessly missing out on an opportunity to enhance the legitimacy of the crimi-
nal process").
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that test. 3ss Lower courts, meanwhile, have found, A la Landmark Com-
munications, that confidentiality rules in judicial misconduct investiga-
tions remain viable despite. the access test, at least until the
investigating body finds probable cause of wrongdoing.38 9 Thus, even
if there is a presumptive right of access to the names of arrestees and
suspects before a judicial finding of probable cause is made, the pri-
vacy interests of these individuals could constitute-should constitute,
in my view-a sufficiently compelling interest to allow withholding
those names from the public. In other words, the names should not
be considered so newsworthy as to outweigh the privacy concerns of
suspects and arrestees and compel public access to them.
c. Case-by-Case Findings, Narrowly Tailored Means.-To satisfy
the final requirements of the access doctrine, any closure-assuming
a presumptive right of access has attached-must be supported by
case-by-case findings and served by narrowly tailored means.39 ° With-
holding the names of arrestees and suspects as I propose can satisfy
both of these requirements. As for case-by-case findings, notifying ar-
restees of their right to anonymity and giving them the option to exer-
cise that right is the kind of privacy protection other courts, including
the Supreme Court itself, have found satisfactory under the access
doctrine with respect to prospective jurors.391 If necessary, a require-
ment that a judge approve the arrestee's request could be easily ad-
388. See, e.g., Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 629-31 (1990).
389. See, e.g., Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106 (2d Cir. 1994) (uphold-
ing a state prohibition against the disclosure by a complainant that a complaint existed or
by a witness that testimony existed, against a judge, or any disclosure of information about
the investigation, before probable cause is determined); First Amendment Coalition v. Ju-
dicial Inquiry & Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467 (3d Cir. 1986) (upholding a Pennsylvania law
forbidding public access to records of a state judicial disciplinary agency unless the agency
recommends disciplinary measures).
390. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14.
391. In Press-Enterprise I, the Court stated:
To preserve fairness and at the same time protect legitimate privacy, a trial
judge . . . should inform the array of prospective jurors, once the general nature
of sensitive questions is made known to them, that those individuals believing
public questioning will prove damaging because of embarrassment, may properly
request an opportunity to present the problem to the judge in camera but with
counsel present and on the record.
By requiring the prospective juror to make an affirmative request, the trial
judge can ensure that there is in fact a valid basis for a belief that disclosure
infringes a significant interest in privacy. This process will minimize the risk of
unnecessary closure.
464 U.S. 501, 512 (1983); see also Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 507, 509
n.22, 510 n.24 (1st Cir. 1989); supra notes 369-371 and accompanying text (describing
procedures whereby defendants may move to seal their records).
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ded; an individualized finding that an arestee has no effective means
of redress for unwarranted naming might also be required.392 Nor
could the protection be more narrowly tailored than by withholding
only identifying information-an approach the Court itself has en-
dorsed, as have lower courts, for protecting privacy within the con-
tours of the access doctrine. 93 (That approach is also expressly
authorized in the FOIA context, and applied in numerous other con-
texts as well. 39 4 )
It thus appears that withholding the identities of arrestees and
suspects could survive scrutiny under the First Amendment doctrine
of public access to courts. If it does not, the doctrine arguably con-
flicts with the Court's government information cases, which expressly
authorize states to withhold information to protect the privacy of indi-
viduals in criminal and quasi-criminal proceedings. This possible ten-
sion, indeed a contradiction, between the two doctrines remains
essentially unexplored. I do not hope to reconcile the doctrines, or to
declare them irreconcilable, here. I do hope, however, to have
demonstrated that both of these doctrines and the common-law access
doctrine have much to say about the possible newsworthiness of the
names of criminal arrestees and suspects, and that all three doctrines
can accommodate the privacy protection for arrestees and suspects
that I propose. What remains to be determined, before moving on to
a method of protecting this right, is whether the public disclosure tort
is similarly accommodating.
392. See infra note 449.
393. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513 (noting that the privacy of prospective
jurors may be protected by maintaining their anonymity when disclosing the substance of
their answers); id. at 520 (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[T]he constitutionally preferable
method for reconciling the First Amendment interests of the public and press with the
legitimate privacy interests ofjurors and the interests of defendants in fair trials is to redact
transcripts in such a way as to preserve the anonymity of jurors while disclosing the sub-
stance of their responses."); see also United States v. Gerena, 869 F.2d 82, 85-86 (2d Cir.
1989) (finding the redaction of briefs and memoranda to be an appropriate means of
protecting privacy); In re N.Y. Times Co., 834 F.2d 1152, 1154 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding the
redaction of pretrial motion papers to be an appropriate means of protecting privacy, in-
cluding the redaction of content beyond identifying information appropriate, even if the
remaining document becomes "almost meaningless").
394. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) ("Any reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be pro-
vided to any person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are ex-
empt .. "); Mays v. DEA, 234 F.3d 1324, 1327-28 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that the FOIA
exemption targets identifying information and remanding for a determination of whether
such information can be redacted from withheld documents).
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4. Public Disclosure Tort.-Are the names of criminal arrestees
and suspects newsworthy under the public disclosure tort? Dean Pros-
ser was equivocal in his 1960 article: he noted that the common media
practice of naming arrestees was upheld by courts and perhaps un-
avoidable, but he also stressed the need for limits on any "public inter-
est" privilege (i.e., newsworthiness defense) the press might enjoy with
respect to public disclosure suits.39 5 Specifically, Prosser suggested
that there be "some rough proportion" between two factors: the signif-
icance of both the person and the occasion for public interest in that
person, on one hand, and the nature of the private facts revealed, on
the other.3" 6 Applying this measure to criminal accusees, he sug-
gested that privacy expectations .might increase as the seriousness of
the alleged crime decreases.3 97 The Restatement proves more categori-
cal, flatly declaring that people "who commit crime or are accused of
it"-notice the failure to distinguish between convicts and accusees-
are "persons of public interest, concerning whom the public is enti-
tled to be informed." '3 9 8 Cases follow suit, routinely rejecting public
disclosure claims by arrestees and suspects who complain about being
publicly identified in relation to criminal charges.
399
But the Restatement says victims of crime too are categorically
newsworthy under the public disclosure tort, apparently on the basis
of a narrow reading of the Supreme Court's then-recent decision in
Cox;, and cases predating and postdating the Restatement support this
395. Prosser, supra note 46, at 412-13, 415-18.
396. Id. at 417.
397. See id. at 418 ("[N]o doubt the defendant in a spectacular murder trial which draws
national attention can expect a good deal less in the way of privacy than an ordinary citizen
who is arrested for ignoring a parking ticket.").
398. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f; see also id. cmt. g ("Authorized
publicity includes... arrests."); id. cmt. h ("The life history of one accused of murder...
[is] a matter of legitimate public interest."); id. cmt. b (noting that privacy is invaded by
publicity of government records not open to public inspection).
399. See, e.g., Ramsey v. Ga. Gazette Publ'g Co., 297 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 1983) (re-
jecting a claim by a plaintiff who was characterized by media defendants as a "primary
suspect" in a murder case even though police had not so described him publicly); Jones v.
Taibbi, 512 N.E.2d 260, 270 (Mass. 1987) (rejecting a claim against a media defendant for
publicizing plaintiff's erroneous arrest as a serial killer); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. Oakland
County Sheriff, 418 N.W.2d 124, 127-29 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (rejecting a claim by ar-
restees awaiting trial for bank robbery when mug shots were disclosed); Penwell v. Taft
Broad. Co., 469 N.E.2d 1025 (Ohio Ct. App. 1984) (rejecting claims by a bystander-plaintiff
whose mistaken arrest in a "drug bust" was broadcast repeatedly by a television station,
even after the station learned of plaintiff's innocence); Hogan v. Hearst Corp., 945 S.W.2d
246, 250-51 (Tex. App. 1997) (rejecting a claim by the family of a man who committed
suicide after being named by a newspaper as an indecent-exposure arrestee in an article
about a roundup of sex offenders at city parks).
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position as well.400 With respect to both victims and arrestees or sus-
pects, the cases reason that because criminal complaints and arrests
involve public acts, the identities of individuals involved in them are
necessarily beyond privacy protection.40 We know, however, from the
government information cases, including Cox itself, and from grand
jury secrecy, that this is a false axiom, because states (and the federal
government) can and do protect the privacy of adult arrestees, juve-
nile offenders, suspects, grand jury targets, sexual assault victims, and
other actors in the criminal process by withholding identifying infor-
mation from the public. We have also seen that the privacy interest
thus protected, a right of informational privacy, is the very interest
protected by the public disclosure tort. Moreover, public disclosure
cases do embrace the privacy claims of individuals who complain
about having been publicly identified by private citizens as criminal or
400. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. d; id. cmt. f (stating that those who
are the victims of crime are a proper subject of the public interest, and "publishers are
permitted to satisfy the curiosity of the public" about them); see also Ross v. Midwest Com-
munications, Inc., 870 F.2d 271 (5th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a rape victim's public disclosure
claim against media defendants for publicizing her first name and a photograph of her
home, along with details of her rape, in a documentary questioning the guilt of the man
convicted in other allegedly related rapes but not identified by the victim as her rapist);
Morgan v. Celender, 780 F. Supp. 307 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (rejecting a public disclosure claim
by a mother on behalf of her minor child named and pictured by media defendants as a
sex abuse victim when the accompanying story contained information that the plaintiff
gave defendants upon a promise of confidentiality); Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc.,
584 P.2d 1310 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978) (finding a newspaper not liable for naming a fourteen-
year-old victim of a kidnapping and attempted sexual assault despite the reporter's alleged
promise not to do so); Ayers v. Lee Enters. Inc., 561 P.2d 998 (Or. 1977) (finding police
and media defendants not liable for invasion of privacy for, respectively, disclosing and
publishing a rape victim's name and address).
401. See Morgan, 780 F. Supp. at 310 (holding that the name and age of a child sex abuse
victim were not "private facts" but rather "elements of the offense," and "clearly within the
public domain, [because] they were part of the public record in state court," and that facts
of the crime, though offensive, "constitute the elements of the offense" and are "issues of
legitimate public concern"); Ramsey, 297 S.E.2d at 96 (finding the "investigation of crimi-
nal activity" to be a matter of "public interest"; disseminating information "pertaining
thereto" therefore does not violate a right of privacy because the "[d] issemination of infor-
mation pertaining to [a public] drama is no violation of the plaintiffs right of privacy");
Jones, 512 N.E.2d at 269 ("A person's arrest must be recorded by the police, and that record
is public information."); Poteet, 584 P.2d at 1312 (holding that kidnapping and attempted
sexual assault is "a matter of public record and.., therefore newsworthy"); Ayers, 561 P.2d
at 1002 (finding that a police report showing the name and address of a victim of any
"infamous crime," including rape, is part of the "public record" subject to public inspec-
tion under the then-existing public-records law); Hogan, 945 S.W.2d at 250-51 (holding
that "[p]olice offense and arrest records are public records" and the public is entitled to
know the "identification and description of the complainant" as well as the arrestee's name
and address, among other information); cf. Ross, 870 F.2d at 274-75 (finding that the first
name of a rape victim and a photograph of her home might be "uniquely crucial" facts
depending upon the case).
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otherwise untrustworthy persons, even when the named persons do
not dispute the accuracy of the allegations against them.
4 °2 Cases
brought under defamation law for being falsely associated with crimi-
nal allegations or suspicion, meanwhile, indicate that individuals do
not lose their status as private citizens simply by virtue of being ar-
rested for crime or suspected of it.4°3 It thus appears that while the
402. See Mason v. Williams Discount Ctr., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982)
(permitting a public disclosure claim against a store that named the plaintiff on a "no
checks" list posted in view of customers); Zinda v. La. Pac. Corp., 440 N.W.2d 548, 555-56
(Wis. 1989) (finding a prima facie public disclosure claim established against an employer
who disclosed the reason for plaintiff's termination-falsification in employment applica-
tion-in a company newsletter); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a, illus. 2
("A, a creditor, posts in the window of his shop, where it is read by those passing by on the
street, a statement that B owes a debt to him and has not paid it. This is an invasion of B's
privacy."); see also Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 499 N.E.2d 1291, 1292-95 (Ohio. Ct.
App. 1985) (permitting a public disclosure claim against a store for a security guard's "pa-
rading the plaintiff through the store," and "subject[ing her] to great public awareness of
her detainment" for disorderly conduct after a dispute over her credit status). But see Lewis
v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1260, 1261-62 (M.D. Fla. 1989) (stating that there
were no "private facts" in defendant's alleged disclosures to plaintiff's customers that plain-
tiff "was stealing their payments" and that plaintiff "was a bad influence").
403. In defamation law, a plaintiff who is deemed a "public figure" must prove a higher
degree of fault on the part of the defendant in order to prevail, according to standards
defined by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and its progeny. In Sullivan,
the Supreme Court forbade defamation recovery by "public officials" for falsehoods relat-
ing to their "official conduct" absent "actual malice," i.e., proof that the defendant either
knew the publicized statement was false or acted with reckless disregard for its truth or
falsity. Id. at 279-80. In subsequent decisions, the Court extended this rule to all "public
figures," which it defined as people who are "intimately involved in the resolution of im-
portant public questions" or who "shape events in areas of concern to society at large."
Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967). The Court also, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., subdivided "public figures" into two categories: those who "achieve such pervasive
fame or notoriety" that they become public figures "for all purposes and in all contexts,"
and those who "inject[ ] [them]sel[ves] or [are] drawn into a particular public contro-
versy" and thus become public figures "for a limited range of issues." 418 U.S. 323, 351
(1974). Sullivan's actual-malice standard for defamation recovery applies always to plain-
tiffs in the first category, "general-purpose" public figures; to those in the second category,
"limited-purpose" public figures, it applies insofar as the plaintiff complains about a false-
hood that relates to the matter that makes her a public figure. Id. at 343-51. Private indi-
viduals, however, and limited-purpose public figures who complain about falsehoods
relating to their nonpublic lives, can recover in defamation upon a lesser showing of fault.
The point, of course, is to protect speech on newsworthy matters by limiting liability for
falsehoods relating to individuals involved in such matters to those instances in which the
publicizing defendant acts with the highest degree of fault.
Criminal arrestees and suspects are not, by virtue of their status as criminal accusees
alone, categorically public figures under this analysis. In Foretich v. Capital Cities/ABC, for
example, grandparents involved in a highly publicized child custody dispute retained non-
public-figure status in a defamation suit they filed against producers and broadcasters of a
television docudrama that referred to them as sexual abusers of their grandchild, even
though the custody dispute was a public controversy and the grandparents had replied
publicly to the accusation. 37 F.3d 1541 (4th Cir. 1994); see also Bender v. Seattle, 664 P.2d
492, 504 (Wash. 1983) (holding that the plaintiffs position as a prominent business owner
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public disclosure tort is a necessary point of departure for the privacy
right proposed here, as it is for so much of common-law privacy doc-
trine, its current contours are not coextensive with the full range of
privacy protection available in the criminal process.
This result may be in part due to the fact that the public disclo-
sure tort typically involves speech by private actors, while the informa-
tion restrictions we have seen the courts approve have involved
dissemination by the government. In other words, what the govern-
ment can restrict itself from publicizing appears to encompass more
than what private actors can be penalized for publicizing. This was in
fact the essence of the rulings in Cox, Florida Star, Daily Mail, and
Landmark Communications. But the shortcomings of the tort for our
purpose can also be attributed to features intrinsic to it, or at least to
its interpretation and application. Of these features, the newsworthi-
accused of a crime is not sufficient to make him a public figure). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has said that even a criminal conviction does not automatically make a plaintiff a
public figure for defamation purposes. Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S.
157, 168 (1979) (rejecting the "contention that any person who engages in criminal con-
duct automatically becomes a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range of
issues relating to his conviction"). Accordingly, case law establishes that much more than
mere arrest or suspicion is required to convert a private citizen into a public figure for
purposes of defamation recovery. See, e.g., Ruebke v. Globe Communications Corp., 738
P.2d 1246, 1251-52 (Kan. 1987) (finding an accused triple-murderer, who was indicted and
awaiting trial, a public figure for the purposes of a defamation suit against a magazine
publisher that discussed allegations against him, because of "the intense media coverage"
of the investigation, the defendant's "voluntary act of turning himself in" and seeking pro-
tective custody, and the fact of his arrest and indictment); see Tracy A. Bateman, Annota-
tion, Who Is "Public Figure"for Purposes of Defamation Action, 19 A.L.R.5th 1, § 100 (1994 &
Supp. 2004) (collecting cases); see also 1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, THE LAw OF DEFAMATION
§§ 2:20-2:24, at 2-32 to 2-33 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing lower court tests for public-figure
status following Gertz). Among the rationales for this result is that however newsworthy
crime and the government's response to it might be, individuals arrested for it or accused
of it have not voluntarily made themselves part of that news. See, e.g., Foretich, 37 F.3d at
1563 (noting that the grandparent-plaintiffs retained private-figure status partly because
they did not "thrust themselves to the forefront of a public controversy in order to influ-
ence its outcome," but rather sought, in public replies to accusations of child abuse, "to
defend their own good names"); see also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976)
("[Wihile participants in some litigation may be legitimate 'public figures,' ... the majority
will more likely . . . [be] drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order to
attempt to obtain the only redress available to them or to defend themselves against actions
brought by the State or by others." (emphasis added)). Holding otherwise would enable al-
leged defamers to strip individuals of their status as private figures by the very act of pub-
lishing information about them-or, for our purposes, by simply accusing them of crime.
See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979) (stating that "clearly, those charged
with defamation cannot, by their own conduct, create their own defense by making the
claimant a public figure"); Khawar v. Globe Int'l, Inc., 965 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1998) (holding
that a photojournalist present at the assassination of Robert Kennedy was not a public
figure for the purposes of a defamation suit against a tabloid that publicized an allegation
that he had been the assassin).
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ness defense-the question of whether the information at issue is of
legitimate concern to the public, which is the ultimate inquiry in any
public disclosure claim 4 04-is as good a place as any to start. There is,
to begin with, a lack of clarity over whether the newsworthiness de-
fense, also called the "public interest" privilege, is normative or de-
scriptive. That is, courts and commentators differ over whether the
privilege covers only information that is in the public interest-i.e.,
information of social value-or all information that is of public inter-
est-i.e., information in which the public shows an interest, regardless
of its social value.4 °5 Some courts and early commentators on the tort
favor the latter approach; those in this descriptive camp maintain that
the press's publication of information itself makes the information
sufficiently newsworthy to defeat liability under the public disclosure
tort.40 6 The Restatement gives support to this position, notwithstanding
its own definition of newsworthy information as information in which
the public has a legitimate interest.40 7
But other courts and commentators advocate the normative defi-
nition and inveigh against the descriptive approach; they point out its
circularity and its problematic results. A descriptive approach, by defi-
nition, makes public disclosure law a ratification of existing practices
rather than an expression of aspirational norms.40 8 In practice, the
descriptive approach also allows the press to determine the parame-
ters of the tort according to the press's own assessment of public appe-
tite, curiosity, or whim.40 9 Of course, the press's financial interests will
figure prominently in this assessment;410 to permit the press to define
404. Recall that the three elements of the standard version of the tort-that the matter
disclosed concerns one's private life; that the disclosure is highly offensive to a reasonable
person; and that the matter is not of legitimate concern to the public (i.e., not news-
worthy) -effectively merge into the question of newsworthiness. See supra text accompany-
ing note 102.
405. See Mintz, supra note 44, at 443-45 & nn.106-117.
406. See id. at 442-44 & nn. 98-101 (citing these views); Dendy, supra note 73, at 159-60
(same); Jurata, supra note 56, at 505-06 (same).
407. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g ("To a considerable extent, in
accordance with the mores of the community, the publishers and broadcasters have them-
selves defined the term ['news'] .... ").
408. See also Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, supra note 9, at 1142 ("Without a normative
component, a conception of privacy can only provide a status report on existing privacy
norms rather than guide us toward shaping privacy law and policy in the future.").
409. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that al-
lowing the press to "publicize [facts] to the extent it sees fit" would base privacy "not on
rights bestowed by law but on the taste and discretion of the press").
410. See also Edelman, supra note 56, at 1231 (noting that allowing the press to publish
any information lawfully obtained "makes all too likely the prospect that individuals will be
held at the mercy of what the media considers to be an entertaining bit of information that
might increase the audience"); Frank Rich, The Thrill oft All, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2001, at
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newsworthiness is thus to empower an interested party to perform the
careful balance of First Amendment concerns and privacy interests
that privacy doctrine calls for. It also, in the eyes of many, simply evis-
cerates the tort.411 Surely, a meaningful definition of newsworthiness,
just as meaningful notions of privacy, must come from legislatures and
courts, reflecting the norms and aspirations of privacy rather than the
imperatives and interests of the press.
41 2
A second problem with the Restatement's newsworthiness test is the
short shrift it gives the involuntariness of publicity regarding a person
as a factor in assessing the privacy protection afforded her under the
tort.4"' That a person has not "voluntarily exposed [himself] to in-
creased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood," "voluntarily in-
ject[ed] himself ... into a particular public controversy," or "thrust
himself into the vortex of [a] public issue" is crucial to determining
the degree of fault required for recovery in defamation, which is
closely related to public disclosure tort.4 14 It is equally important
when considering claims under the "false light" invasion of privacy, a
sister tort of both defamation and the public disclosure tort.4 15 But
A15 ("Most of the decisions made in television news are not about news, they're about
money." (quoting television commentator Andy Rooney)).
411. See Virgil, 527 F.2d at 1127, 1128 (arguing that if the press were allowed to publish
any true fact, the private facts tort would be "written out of the law," and would "seem to
deny the existence of 'private' facts"); Edelman, supra note 56, at 1231 (arguing that giving
the press the power to publish any information lawfully obtained implies "[t]he near ex-
tinction" of the private facts tort). Some suggest the tort has already been put to bed. In
Florida Star, Justice White, writing for a three-person dissent, wrote that the majority had
effectively "obliterate [d] one of the most noteworthy legal inventions of the 20th Century."
Florida Star v. BJ.F., 491 U.S. 525, 550-51 (1989) (WhiteJ., dissenting); see also Solove, The
Virtues of Knowing Less, supra note 135, at 1022 n.246 (citing similar arguments).
412. See Mintz, supra note 44, at 443 ("[A]llow[ing] the press, the largest class of defend-
ants under this tort, to establish the terms of virtual immunity from liability . . . [is] an
abdication [that] mocks the privacy interest ...."); Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy,
supra note 48, at 984 (arguing that the public disclosure tort "draws upon the social norms
that govern the flow of information in society"); Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less, supra
note 135, at 1003-08 (criticizing, on several grounds, deference to the media for news-
worthiness determinations).
413. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f.
414. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345, 351-52 (1974); see also supra note
403; 1 SMOLLA, supra note 403, § 2:31, at 2-43 ("There is little question that the extent to
which the plaintiff voluntarily injects himself or herself into a particular public controversy
is one of the single most important factors in determining public figure status [for pur-
poses of the degree of fault required for defamation liability]."); cf Prosser, supra note 46,
at 398, 422 (likening the public disclosure tort to defamation).
415. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E cmt. d (discussing the bearing of the
defamation-recovery standard of Gertz on false light claims); id. cmt. e (considering the
bearing of other defamation principles on false light claims); see also ELDER, supra note 56,
§ 4:13, at 4-153 (discussing the bearing of the defamation-recovery standard of Gertz on
false light claims and concluding that "[s]ubstantial persuasive case law, representing
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the Restatement inexplicably abjures this consideration under the pub-
lic disclosure tort. "[I]ndividuals who have not sought publicity or
consented to it" may still "become 'news"' for purposes of the public
disclosure tort, the Restatement says, listing as among such individuals
"[t]hose who commit crime or are accused of it," "victims of crime or
[those who] are so unfortunate as to be present when it is commit-
ted," and "victims of catastrophes or accidents or [those who] are in-
volved in judicial proceedings or other events that attract public
attention. "4 16 Both Dean Prosser and the first Restatement had de-
scribed the emerging tort similarly, indeed in identical language at
points.4 17 But it is not clear that Prosser endorsed this result,4"' and
again a question of whether this illustration is normative or descriptive
arises. There is, moreover, no logic to finding the involuntariness of
an individual's involvement in a matter of public interest central to
her protection under the false light tort or defamation but irrelevant
to her protection under the public disclosure tort.
4 19 In both in-
stances, an individual has been drawn into a newsworthy matter
through no fault or choice of her own; in both instances she seeks to
protect her reputation by limiting what others can say about her (un-
willing) involvement in the matter. Indeed, for unprosecuted ar-
restees or suspects-those who are the intended beneficiaries of my
proposal-a public disclosure claim with respect to their names per-
haps comes as close to a false light claim as the disclosure of a true fact
possibly can: it is the harm of misjudgment by the public caused by
reports of their arrest or suspicion that this privacy right would pre-
vent. But the Restatement conflates the categories of those who "com-
mit crime" and those who "are accused of it," and classifies them both
clearly the more defensible position, suggests that... the powerful similarities and overlap
of" defamation and false light torts compel an equivalent standard for false light claims
(footnotes omitted)); Prosser, supra note 46, at 400 ("The interest protected [in false light
cases] is clearly that of reputation, with the same overtones of mental distress as in defama-
tion."); id. at 422 ("The public disclosure of private facts, and putting the plaintiff in a false
light in the public eye, both concern the interest in reputation, and move into the field
occupied by defamation.").
416. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f.
417. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 867 cmt. c (1939); Prosser, supra note 46, at 412-14.
418. See Prosser, supra note 46, at 412 ("To a very great extent the press, with its experi-
ence or instinct as to what its readers will want, has succeeded in making its own definition
of news," which includes "many ... matters of genuine, if more or less deplorable, popular
appeal."). This statement of ambivalence reappears almost verbatim in the Restatement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. g.
419. See also Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, supra note 48, at 1002 ("[T] he Restate-
ment cannot explain exactly why the information preserves of involuntary public figures
should be subject to 'authorized publicity.'").
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as unprotected, albeit involuntary, subjects of public interest,42° as
though there is, and should be, no difference between the privacy in-
terests of someone convicted of a crime and those of someone merely
accused.
Underlying these problems is the Restatement's baseline premise
that all information about crime and criminal proceedings is categori-
cally newsworthy, and therefore outside the protections of the public
disclosure tort. The Restatement asserts the newsworthiness of "crimes"
and "arrests," following Dean Prosser (who based this assertion on ex-
isting judicial opinions), without distinguishing between individuals at
different stages of a criminal prosecution or the types of information
about them that may be disclosed.42' It notes that no liability arises
under the tort when the name of a rape victim is learned from a crimi-
nal indictment and is broadcast, a la Cox, and it states that the "life
history" of someone on trial for murder, "together with such hereto-
fore private facts as may throw some light upon what kind of person
he is, his possible guilt or innocence, or his reasons for committing
the crime," are similarly unprotectable.422 In other words, it assumes
the answer to the question posed here-whether the names of ar-
restees and suspects are newsworthy-much as Justice White did in
Florida Star. This assumption is flatly contradicted by the existing
pockets of privacy in the criminal process discussed above in Part I,
and easily assailable according to the arguments presented in Part II.
And even the Restatement's own reference to Cox does not accurately
portray that case, as it omits Cox's advice that states should withhold
privacy-infringing information from the public;423 and then there is
the reaffirmation of that advice in Florida Star, and the Court's refer-
ence to the public disclosure tort in both instances. Thus, the Restate-
ment's approach to newsworthiness for purposes of the public
disclosure tort does not accurately reflect the evolution of informa-
tional privacy doctrine, at least as the doctrine exists in the criminal
process today.
This might not be so surprising, given how much privacy doctrine
has evolved in the nearly thirty years since the Restatement issued in
1977. But even then the Restatement might have been a bit more hospi-
table to the notion of a privacy right for criminal accusees under the
public disclosure tort, given the tort's genesis in Reid and Briscoe. The
harms alleged by the plaintiffs in each of those cases-the former
420. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. f.
421. See id. cmt. g.
422. Id. crnt. h.; see also Prosser, supra note 46, at 412-13, 418.
423. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D.
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prostitute and accused murderer in Reid,424 and the hijacking convict
in Briscoe12 5 -from being publicly associated with past crimes and alle-
gations are the very same harms one can suffer from being publicly
accused or suspected of crime. Concerns about damage to one's rep-
utation, personal relationships, and "pursuit of happiness" are as im-
plicated by public knowledge that one is accused or suspected of a
crime as by public knowledge of proven criminal wrongdoing. That
damage is all the more unwarranted in the case of unproven allega-
tions, of which the named individual may be innocent to boot. True,
that the crimes and allegations were in the past rather than ongoing
was central to the holdings in both Reid and Briscoe. At the same time,
it was undisputed that both plaintiffs were in fact guilty of at least
some criminal acts, unlike the case with mere arrestees or suspects;
but protection lay nonetheless. Indeed, the Reid court equated the
two scenarios-proven guilt, and unproven accusation-by drawing
no distinction between the information about the plaintiffs murder
trial and acquittal and her life as a prostitute;
4 26 both were potentially
offending disclosures. Thus, under Reid, the two very different types
of information about a person's involvement in the criminal justice
system-unproven allegations of crime and undisputed criminal ac-
tions-might equally invoke common-law privacy protection. And this
is true even though the information was already in the public domain.
Moreover, in Reid the court emphasized that the possible privacy inva-
sion was the identification of the plaintiff, as opposed to the portrayal
of the "incidents" of her life, which were "contained in [the] public
record" and thus had "cease[d] to be private.
'
"427 In other words,
naming the defendant raised privacy concerns that discussing the
crimes or the trial did not.
We cannot, of course, rely on Reid and Briscoe to support a privacy
right for convicted criminals, as those cases have now been over-
ruled.428 But again, that is not the privacy right I propose. The pro-
posal is not that liability be imposed for the disclosure, by private
424. Melvin v. Reid, 297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
425. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34 (Cal. 1971).
426. Reid, 297 P. at 91-93.
427. Id. at 93. The court thus foreshadowed the modern axiomatic distinction between
matters "already in the public record" and those not already disseminated publicly, with a
different privacy calculus for each. But the court's distinction is puzzling, since certainly
the plaintiff's name was also "contained in the public record" in association with informa-
tion about the incidents of her life.
428. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. But see Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less,
supra note 135, at 1056-59 (discussing rehabilitation of convicted criminals as a social value
that could justify the privacy protections of Reid and Briscoe).
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parties, of already-public information about convicted criminals (or
accused ones for that matter); it is that government actors not make
the identities of pre-probable cause arrestees and suspects public in
the first place. The reasoning of Reid and Briscoe, discredited as it
might be with respect to already-public information about convicted
criminals, applies all the more to not-yet-public information about
pre-probable cause arrestees and suspects.
Inevitably, the question of the newsworthiness of the names of
criminal arrestees and suspects for public disclosure purposes must be
determined by balancing the public interest against the privacy inter-
est. And ultimately, the Restatement arguably endorses a normative ap-
proach to this question. According to Dean Prosser and the
Restatement, newsworthiness is defined by "community mores," consid-
ering "the customs and conventions of the community," and by draw-
ing the line when publicity crosses over from "information to which
the public is entitled" to "a morbid and sensational prying into private
lives for its own sake."42 Information protected under this standard is
information in which "a reasonable member of the public, with de-
cent standards" would say he "had no concern."4 ' "[C]ommon de-
cency," the Restatement goes on, arrived at by balancing "due regard"
for both press freedom and individual dignity, is the arbiter of news-
worthiness under the public disclosure tort, along with "reasonable
proportion" between the event of public interest and the private facts
to which publicity is given. 43
My position on how the balance should be struck comes in the
pages above. We withhold the names of various actors in the criminal
process who are categorically blameless, such as jurors and potential
jurors. We withhold the names of other actors in criminal and quasi-
criminal proceedings who are at least presumptively blameless, such as
sexual assault complainants, accused judges and lawyers, and individu-
als named in the indictments of others. We withhold the names of
criminal accusees in various instances, such as in juvenile proceedings,
grand jury proceedings, and arrest records. We even withhold the
names of convicted offenders when they are juveniles, and adults inso-
far as information about their convictions is reflected in withheld ar-
rest records. In all of these instances, privacy is the motivating
principle of this protection. All I propose is that the protection be
429. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. h.
430. Id.
431. Id.; see also Prosser, supra note 46, at 416-19; Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129
(9th Cir. 1975) (applying this newsworthiness test for the first time and quoting the 1967
tentative draft of the Restatement).
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consistent, and formalized, to cover all criminal arrestees and suspects
before a judicial finding of probable cause of their guilt is made.
So much for the argument that the protection should be insti-
tuted. In Part III, I discuss how it can be done.
III. PROTECTING AND EXPLORING THE RIGHT
A. Protecting the Right
Privacy in the criminal process is protected in various ways, as we
have seen above. Sexual assault complainants are protected by stat-
utes that forbid government officials to identify them and withhold
their names from public records. Juvenile proceedings are closed,
and records of those proceedings are also withheld from the public.
Proceedings and records of judicial misconduct inquiries and other
professional disciplinary actions are also nonpublic, at least until find-
ings of wrongdoing (and even afterward); so, too, can arrest records
be. Names are deleted from both executive branch and judicial docu-
ments, including indictments, to protect uncharged suspects. Initials
or pseudonyms protect the privacy of all of these individuals in pro-
ceedings and records, as well as that of civil parties who fear stigma
from the association with criminal allegations related to their suits.
A combination of all of these methods of privacy protection could
easily provide the proposed protection for criminal arrestees or sus-
pects. Statutes could forbid public officials from identifying arrestees
and suspects to the public until there is a judicial finding of probable
cause, just as they now forbid public officials to identify sexual assault
complainants and juvenile accusees and offenders."
2 The same stat-
utes could declare those portions of government documents that
identify arrestees and suspects nonpublic until a probable cause find-
ing is made, again as statutes now declare records pertaining to sexual
assault complainants and juveniles categorically nonpublic.
3 These
statutes should also require that arrestees be notified of the option to
432. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 293(c)-(d) (forbidding "law enforcement
agenc[ies]" from disclosing names or addresses of alleged victims of specified sex crimes
who have requested privacy, except to other law enforcement officers or where authorized
or required by law); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAw § 50-b(l) (McKinney 1992) ("The identity of any
victim of a [specified] sex offense . . .shall be confidential .... No . . .public officer or
employee shall disclose any portion of any police report, court file, or other document,
which tends to identify such a victim except as provided [in exceptions listed in a subse-
quent subsection].").
433. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. RiGHTS LAw § 50-b(1) ("No report, paper, picture, photograph,
court file or other documents, in the custody or possession of any public officer or em-
ployee, which identifies ... a victim [of a specified sex offense] shall be made available for
public inspection.").
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choose privacy or publicity of their arrest, in order to empower the
affected individuals to make the privacy decision, which, as we have
discussed, is a core aspect of privacy. 4  (Unarrested suspects would
presumably not need this particular protection, because they are liter-
ally at liberty to publicize their status if they wish.) For the same rea-
son, and in order to protect other arrestee rights, the statutes should
require the government to name any arrestee who requests publicity.
The statutes could expressly provide civil remedies for their violation,
as do some statutes that protect the identities of sexual assault com-
plainants,43 5 and as the Supreme Court approved for sexual assault
complainants in Florida Star and judicial misconduct proceedings in
Landmark Communications.
But more would be required than merely forbidding public offi-
cials to name arrestees and suspects, notifying these individuals of
their right to choose publicity or privacy, and declaring those portions
of records that identify them nonpublic. Since the protection lasts
until a judicial finding of probable cause, provision must be made for
conducting an initial judicial hearing with an arrestee-defendant, and
further hearings if the probable cause issue is not addressed in the
initial hearing, without his being named, unless and until the judicial
officer finds probable cause. Initials or pseudonyms are obvious can-
didates, and there is plenty of precedent for their use. California ex-
pressly authorizes the use of a 'Jane Doe" or 'John Doe" pseudonym
for the sexual assault complainant who chooses anonymity, "for all
records and during all proceedings"-including during trial.43 6
434. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 293(a)-(b) ("Any employee of a law enforcement
agency who personally receives a report from any person, alleging that the person making
the report has been the victim of a sex offense, shall inform that person that his or her
name will become a matter of public record unless he or she requests that it not become a
matter of public record .... "). In New York there is no notification requirement, but
confidentiality is the default position and the complainant or his or her legal representa-
tive must waive the protection in writing. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 50-b(2)(c).
435. New York's protection of victims of sex offenses is an example:
Private right of action
If the identity of the victim of a sex offense is disclosed in violation of [the
disclosure prohibition], any person injured by such disclosure may bring an ac-
tion to recover damages suffered by reason of such wrongful disclosure. In any
action brought under this section, the court may award reasonable attorney's fees
to a prevailing plaintiff.
N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 50-c; see supra text accompanying note 148.
436. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 293.5(a)-(b) (providing that "the court... may order the
identity of the alleged victim [of a specified sex offense] in all records and during all
proceedings to be either Jane Doe or John Doe, if the court finds that such an order is
reasonably necessary to protect the privacy of the person and will not unduly prejudice the
prosecution or the defense," and that "if there is a jury trial, the court shall instruct the
jury... that the alleged victim is being so identified only for the purpose of protecting his
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Pseudonyms and initials are also commonly used in place of parties'
names in civil proceedings for privacy reasons. Initials replace names
in child abuse, neglect, and custody cases, typically in deference to
statutes that declare such proceedings confidential, and civil litigants
have for decades used names such as "Doe" and "Roe" in order to
protect their privacy.4 7 The Supreme Court has approved of this
practice, both by using pseudonyms itself and by expressly endorsing
them,43 and courts routinely (though not always) adopt a party's use
of a pseudonym with little or no discussion.439 Challenges to the prac-
tice have resulted in governing standards in at least some
jurisdictions.440
or her privacy pursuant to this section"); cf N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 50-b(4) ("Nothing
contained in this section shall be construed to require the court to exclude the public from
any stage of the criminal proceeding [relating to a specified sex offense].")
437. The history of this practice is well summarized in Carol M. Rice, Meet John Doe: It Is
Time for Federal Civil Procedure to Recognize John Doe Parties, 57 U. PiTT. L. REv. 883, 908-13
(1996). For an analysis of the types of cases in which parties seek privacy protection
through pseudonymous litigation, see Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties:
When Should Litigants Be Permitted to Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 43-
85 (1985).
438. In both Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 n.4, 121 n.5, 124 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 184 n.6, 187 (1973), the Court noted that the plaintiff's name was a pseudo-
nym and held that she nonetheless presented a justiciable controversy. See also Rice, supra
note 437, at 909-10 & nn. 85-87.
439. For a review of recent practice and rulings on party anonymity in civil cases, see
Babak A. Rastgoufard, Note, Pay Attention to That Green Curtain: Anonymity and the Courts, 53
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1009, 1021-33 (2003).
440. The Fourth Circuit, for instance, has ruled that courts should balance the following
factors in deciding whether a civil litigant may proceed anonymously: (1) whether ano-
nymity is requested "to preserve privacy in a matter of sensitive and highly personal na-
ture"; (2) whether naming the party "poses a risk of retaliatory physical or mental harm" to
the party "or even more critically to innocent non-parties"; (3) "the ages of the persons
whose privacy interests are sought to be protected"; (4) whether the opposing party is the
government or a private party; and (5) "the risk of unfairness to the opposing party from
allowing an action against it to proceed anonymously." James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238
(4th Cir. 1993) (reversing the trial court's refusal to allow a pseudonymous trial for plain-
tiffs suing their doctor for artificially inseminating patients with his own sperm). Cf Doe v.
Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that anonymous litigation is allowed
only in "exceptional cases involving matters of a highly sensitive and personal nature, real
danger of physical harm, or where the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result
of the disclosure of the plaintiffs identity," such as in suits to protect privacy rights); Doe v.
Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 186 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that a trial court's decision on pseudon-
ymous litigation "requires a balancing of considerations calling for maintenance of a
party's privacy against the customary and constitutionally embedded presumption of open-
ness in judicial proceedings," and thus permitting Doe protection for parents and minors
challenging school prayer). But see Coe v. United States Dist. Court, 676 F.2d 411 (10th
Cir. 1982) (rejecting a physician's attempt to proceed anonymously in a suit to enjoin the
state medical licensing board from taking formal, public disciplinary proceedings against
him, due to the public interest in full disclosure). See generally Mark Albert Mesler II, Note,
Civil Procedure-Doe v. Frank: Determining the Circumstances Under Which a Plaintiff May Pro-
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Any such protection should, at the same time, satisfy the public-
access requirements of Richmond Newspapers and its progeny; as dis-
cussed above, because a judicial proceeding is now taking place, to
pass constitutional muster, this closure regarding an arrestee's name
might require a case-by-case finding of a compelling interest and nar-
rowly tailored means. Exceptions to the nondisclosure rule would be
needed, too, not only for those arrestees or suspects who choose pub-
licity, but also to allow disclosure of the information to other public
officials as needed, and to parties and witnesses to the case.4 4 ' An
exception would also be needed to enable the government to with-
hold the information for countervailing law enforcement purposes,
upon judicial approval, despite a request for publicity by an arrestee
or suspect.
A sample statute, combining elements of the statutory protections
for sexual assault complainants in California and New York,442 with
some additions to adjust the protection to arrestees and suspects as
proposed and to require disclosure in appropriate circumstances,
might read as follows:
Right of privacy-arrestees and suspects.
(a) Principle. The identity of any person arrested for or sus-
pected of a criminal offense shall, until a finding of probable
cause of guilt is made by ajudicial officer, or an indictment is
returned by a grand jury, be confidential and nonpublic, ex-
cept when disclosure of that information is required or per-
mitted by subsections (f) or (g) of this section.
ceed Under a Fictitious Name, 23 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 881 (1993). One commentator has
proposed that a civil defendant should have the right to proceed pseudonymously when a
plaintiff alleges "a stigmatizing intentional tort," such as sexual abuse. SeeAdam A. Milani,
Doe v. Roe: An Argument for Defendant Anonymity When a Pseudonymous Plaintiff Aleges a Stig-
matizing Intentional Tort, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1659 (1995); see also Doe v. Diocese Corp., 647
A.2d 1067, 1073 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1994) (noting that "the mere filing of a civil action
against other private parties may cause damage to their good names and reputation and
may also result in economic harm," and thus rejecting an effort by defendant diocese and
churches to proceed pseudonymously in a suit alleging sexual abuse by clergyman (quot-
ing S. Methodist Univ. Ass'n of Women Law Students v. Wynne & Jaffe, 599 F.2d 707, 713
(5th Cir. 1979))).
441. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 293(c)-(d) (permitting disclosure of the name of
a sexual assault complainant to "the prosecutor, parole officers..., hearing officers of the
parole authority, or other persons or public agencies where authorized or required by
law"); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 50-b(2) (a)-(b) (permitting disclosure of the identity of a
sexual assault complainant to the defendant, defendant's "counsel or guardian," public
officials "charged with the duty of investigating, prosecuting, keeping records relating to
the offense," "any necessary witnesses for either party," and anyone who demonstrates
"good cause").
442. CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 293, 293.5; N.Y. Ctv. RGHTS LAw §§ 50-b, 50-c.
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(b) Records. No portion of any report, paper, picture, photo-
graph, court file, or other document, in the custody or pos-
session or control of any public officer or employee, that
identifies a person described in subsection (a) of this section
shall, before a probable cause finding or an indictment as
described in subsection (a), be made available for public in-
spection, except when disclosure of that information is re-
quired or permitted by subsections (f) or (g) of this section.
(c) Public officials. No public officer or employee shall dis-
close any information, including any portion of any police
report, court file, or other document, that identifies a person
described in subsection (a) of this section before a probable
cause finding or an indictment as described in subsection
(a), except when disclosure of that information is required
or permitted by subsections (f) or (g) of this section.
(d) Proceedings. In all public proceedings, including judicial
proceedings, pertaining to the investigation or prosecution
of a person described in subsection (a) of this section, before
a probable cause finding or an indictment regarding the rel-
evant alleged criminal offense as described in subsection (a),
the judge or other public officer or employee presiding over
the proceeding shall, at the start of the proceeding, inquire
whether the person has waived the protection of this section.
If the person has not waived this protection, the court shall
order restrictions on the dissemination of information that
tends to identify the person during the hearing. All public
officers and employees, and other individuals involved in the
proceeding, including witnesses, shall abide by these restric-
tions. Such restrictions include, but are not limited to, sub-
stituting the name of the person during the proceeding and
in all related documents with initials or with a 'John Doe" or
'Jane Doe" pseudonym.443
(e) Notification; waiver; memorialization.
443. Qualifiers such as those in the California protection for sexual assault complainants
might be incorporated: "[T]he court, at the request of the alleged victim, may order the
identity of the alleged victim in all records and during all proceedings to be either Jane
Doe or John Doe, if the court finds that such an order is reasonably necessary to protect the
privacy of the person and will not unduly prejudice the prosecution or the defense." CAL. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 293.5(a). This optional protection is, however, only supplemental to the
mandatory provision that the alleged victim be notified of her right to confidentiality and
that, if she exercises that right, her name not be disclosed by public officials. Id. § 293.
One can also imagine a proceeding that is unrelated to the alleged offense but in which
the identity of the arrestee or suspect is central-for instance, when he is called as a witness
at the trial of another. In such a case, the protection would presumably attach to the fact
of his arrest or suspicion rather than to his identity.
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(1) Any employee of a law enforcement agency who ar-
rests a person for a crime, and any public officer or official
who speaks with a person arrested for a crime, shall, before a
probable cause finding or an indictment with respect to that
person's involvement in that crime as described in subsec-
tion (a) of this section, and at the earliest possible opportu-
nity, inform that person of his or her right to confidentiality
with respect to that arrest until such finding or indictment,
unless the person has already been informed of this right or
has waived confidentiality as specified in subsection (e) (2)
below.
(2) A person described in subsection (a) may waive the
confidentiality provided for in this section, provided the per-
son has been notified of the right to confidentiality as re-
quired by subsection (e) (1). Any such waiver shall be in
writing and signed by the person.
(3) The fact that a person described in subsection (a) has
been informed of his or her right to confidentiality as re-
quired by subsection (e)(1), and the fact of any waiver of
confidentiality by that person pursuant to subsection (e) (2),
shall be memorialized in writing, in a place and manner
readily visible to all public officers and employees, including
judicial officials, who have access to the identity of the defen-
dant through documents or other information. 444
(f) Exceptions. Information that identifies a person de-
scribed in subsection (a), including his or her name, may be
disclosed by public officers or employees at any time in the
following circumstances:
(1) When the person has waived confidentiality pursuant
to subsection (e) (2);
(2) To public officers and employees charged with the
duty of investigating or prosecuting the person or keeping
records relating to the alleged offense;
(3) To the person's counsel or legal guardian, and mem-
bers of the person's immediate family;
445
444. Cf CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 293(b) ("Any written report of an alleged sex offense
shall indicate that the alleged victim has been properly informed [of the right to confiden-
tiality] and shall memorialize his or her response.").
445. The temptation to exclude family members here, on the theory that one's family
may very well be among those a person does not want to know about her arrest or suspi-
cion, gives way to the greater undesirability of allowing law enforcement officers entirely to
conceal someone's arrest before her release or first court appearance.
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(4) To any necessary witnesses for either party;446
(5) To any person by a law enforcement officer when that
officer reasonably believes such disclosure is necessary to ap-
prehend a criminal suspect (a) with respect to whom the of-
ficer has probable cause of guilt and (b) whom the officer
reasonably believes might destroy evidence or cause bodily
harm to any other person before the officer is able to obtain
a judicial finding of probable cause [i.e., in exigent circum-
stances/hot pursuit]; and
(6) To any other person who, upon application to a court
having jurisdiction over the alleged offense, demonstrates to
the satisfaction of the court that good cause exists for disclo-
sure to that other person, provided that notice of such appli-
cation is given to the person to be identified or that person's
counsel and to the public officer or employee charged with
the duty of prosecuting the alleged offense.447
(g) Mandatory disclosure. Information that identifies a per-
son described in subsection (a), including his or her name,
must be disclosed by public officers or employees when the
person has requested disclosure, unless, upon application, a
court finds that such disclosure could reasonably be ex-
pected to (1) interfere with enforcement proceedings or (2)
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual.
448
(h) Penalties. If the identity of a person described in subsec-
tion (a) of this section is disclosed before a probable cause
finding or an indictment as described in subsection (a) of
this section, except as provided in subsections (f) and (g),
any person injured by such disclosure may bring an action to
recover damages suffered by reason of such wrongful disclo-
sure and for appropriate injunctive relief. In any action
brought under this section, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
This sample statute follows the advice of Cox and Florida Star and
commands only the withholding of government information, by pub-
lic officials. It follows Landmark Communications and Daily Mail in pro-
viding penalties only for government officials who violate its
disclosure prohibition. And it arguably satisfies Richmond Newspapers
446. An exception might also be crafted to clarify that law enforcement officers may
name an arrestee or suspect for legitimate investigatory purposes, for instance when seek-
ing witnesses or other information about the arrestee or suspect.
447. Cf N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 50-b(2)(b).
448. These exceptions are drawn from FOIA exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b), with the
added requirement that the withholding decision be judicially approved.
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by requiring closure only upon an arrestee-defendant's request for an-
onymity; providing for only the narrowly tailored closure of withhold-
ing of the arrestee-defendant's name (and other identifying
information), at an otherwise entirely public hearing, and only until a
judicial finding of probable cause; and supplying findings in the form
of the judge's inquiry about the arrestee-defendant's wishes.44 9
Certainly, alternative forms of protection might be suggested.
For instance, instead of a nondisclosure statute, a version of the "re-
traction" rule of defamation might be considered, whereby an arres-
tee or suspect who is named, but with respect to whom no probable
cause finding ever issues, could demand that the government disclose
the latter fact with the same degree of publicity with which it publi-
cized her initial arrest or suspicion.4 50 But that approach would fall
short of a full remedy for the same reasons it falls short in the defama-
tion context, and more. A publisher's retraction of a defamatory
statement serves only as a mitigation of damages, rather than as a de-
fense on the merits, because the renunciation "might never quite
catch up with the original lie."45' Requiring the government to publi-
cize the failure of probable cause with respect to a named arrestee or
suspect would face the same difficulty, especially because it would still
be up to the press to decide how much attention to devote to the less
titillating news that a person arrested or suspected with great fanfare
last week is no longer facing prosecution this week due to an absence
of probable cause. Defamation law also evinces a concern that equivo-
cal retractions may be "damning by faint praise, doing more damage
than repair." '452 The same danger attends the inherently ambiguous
statement, however unequivocally it may be made, that an individual's
prosecution has ended, or never began, due to a "lack of probable
449. See supra notes 370-371 and accompanying text. A short litany making the inquiry
and findings more explicit could be added, for an exchange along the lines suggested by
the First Circuit in Pokaski. And a more detailed and individualized finding could be re-
quired. For instance, the statute could require a two-pronged finding: first, that the arres-
tee requests anonymity; and second, that the harm of her unwarranted naming would be
effectively irreparable since she is not otherwise a "public figure," such as a celebrity or a
public official, who might have the opportunity to correct the record. See also infta text
accompanying notes 464-????.
450. See 2 SMOLLA, supra note 403, §§ 9.70-9.84, at 9-48.1 to 9-55.
451. 2 id. § 9:71, at 949; see also, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE § 48(a) (2) (West 1982) ("If a cor-
rection [of a defamatory statement] be demanded within said period and be not published
or broadcast in substantially as conspicuous a manner in said newspaper or on said broad-
casting station as were the statements claimed to be libelous, in a regular issue thereof
published or broadcast within three weeks after such service, plaintiff, if he pleads and
proves such notice, demand and failure to correct, and if his cause of action be main-
tained, may recover general, special and exemplary damages .....
452. 2 SMOLLA, supra note 403, § 9:81, at 9-51.
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cause"-i.e., as compared with an affirmative declaration of inno-
cence. Most important, whereas a retraction in defamation law serves
to correct a false statement, its analog for our purposes would serve to
supplement a true statement, when it is the very truth of the initial
disclosure that causes the damage. It thus would not address the crux
of our concern here: the stigma that attaches to someone ever associ-
ated with criminal charges. A rule of retraction, or "supplementa-
tion," it might be called here, would therefore not provide the
protection proposed.
Another suggestion might be regulations and policies, rather
than legislation, forbidding the initial disclosure. Rules of profes-
sional ethics, for instance, could be amended to forbid a prosecutor's
pre-probable cause disclosure of information that identifies an arres-
tee or suspect (instead of expressly authorizing it, as they do now
4 53 ),
and directives could formalize the rule for prosecutors and for all of
the other executive agencies involved with investigating and prosecut-
ing alleged criminal offenders-police departments, pretrial services
departments, corrections departments, parole boards and the like.
But a rule that governs judges, probation officers, court clerks, and
453. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.6 (2002) (Trial Publicity). The rule
states that, notwithstanding the rule forbidding a lawyer involved in a case to make state-
ment she knows or reasonably should know will be publicly disseminated and will have a
substantial likelihood of prejudicing the adjudicative proceeding, a lawyer may disclose
"the claim, offense or defense involved and, except when prohibited by law, the identity of
the persons involved;" and in criminal cases, among other information, "the identity, resi-
dence, occupation and family status of the accused" as well as "information necessary to aid
in the apprehension of [the accused if she has not yet been apprehended]." Id. Notably,
the Model Rules already suggest some obligation on the part of prosecutors to temper
their extrajudicial statements with respect for the privacy of criminal accusees. See id. R.
3.8(f) ("[E]xcept for statements that are necessary to inform the public of the nature and
extent of the prosecutor's action and that serve a legitimate law enforcement purpose, [a
prosecutor shall] refrain from making extrajudicial comments that have a substantial likelihood of
heightening public condemnation of the accused and exercise reasonable care to prevent investi-
gators, law enforcement personnel, employees or other persons assisting or associated with
the prosecutor ... from making an extrajudicial statement that the prosecutor would be
prohibited from making under Rule 3.6 or this Rule." (emphasis added)); id. R. 3.8, cmt. 5
("In the context of a criminal prosecution, a prosecutor's extrajudicial statement can create the
additional problem of increasing public condemnation of the accused. Although the announce-
ment of an indictment, for example, will necessarily have severe consequences for the ac-
cused, a prosecutor can, and should, avoid comments which have no legitimate law enforcement
purpose and have a substantial likelihood of increasing public opprobrium of the accused." (emphasis
added)). Also, until 1994, Rule 3.6 listed, among extrajudicial statements that are "ordina-
rily.., likely" to have a "substantial likelihood" of materially prejudicing a trial, a statement
that "relates to... the fact that a defendant has been charged with a crime, unless there is
included therein a statement explaining that the charge is merely an accusation and that
the defendant is presumed innocent until and unless proven guilty." MODEL CODE OF
PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY R. 3.8(a), (b)(6) (1994). A 1994 amendment to the rules moved
this statement to the comments.
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other judicial branch officers would also need to be promulgated;
oversight mechanisms and enforcement procedures would have to be
instituted for each of these agencies, and such an amalgam of rules
and regulations would inevitably add up to provisions much like those
that appear in the statute I have proposed above. The two crucial
differences would be the scattering of the rules in various executive
and judicial provisions and the absence of the power statutes carry as
expressions of popular will, as well as their nonrevocability by execu-
tive or judicial fiat. None of the other parties we have discussed find
their privacy so weakly protected in the criminal process.
Nor should we await self-restraint by the press. True, the press
voluntarily withholds the names of sexual assault complainants,
juveniles, and other parties to the criminal process whose privacy it
deems worthy of protecting. But this protection is discretionary; it
only supplements existing statutory protections; and it arguably serves
the press as much as it does anyone else, by giving the public and the
courts less ammunition for attempts to regulate it by lawsuits or legis-
lative action.454 Privacy protections should not, of course, depend on
the press's benevolence, let alone its bottom line-particularly a press
that is "increasingly prone to treat crime and its criminal justice after-
math as a form of popular entertainment," as one court nicely put
it.455
B. Exploring the Protection
What would be the consequences of this protection, beyond its
intended effect of prohibiting the government's disclosure of the
names of arrestees and suspects until at least the firstjudicial hearing?
How broadly or narrowly might this protection reach? How might the
protection be defeated or circumvented?
Perhaps the most immediate result would be routine requests by
the government for judicial findings of probable cause at the first
hearing in a criminal case, in those jurisdictions where it is not already
made at that hearing. As discussed above, this is not a particularly
burdensome addition to the process; judges routinely make these de-
terminations in a matter of moments, even seconds, when asked to do
454. Whatever its motivation, the press is not entirely insensitive to distinctions between
convicted criminals, individuals only accused, and those not yet even accused. See, e.g.,
TIMES MANUAL, supra note 110, at 321 ("Fairness calls for suspect in referring to people
accused of crimes; that reflects the presumption of innocence. But when no one has yet
been accused, suspect is the wrong word for the person sought or involved.").
455. S.E. Newspapers Corp. v. State, 454 S.E.2d 452, 455 (Ga. 1995) (upholding trial
court closure of pretrial evidentiary hearings to protect defendants' fair trial rights).
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so and when presented with arrest reports or affidavits to review for
that purpose. Any challenge to probable cause at this stage by a de-
fense attorney, who has typically been appointed to the case just
before the hearing, is disposed of similarly quickly (and nearly always
unfavorably to the defendant). Nor is my proposal the only reason to
have such a finding; as discussed above, that a judicial probable cause
determination should be required simply to maintain a criminal case
is a notion shared by at least two current justices of the Supreme
Court and two federal circuits.456 In those jurisdictions where that
finding is already routinely made at the initial hearing, the proposal
entails no more than the withholding of the arrestee's name when the
case is first called and until the judge makes that finding.
Another consequence might entail more visits to judicial officers
for arrest warrants. The judicial probable cause finding that autho-
rizes an arrest warrant would equally authorize an arrestee's naming;
the protection might thus prompt police officers more often to seek
judicial approval before they arrest suspects, rather than afterward-a
result that would bring us closer to what we still regard as a Fourth
Amendment presumption against warrantless arrests. Police officers
could also seek mere "naming" warrants, if they wished to name a sus-
pect but not arrest him, but circumstances in which they might have
this interest are difficult to imagine. More likely, a law enforcement
interest in naming a suspect would coincide with an interest in arrest-
ing him, most obviously in the case of a dangerous suspect who is yet
to be apprehended. The same probable cause finding that authorizes
his arrest would authorize his public naming.
A third consequence might be more dispositions of criminal
cases, and quicker dispositions, by guilty pleas. An accusee might
want to admit his wrongdoing as soon as possible in an effort to limit
public attention to it. The desire to avoid publicity is already a well-
recognized incentive for defendants to plead guilty;4 57 that confidenti-
ality might promote dispositions was also suggested by the Supreme
Court in Landmark Communications with respect to charges of judicial
misconduct.158 Indeed, a prosecutor could use her power to disclose
or withhold an arrestee's name as a bargaining chip, and offer to
forego a judicial probable cause determination in those jurisdictions
456. See supra note 204.
457. See G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 2.03(3), at 8 (2d ed. 2004).
458. See Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 835-36 (1978)
("When removal or retirement is justified by the charges, judges are more likely to resign
voluntarily or retire without the necessity of a formal proceeding if the publicity that would
accompany such a proceeding can thereby be avoided.").
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where she can, or simply to continue withholding an arrestee's name
until a certain date notwithstanding a probable cause finding, as one
incentive for the defendant to accept a plea offer. The prosecutor
could even promise never to affirmatively disclose the defendant's
identity to the press, as one term of a plea agreement, and instead
leave it to the press to learn the identity on its own from public hear-
ings and documents and other investigation. Once the defendant
pled guilty, of course, his name and conviction would be public; and
during the plea hearing and other hearings, the prosecutor would
have no power to prevent the court from naming the defendant in
open court and even, if the judge desired, sua sponte finding proba-
ble cause in order to do so. But the arrestee's very fear of that would
be his incentive to plead guilty, and to do it quickly.
The press, for its part, might find out the names of arrestees and
suspects on its own at any stage of the process. Recall, for instance,
that in Daily Mail the newspaper had learned the name of the juvenile
murder suspect by speaking with civilian witnesses, police, and an as-
sistant prosecutor.459 And the allegations against the upstate New
York prosecutor accused of raping teenager Tawana Brawley were first
publicized not by government officials, but by the alleged victim's ci-
vilian advisers, the Reverend Al Sharpton among them.46° This reality
would seem to defeat the protection proposed here, because I do not
suggest any constraints on publicity by the media.46' But being forced
to discover identifying information on its own would require the press
to make a true newsworthiness decision, or at least a more refined
one, in order to decide whether or not to devote resources to finding
out the name of an arrestee or suspect. The inevitable result should
be less unwarranted naming. Regarding arrestees, in the forty-eight
hours or so between the time of arrest and the initial court appear-
ance, the press could investigate for identifying information if it
wished; or, it could await the hearing to decide whether or not the
case merited more scrutiny, with or without a judicial probable cause
finding.
On the other hand, a government practice of not naming crimi-
nal accusees until that finding, based on a statute forbidding it, could
encourage the press to hew to the expression of principle and popular
will that that practice and statute represent. "Our government is the
459. Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 99 (1979).
460. See supra note 58.
461. Recall too, though, that in Horida Star the Court left open the possibility of punish-
ing the press for disclosures that violate carefully tailored privacy protections. See supra text
at notes 250-252.
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potent, the omnipresent teacher," Justice Brandeis wrote, and "it
teaches the whole people by its example. 462 That the press volunta-
rily refrains from identifying sexual assault complainants and juvenile
offenders, among others, indicates that it is not impervious to public
understandings of privacy and commensurate protections. Even if the
press did not honor the right, a public that has chosen, by statute, not
to name arrestees and suspects before judicial findings of probable
cause would presumably discount early identifications by the press ac-
cordingly, knowing the accusation does not yet bear the imprimatur
of official endorsement and waiting out a probable cause finding (at
least) before making much of the everyday criminal accusation.
The press is, moreover, most likely to devote its attention to three
types of cases-those that (1) are especially titillating or lurid, (2) in-
volve celebrities, or (3) involve public officials. Regarding the first
category, I concede there may be little that can be done. The hand-
some California man suspected (and eventually convicted) of killing
his pregnant wife in 2004; the serial suspects in the kidnapping of the
young girl in Utah in 2002; the veteran middle-school gym coach in
suburban Washington, D.C., accused of molesting several of his stu-
dents in 2000; and let us not forget the wealthy Colorado couple
whose six-year-old beauty-queen daughter was found strangled inside
her home over Christmas in 1996 46 -the voracious public appetite,
462. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
463. In the weeks after fourteen-year-old Elizabeth Smart was kidnapped from her Salt
Lake City home, police named at least four individuals as possible suspects, and the press
spread the word. See Kevin Cantera & Michael Vigh, Police Eye Relatives in Probe; One Police
Theory: The Abduction of Teen Was Staged to Look Forced; Police Extend Search for Girl Into Idaho,
SALT LAKE TRIB., June 13, 2002, at Al (reporting that the police released the name and
photo of a man, the location of whom was unknown, saying he "was not a suspect but is
wanted for questioning in the [Elizabeth Smart case]," and the photo "quickly appeared in
news accounts nationwide"); 'Most Wanted'Airs an Update, DESERT NEWS, June 16, 2002, at
A16 (reporting on the nationwide television program that announced police interest in
the suspect); Michael Vigh & Stephen Hunt, Convict Placed at 'Top of the List' in Smart Case,
SALT LAKE TruB., June 25, 2002, at BI (reporting the police announcement that a different
man, a handyman arrested on unrelated charges, is at the "top of the list" of potential
suspects in the Smart case); Michael Vigh & Kevin Cantera, 3 Ex-Cons at Heart of Probe;
Prison Pals All Worked in Smart Neighborhood; New Reward of $25,000 Offered by Police, FBI, SALT
LA TRuB., July 4, 2002, at Cl (reporting the police "focus" in the investigation on the
previously named handyman and two others with whom he worked, both of whom police
had already located and interviewed). The lead "potential" suspect-the first handyman-
died in prison, weeks after he was named and months before he was cleared of suspicion by
the arrest (and ultimate conviction) of two entirely different people. His widow's subse-
quent lawsuit against government officials for, inter alia, wrongful death, false imprison-
ment, and slander has been settled with the Utah Department of Corrections, but is still
pending against the Salt Lake City Police Department. See Matt Canham, A Bittersweet Day
forAngela Ricci, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 13, 2003, at A8; Pamela Manson, Ricci Lawsuit Ordered
to Halt; Baseless? A Magistrate Wants Pretrial Activity Put on Hold Until Another Judge Decides
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or at least press appetite, for such stories may very well vanquish any
attempt to protect from the media the privacy of individuals like
these, whether or not they are ever formally accused by police or
charged by prosecutors. As for the second category, celebrities, while
the press will certainly pursue with vigor any criminal suspicion that
attaches to them, celebrities enjoy protections that everyday citizens
do not have. To begin with, a celebrity's exoneration, or the dismissal
of charges against her, typically gets almost as much public attention
as the initial arrest or accusation. Even if it does not, the celebrity has
the ability to rebut false or unfounded charges on as public a stage as
that on which they were lodged.4 6 4 And even if the unfounded accu-
sation remains in the public mind, the public typically has more infor-
mation than the accusation alone upon which to judge the celebrity
(should it wish to do so), so the danger of a celebrity's being
(mis)represented by unfounded criminal suspicion is less.4 65 Public
officials, for their part, enjoy to some degree the same protections as
celebrities. (It could be argued, moreover, that criminal accusations
against public officials are more newsworthy than those against private
citizens and therefore deserve the extra attention they may garner-
perhapsjust as much when the charges are dismissed as when they are
substantiated.)
The protection would also not be particularly helpful in keeping
the fact of one's arrest or suspicion a secret from those in one's neigh-
borhood and immediate community; such news travels well in small
circles. Nor is it of much use with respect to total strangers who hear
the news of one's arrest but never have occasion or reason to translate
any judgment they may make into a meaningful decision about that
person-i.e., whether or not to employ her, to leave children in her
care, to become her client or patient, to be her friend. But people
one will never meet are people with respect to whom privacy protec-
tion is needed least. And people in one's closest circles are both more
likely to learn of a subsequent exoneration or dismissal and less likely
Whether to Dismiss the Case, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 17, 2004, at B3. See also Brigid Schulte,
Accusation Was Agony for Teacher; Man Says False Charge Is Educator's Nightmare, WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 2000, at Al (reporting the ordeal of a Maryland gym teacher falsely accused by
students of sexual misconduct). For the latest on the still-unsolved 1996 killing of child
beauty queen Jon Benet Ramsey, see Alicia Caldwell, Judge Dismisses Ramsey Libel Lawsuit;
Taken in its Entirety, the Ruling Said, A Fox News Report Did Not Imply the Family Was Involved in
the 1996 Slaying ofJonBenet, DENVER POST, Jan. 9, 2005, at C2.
464. See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) ("Public officials and
public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the channels of effective commu-
nication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than
private individuals normally enjoy.").
465. Id. at 345.
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(one would hope) to be influenced by unsubstantiated charges, be-
cause, again, they have more information on which to base a judg-
ment than merely the fact of arrest or suspicion.
466
Ultimately, the protection is aimed at the sphere of people in be-
tween strangers and intimates, the vast body of people an individual
does not know but might run into in the course of daily life.
4 67 Fellow
shoppers at the supermarket, actual or potential business associates,
patients or clients, current and future employers, prospective lovers
and friends-this is the sphere of people who, upon hearing one has
been accused of crime, likely know little more than that fact about the
person, including what ultimately came of the charges. These are the
people who will, understandably, link the person with the criminal
allegation and vice-versa, judging him or her accordingly, thus mis-
judging the innocent arrestee or suspect. These are the people whom
we do not necessarily want to know any of a wide range of information
about our past or present-not our medical conditions; not our finan-
cial status; not our sexual habits, or our favorite magazines; and not
the fact that we have been arrested for, or suspected of, a crime we did
not commit, or at least one for which we were never prosecuted.
These are people who, however much they may want to know this in-
formation, do not need to know it, and should not.
4 68
466. See supra note 237; see also Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy, supra note 48, at 984
("Information that may be widely known in some circles, may be inappropriate to reveal in
others."); id. at 980-81, 990-91 (discussing the nature of the audience to whom embarrass-
ing facts are disclosed as a salient aspect of privacy).
467. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 37 (Cal. 1971) ("Men fear expo-
sure not only to those closest to them; much of the outrage underlying the asserted right to
privacy is a reaction to exposure to persons known only through business or other secon-
dary relationships. The claim is not so much one of total secrecy as it is the right to define
one's circle of intimacy . . ").
468. Interestingly, the public appears to agree. A 2001 DOJ study found that, on the
question of how much access the public should have to criminal history information about
others, fully 66% of respondents saw a difference between records of convictions and
records of only arrests. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC
ATTITUDES TOWARD USES OF CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION: A PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY AND
CRIMINALJUSTICE INFORMATION REPORT 5, 36 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Bulletin No. NCJ
187663, July 2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/pauchi.pdf. More-
over, while half or somewhat more of respondents said they would support access to "ar-
rest-only" records by military recruiters, potential employers for "sensitive" work (such as
"handling money, dealing with children, or serving as security guards"), and private organi-
zations that involve children (such as the Boy Scouts), only 15% would grant access to
those records by all employers or government licensing agencies (while some 30% would
ban access by those entities), and less than a quarter would allow access to arrest-only
records by reporters seeking information about political candidates, banks deciding on
personal loan applications, and individuals "wanting to learn if a neighbor has any criminal
record." Id. at 5, 36, 67-68.
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CONCLUSION
Consider the following front-page news item from a recent
morning:
The F.B.I. is investigating a Pentagon official on suspicion of
passing secrets to Israel, government officials said Friday.
The espionage investigation has focused on an official who
works in the office of Douglas Feith, the under secretary of
defense for policy, officials who have been briefed about the
investigation said. The F.B.I. has gathered evidence that the
official passed classified policy documents to officials at the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee, a major pro-Is-
raeli lobbying group, which in turn provided the informa-
tion to Israeli intelligence, the officials said.
Several government officials identified the official who was
under investigation, but he could not be immediately
reached for comment about the accusations.
Neither the official under suspicion nor anyone else associ-
ated with the case has been arrested, the officials said....
Justice Department officials declined to comment on the
matter .... 469
We know from this story that the government is investigating a
certain person for a certain crime. We know the investigation is ongo-
ing but has not reached the arrest stage. We know, from the above
excerpt and the remainder of the news story, the implications of this
investigation and potential crime-viz., the possible compromise of
national security information and other improper contacts between a
government official, U.S. citizens, and another country.4 7 ° We know
the office in which the suspect works, and we know the suspect is
male. All we don't know is his name.47 1 Do we want to know his
name? Absolutely. Hearing a crime report without learning the name
of the alleged offender feels incomplete and unsatisfying; it is an ex-
perience of titillatio interruptus, creating a sensation not dissimilar to
469. James Risen, Pentagon Official Suspected of Giving U.S. Secrets to Israel, N.Y. TiMES, Aug.
28, 2004, at Al.
470. "Some of the classified information that investigators suspect was passed to Israel
dealt with sensitive discussions about the United States' position toward Iran," the article
tells us, and "[a]s a result, the investigation is likely to give rise to questions about whether
Israel may have used the information to influence American policy in the Middle East." Id.
471. Nor, curiously, is there any explanation for its absence, though the author of the
news story clearly knows it.
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the sensation one might have upon-upon not finding an end to this
sentence, for instance. We are used to hearing the name.
But do we need to know it? The newspaper story addresses a mat-
ter that surely is "newsworthy" under any definition of the term. But is
the suspect's name an essential aspect of that newsworthiness? What
use will the everyday reader make of that additional information?
What life decisions will it inform? What meaningful purpose will it
serve? The overwhelming majority of people who read the story will
not recognize the name; they do not know the man and never will
have any contact with him. Those readers who know him well likely
already know about the investigation, and in any case have access to
other information about him beyond the fact that the government
suspects him of this serious wrongdoing. And what about readers who
are not complete strangers to him, but are also not close enough to
him to know more-his physician; the parents of his children's school
friends; a potential future employer or client; his barber; his next-
door neighbor? What use will these people make of this information,
other than to view him differently-forever? Why should they be
given this information and empowered to make judgments and deci-
sions on the basis of it, when the FBI has not yet even decided to
arrest him? Enough information is out for the public to monitor the
case and follow it up for any hint of impropriety. The suspect himself
is free to speak out if he feels the government is mistreating him. And
it bears reminding, we do not get even this much information about
the vast majority of individuals who are suspected of crime, investi-
gated for it, but never charged.
I ask again: do we really have to know his name? Very well, then:
it is Larry Franklin. We learn that from a news story in the same news-
paper, by the same author, on the very next day, which tells us that
suspect Franklin is cooperating with the FBI investigation.
472 How
much did we lose in the twenty-four hours we did not know Mr. Frank-
lin's name? How much have we gained by learning it? And why, in
the end, was it entirely up to the FBI (and the reporter) whether and
when Mr. Franklin should be named, rather than a collective decision
via legislation? One thing is certain: Larry Franklin has lost a great
deal from the disclosure. Let us hope Mr. Franklin is guilty, lest his
outing as a criminal suspect-the public revelation of this stigmatizing
472. James Risen, FBI. Said to Reach Official Suspected of Passing Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
29, 2004, at Al. To conduct the same exercise with news of an arrest, see, for example,
Shaila K Dewan, Man Is Shot for Cellphone on Busy Day of Mayhem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2004,
at B3 (naming, after describing a number of shooting incidents, two men arrested in con-
nection with them).
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fact, a fact people will remember about him and judge him by for the
rest of his life-prove to be little more than the wrongful and unnec-
essary branding of an innocent man.
